Alternation through Death: Is Gerontocracy an Equilibrium?

• Author: Raul Magni Berton,Sophie Panel
• Published date: 01 December 2018
• Date: 01 December 2018
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918775251
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918775251

Political Research Quarterly

2018, Vol. 71(4) 975 –988

© 2018 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912918775251

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Article

Introduction

This article aims to demonstrate that gerontocracy pro-

duces domestic peace. According to the minimal theory

of democracy, the reason why civil wars are less frequent

in democracies is that opposition parties can expect a

leadership change in a foreseeable future: although they

would be better off in the short run rebelling rather than

complying, they are better off in the long run complying

if they have a reasonable chance of winning the next elec-

tions (Przeworski 1999). In dictatorships, waiting until

the dictator dies is generally much costlier. This waiting

time, however, is shortened when the dictator is old.

Therefore, the risk of domestic conflict should decrease

along with the age of leaders.

This peace-inducing property of aging leaders might

be a reason why, in primitive and agrarian societies,

elderhood was often associated with high status (Flanagan

1989; Posner 1995) and why, in many systems, the chief

is chosen among the oldest men (Simmons 1945; Spencer

1965). Although gerontocracy is classically explained by

social ties acquired with age or on personal characteris-

tics such as wisdom or knowledge (Werner 1981), it has

been recently demonstrated that old rulers are preferred

because they produce alternation in power (Magni Berton

and Panel 2017). This article investigates a further impli-

cation of the latter hypothesis: if elections in democracies

and gerontocracy in autocracies are indeed functional

equivalents, both should have similar effects on political

violence.

A quick glance at history lends some credence to these

intuitions, as many systems became more stable as they

started institutionalizing gerontocracy. In Venice, most

elected officials were selected for a fix term in office

except for the Doge who was elected for life (Tullock

2002): as a consequence, Doge entered office at age

sixty-eight on average—compared with thirty-three for

European kings during the same period (Eisner 2011).

This combination of mechanisms for limiting incum-

bency has proven fairly stable on the long run, since

Venice experienced few coups or interfamily wars in its

several centuries of existence (Tullock 2002, 252). In the

contemporary period, the USSR experienced widespread

political unrest under Stalin, who took power at age forty-

four, but violent contestation declined under his succes-

sors, who entered office at age sixty-two on average.

During the post-Stalin era, the two oldest Soviet leaders,

Andropov (sixty-eight) and Chernenko (seventy-three)

both had short but peaceful tenures, which ended with

their natural death; the youngest, Gorbachev (fifty-four)

was removed by a coup.

Beside this anecdotal evidence, the relationship

between leaders’ age and internal conflicts has never been

systematically investigated. Although leaders are increas-

ingly considered as one of the main units of analysis in

international relations (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza

775251PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918775251Political Research QuarterlyMagni Berton and Panel

research-article2018

1Université Grenoble Alpes, France

2Sciences Po Grenoble, PACTE, France

3Sciences Po Bordeaux, Centre Emile Durkheim, France

Corresponding Author:

Sophie Panel, Centre Emile Durkheim, Sciences Po Bordeaux, 11 allée

Ausone, F-33607 Pessac, France.

Email: sophie.panel@scpobx.fr

Alternation through Death: Is

Gerontocracy an Equilibrium?

Raul Magni Berton1,2 and Sophie Panel3

Abstract

According to minimalist theories of democracy, the reason why civil conflicts are less frequent in democracies is

that opposition parties can reasonably expect to win the next elections: they then prefer to wait than to rebel. In

dictatorships, waiting until the dictator dies is generally much costlier. This waiting time, however, is considerably

shortened when the dictator is old. Therefore, the risk of domestic conflict should decrease along with the age of

autocratic leaders. Based on 160 countries from 1960 to 2008, our empirical analysis shows that the leader’s age

decreases the likelihood of violent rebellion in dictatorships, but not in democratic regimes.

Keywords

political leaders, dictatorship, intrastate conflict, democracy