“Although Burdened, Do We Need to Do More?” Street-Level Bureaucrats’ Organizational Citizenship Behaviors in Poverty Alleviation Policy Implementation

• Published date: 01 November 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00953997241268163
• Author: Suyang Yu
• Date: 01 November 2024

https://doi.org/10.1177/00953997241268163

Administration & Society

2024, Vol. 56(9-10) 1212 –1244

© The Author(s) 2024

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DOI: 10.1177/00953997241268163

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Article

“Although Burdened,

Do We Need to

Do More?” Street-

Level Bureaucrats’

Organizational

Citizenship Behaviors

in Poverty Alleviation

Policy Implementation

Suyang Yu1

Abstract

Drawing on attentional resource allocation theory and transaction cost the-

ory, this study links street-level bureaucrats’ problem-solving organizational

citizenship behaviors with perceived administrative burden. Based on 28 in-

depth interviews and 657 survey responses from street-level bureaucrats

involved in China’s Targeted Poverty Alleviation Policy during 2019 and 2020,

the study found positive relationships between problem-solving organizational

citizenship behaviors, resource deficiency, bureaucratic control, and perceived

administrative burden. Policymakers should be cautious when using control

tools and avoid exploiting street-level bureaucrats’ commitment and com-

passion for clients to ensure effectively policy implementation and reduce

administrative burdens on dedicated public servants.

1University of Illinois, Springfield, IL, USA

Corresponding Author:

Suyang Yu, School of Public Management and Policy, Center for State Policy and Leadership,

University of Illinois at Springfield, One University Plaza, PAC Building, Room 422, Springfield,

IL 62703, USA.

Email: syu70@uis.edu

1268163AAS0010.1177/00953997241268163Administration & SocietyYu

research-article2024

Yu 1213

Keywords

organizational citizenship behavior, street-level bureaucrats, administrative

burden, mixed-method research, bureaucratic control

Introduction

Street-level bureaucrats’ policy implementation strategies, coping behav-

iors and related policy outcomes have been studied widely in developed

and developing countries for decades. In his seminal work, Lipsky (1980)

defined street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) as “teachers, social workers, coun-

selors, police officers, and other public workers, who regularly interact

with citizens in the course of their jobs” (p. xi). SLBs’ work routines involve

considerable decision-making and the exercise of discretion during policy

implementation and service delivery, such as judging recipients’ eligibility,

allocating resources and benefits, and issuing sanctions, all of which have

extensive impacts on citizens (Lipsky, 1980; Scott, 1997; Sorg, 1983).

Often, SLBs confront both significant demands and requests from their

clients and commands and formal and informal requirements from their

supervisors (Hill, 2003; Keiser & Soss, 1998; May & Winter, 2009). Yet,

SLBs may not fully respond to such needs and commands due to insufficient

resources, goal conflicts, or unattainable idealized expectations (Resh &

Pitts, 2013). For example, teachers, although underpaid and understaffed,

may have to work extra hours to give each student enough attention (Dizon-

Ross et al., 2019). SLBs also must follow rules during policy implementa-

tion, but the ambiguity and uncertainty of some rules and the associated red

tape may increase their workload, stress, and negative evaluations of policies

(Brewer & Walker, 2010; Heinrich, 2018; Linos & Riesch, 2020; Scott &

Pandey, 2000). Moynihan et al. (2015) conceptualized such compliance,

learning, and psychological costs during policy implementation and service

delivery as individuals’ administrative burden. In an earlier version, Burden

et al. (2012) defined administrative burden as “an individual’s experience of

policy implementation as onerous,” and noted that the individual could be

“either a member of the public or a public official” (p. 742). Building on the

categories of bureaucratic encounters within or external to organizations (or

governments), Heinrich (2016, 2018) proposed a theoretical framework for

analyzing four types of administrative burden initiated by and directed at

various levels of governments and citizen clients.

Current studies have focused on administrative burdens experienced by

citizens or clients (see Baekgaard et al., 2021; Christensen et al., 2020; Hattke,

2020; Heinrich et al., 2022), which are obviously important, but it seems clear

1214 Administration & Society 56(9-10)

that administrative burden is not limited to citizens. When dedicated public

servants have the ability to provide effective services undercut by administra-

tive burden, it warrants attention and perhaps new directions in theory.

Arguably, SLBs’ administrative burden experiences during policy imple-

mentation are different from the “red tape” they may encounter. According to

Bozeman (1993), red tape includes “rules, regulations and procedures that

remain in force and entail a compliance burden for the organization but make

no contribution to achieving the rules’ functional objectives” (p. 283). In a

recent study, van Loon et al. (2016) regard red tape as a “two-dimensional

construct that includes compliance burden and lack of functionality” and takes

“a job-centered approach that measures red tape experienced by employees in

their jobs rather than more generally in the organization” (p. 662). As a dys-

functional aspect of policies and rules, red tape may impose compliance bur-

dens on implementers, but it is not equal to policy implementers’ experienced

administrative burden in terms of constructs, measures, and policy implica-

tions (Baekgaard & Tankink, 2021; Bozeman & Youtie, 2020; Madsen et al.,

2021). This is because regardless of whether a policy faces red tape, policy

implementers may still be burdened by it but generate sufficient social bene-

fits for clients (Bozeman & Youtie, 2020). Using empirical data, Stanica et al.

(2022) demonstrated that complicated rules increase frontline law enforce-

ment officers’ reported administrative burden in Romania.

In a burdensome policy implementation context, given the limited time,

information, and resources necessary to respond to all individual cases prop-

erly, SLBs may develop various coping strategies to address their heavy

workload and stress and to balance various policy requirements and goals

(Chang & Brewer, 2023; Hupe et al., 2015; May & Winter, 2009; Tummers

et al., 2015). Built on the hierarchically structured coping strategies devel-

oped by Skinner et al. (2003), Tummers et al. (2015) conceptualized and

categorized SLB coping behaviors during service delivery into three group-

ings: moving toward clients (e.g., using personal resources to help clients),

moving away from clients (e.g., rationing), and moving against clients (e.g.,

following rules rigidly).

This article focuses on one type of coping behavior that moves toward

clients—SLBs’ organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) and their related

costs. Using attentional resource allocation theory and transaction cost the-

ory, the study aims to link the costs of SLBs’ OCBs with their perceived

administrative burden to answer three questions. First, how can policy

resource status and bureaucratic control tools affect SLBs’ policy implemen-

tation behaviors? Second, what is the relationship between SLBs’ OCBs and

their perceived administrative burden? Third, how do policy resource status

and bureaucratic control affect the relationship between SLBs’ OCBs and

perceived administrative burden?