Altruistic humanism and voluntary beneficent euthanasia.

• Author: Kohl, Marvin

I wish to begin with a passage from the writings of Mahatma Gandhi:

I see there is an instinctive horror of killing living beings under any circumstances whatever. For instance, an alternative has been sug- gested in the shape of confining even rabid dogs in a certain place and allowing them to die a slow death. Now my idea of compassion makes this thing impossible for me. I cannot for a moment bear to see a dog, or for that matter any other living being, helplessly suffering the torture of a slow death. I do not kill a human being thus circumstanced because I have more hopeful remedies. I should kill a dog similarly situated because in its case I am without a remedy. Should my child be attacked with rabies and there was no helpful remedy to relieve his agony, I should consider it my duty to take his life.

Gandhi understood that, in at least one situation, the great trinity-- benevolence, beneficence, and caring love requires that we take a life.

It is clear that he is speaking about a definite duty, an obligation that is strict and exact, enjoining itself upon the agent in an absolute manner. What is not clear is whether such a special duty is limited to parents or emergency situations. I believe Gandhi would follow me in saying that it is not. The intuition, albeit not a simple one, is that in certain circumstances it is a kindness to end a life and that, from the perspective of what I call altruistic humanism, it is morally permissible, if not obligatory, to do so. I will attempt to explain why this is so.

A Theory of Humanism

Humanism is a system of thought and action that makes human welfare the measure and end of all moral and political endeavors. While welfare is the measure and end, knowledge and the supportive dispositions (strong benevolence and caring love) are the major means. I have discussed the importance of having an adequate theory of belief elsewhere. Here I shall confine my attention to the non-epistemic foundations of humanism, especially the roles of kindness and caring love.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to define welfare successfully. We can in a preliminary way say, when speaking of individuals, that the welfare of X somehow involves the well-being and happiness of X. Perhaps a better way of characterizing what is meant by welfare is to say that it is the more-than-minimal satisfaction and protection of the means of satisfying basic individual needs and correlate interests, as well as the other fundamental interests a society would want to protect if it were fully rational and inspired by love.

By love I mean the kind of relationship between persons or things in which the object of this emotion is a delight to contemplate and in which, if the object is a living being, there is a strong disposition to protect or promote the welfare of that individual. In other words, I wish to distinguish between benevolent love and what I have called caring love.(3) Both kinds of affection involve a direct concern for the good--that is, the happiness and well-being of a person or the welfare of a beloved object. The essential difference between benevolent love and caring love is that the former is often limited to inert concern, while the latter involves, by its very nature, active concern.

Formally, the difference is as follows: If X benevolently loves Y, X must cherish the well-being and happiness of Y, but X need do no more than wish Y well. However, if X caringly loves Y, X is deeply concerned about the welfare of Y (that is, more actively disposed, or more committed, to help Y); largely--but not only--because of this X will intervene in Y's life if that action, in the context of Y's life, is necessary to protect an important good or prevent a serious harm.

Here, however, it seems as though we have a contradictory message concerning the relationship of caring love and the threatened or proposed death of a loved one. On the one hand, if Barbara loves George and if, unknown to George, his life is threatened immediately by deadly force, then Barbara, given the usual caveats about the limits of reasonable action, is required to help George, especially if she is the only one in a position to do so. The rough but fundamental intuition is that death is a great--probably often the greatest--loss, that the greater the threat, the greater the need to protect a beloved against it.

On the other hand, suppose George has lymphoma and is dying. He has consulted several physicians and exhausted various forms of therapy. He has worked during the course of the illness and enjoyed the company of his family. But when he can no longer feed himself, control his excretory functions, or even enjoy looking upon the face of his beloved Barbara, he asks her to help him die. Barbara consents. She does so as a caring wife or lover. Her dominant motivation is helpfulness, that of preventing needless suffering and providing George with a "good death," or at least a better death than it would otherwise be. Here the fundamental intuition is that death is a friend, that its goodness resides in its helpfulness (especially in the badness of what it prevents as well as the badness of what it ends), and that helping George die is an act of caring love. Notice that, although the situations differ significantly the proposition concerning the moral validity of Barbara's helping George to die and that of Gandhi in respect to his son are essentially the same.

Strong benevolence and disinterested beneficence work, but love is better. For love adds emotional bonding and commitment to strong benevolence. Moreover, love at its fullest demonstrates a higher level of commitment, a...