Ambiguous Signaling in Regulatory Conversations How Miscommunication and Hierarchy Hamper Voluntary Regulatee Cooperation

AuthorAute Kasdorp,Leonie Schakel
DOI10.1177/00953997211047867
Published date01 May 2022
Date01 May 2022
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/00953997211047867
Administration & Society
2022, Vol. 54(5) 903 –938
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00953997211047867
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Article
Ambiguous Signaling
in Regulatory
Conversations How
Miscommunication
and Hierarchy Hamper
Voluntary Regulatee
Cooperation
Aute Kasdorp1 and Leonie Schakel1
Abstract
This case study investigates interactions between inspectors and regulatee
representatives during regulatory conversations. We study how health care
inspectors pursue voluntary cooperation from internal supervisors of health
care providers to alter organizational management practices. We identify
ambiguity as a central characteristic of the regulatory conversations. We
observe several discrepancies as inspectors display hierarchical behavior
incongruent with the horizontal relationship they aim for—and incongruent
with the relationship style that internal supervisors expect. Analyzing
these discrepancies in terms of relationship types and associated relational
signals helps explain and prevent suboptimal communication and reduced
acceptance of regulators’ demands by regulatees.
Keywords
relational signaling, voluntary cooperation, regulatory conversations,
relationship style, shadow of hierarchy
1Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Corresponding Author:
Leonie Schakel, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, Rotterdam, 3062
PA, The Netherlands.
Email: LSchakel@nza.nl
1047867AAS0010.1177/00953997211047867Administration & SocietyKasdorp and Schakel
research-article2021
904 Administration & Society 54(5)
Introduction
Studies aiming to understand interactions between representatives of public
regulators (inspectors) and regulatee representatives are often limited to
exploring the perspective of the regulator and their inspectors’ regulatory
enforcement style, separately from regulatees’ compliance motivations and
perceptions of these interactions (Li & Van Rooij, 2021; Pautz et al., 2017).
Such regulatory interactions nevertheless appear to be important sites of con-
flicts and disputes due to misunderstandings and discrepancies between
mutual perceptions that take place in this hierarchical setting (Black, 2002; V.
Braithwaite et al., 1994; Etienne, 2012; Gilad, 2014; Mascini & Wijk, 2009).
Studies that do take into account both perspectives showed how inspectors
were unable to accurately communicate their intentions, while regulatee rep-
resentatives were unable to recognize cooperative intentions and perceived
regulators as punitive and/or inconsistent (Mascini & Wijk, 2009; May &
Wood, 2003; Winter & May, 2001). They also show how regulatory interac-
tions are perceived differs depending on the regulatee representative (Li &
Van Rooij, 2021) and context (Carter & Siddiki, 2021). These studies imply
a need to better understand regulatory interactions in a way that incorporates
regulatees’ perceptions of these interactions and the implications for compli-
ance (Pautz et al., 2017, p. 103). This need is especially salient in the absence
of readily enforceable norms because in such a context inspectors need to
persuade rather than force regulatees to comply with the norms that they
advance (Black, 2009).
We apply Etienne’s (2012) relational signaling framework to study regula-
tory interactions from the perspective of both inspectors and regulatee repre-
sentatives. More particularly, this article examines interactions of inspectors
with members of internal supervisory boards of regulated organizations—a
group that has not been a focal point for such empirical research before. In the
three case studies we present, Dutch health care regulators—the Dutch Health
and Youth Care Inspectorate (Inspectorate) and the Dutch Healthcare
Authority (NZa)—were concerned that poor executive management of the
regulated organization would adversely affect the public interest, and they
perceived the executives of the health care providers to be ineffective or
unwilling to improve the quality of management of their organizations.1 But
what constitutes good or poor organizational management may be subjective
and may not be articulated in detail by (enforceable) law. So, obtaining vol-
untary regulatee cooperation is essential. In response, the regulators searched
for new approaches and collaborated with members of the internal supervi-
sory board of the regulated organizations (a discursive form of “meta-regula-
tion,” see Black, 2002, p. 172 and Ottow, 2015) to nevertheless address the
Kasdorp and Schakel 905
problem. But if there is no readily enforceable norm underlying such attempts,
how do inspectors pursue voluntary cooperation from regulatees in those
regulatory conversations? And, specifically, what role does hierarchy play in
such attempts? That is the focus of the research reported here.
We study the regulatory interactions between inspectors and regulatee rep-
resentatives by identifying and analyzing the displayed behavior and the sub-
jective relationship styles (Freeman, 1985; Huitema & Van Snellenberg,
1999; May & Wood, 2003). We derive the displayed behavior by identifying
the behavior both parties observed during their interaction, making use of the
relational signaling theory as elaborated by Etienne (2012). We derive the
subjective relationship style by asking both parties about their intentions and
perceptions of the relationship (Huitema & Van Snellenberg, 1999; May &
Wood, 2003). Comparing the displayed behavior and the subjective relation-
ship styles brought several discrepancies to the fore that help us understand
regulatory interaction outcomes. A better understanding of this dynamic may
help to more fully illuminate how voluntary cooperation might be obtained,
what role hierarchy plays in this process, and how in such a context regula-
tory relationships evolve and regulatory objectives can be achieved (comp.
Pautz & Wamsley, 2012).
Next, we first provide an overview of relevant regulatory relationship
theory and the methods we have used. We then present our findings and con-
clude with a discussion addressing our research question:
Research Question 1: How do inspectors pursue voluntary cooperation
from regulatees?
Theoretical Framework
Relevant Extant Theory
Whether a regulator primarily aims to elicit voluntary regulatee cooperation
or to establish deterrence is a matter of supervisory strategy, or more particu-
larly agency enforcement philosophy (May & Burby, 1998). To what extent
this voluntary cooperation is sought also where there is no readily enforce-
able norm underlying such attempts, as in our case studies, may depend not
only on the regulator’s discretionary attitude toward its supervisory mandate
(Kasdorp, 2016) but also on individual inspectors’ preferences and enforce-
ment style (Kasdorp & Zijlstra 2020). Our case studies focus on the ensuing
interaction via face-to-face regulatory conversations (Black, 2002) between
inspectors and regulatee representatives and the individual cognition and
decision-making in the context of those conversations. Our theoretical

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