The almighty, impotent state: or, the crisis of authority.

• Author: Knag, Sigmund

That government authority is in crisis is not a new idea. A book recently reviewed by me in this journal, Nicholas Kittrie's The War against Authority (1995), demonstrates that political authority must constantly deal with dissidents and rebels. But warnings of crisis have grown frequent and now come from many quarters. The high ambitions of modern government contrast curiously with the actual sentiments voiced by common people, which are frequently cynical and contemptuous.

Although agreement is growing that a crisis of authority exists, there is less agreement regarding its nature and causes. In the following discussion of the crisis of authority, I shall uphold the following contentions.

-- Authority, properly understood and exercised, has a valuable social function that no credible political theory can neglect or deny. Its demise would spell the disintegration of society and the triumph of the rule of force.

-- The very notion of authority has been gravely misunderstood in this century. Authority has been idolized, as in the interwar years, and thoughtlessly rejected, as in the student rebellion of the 1960s.

-- Western governments now have more power than ever, particularly over economic relationships, in part because of the prevailing faith in the Positive State.

-- Despite the preceding contention, present government does not have much authority. The conspicuous contempt for politics and politicians in all Western countries is at odds with the idealistic official conception of government.

-- The government of the "bad old days" was paternalistic, whereas the present kind of Western government may be called maternalistic. The old power was harsh and visible, modern power soft and all-pervasive. The emphasis is now less on justice and punishment and more on propaganda and intervention.

-- Although present government has extensive powers, the exercise of that power requires negotiation with the corporate organizations of business, labor, agriculture, and other groups. In the political culture of the corporate-pluralist state, deal making has supplanted deliberation. Although government has wide powers, any decision it makes is open to challenge and negotiation, and every group must be heard. The authority of government is weak because its powers are great.

-- The weak authority of modern government is particularly obvious and damaging in the governance of its own large institutions (hospitals, schools, and universities and, in many countries, broadcasting and arts institutions).

-- The present kind of government fails in the crucial function of leadership; that is, it does not have the conviction to seize the initiative and give bold direction to the course of events. Maternalism or political correctness leads government to doubt itself. The consensus-seeking and deal-making components of corporate pluralism bind its hands and feet with a thousand vague promises to a thousand interest groups. Its activist philosophy makes it dizzy with the burden of conflicting duties. Incapable of acting vigorously in the public interest, it has power but lacks authority.

-- We need to restore the authority of government. But doing so means rejecting the idea of the Positive State. More authority requires less government. It also means a more local government, whose citizens can better understand and influence it, even identify with it. And it means a more democratic government, where citizens can effectively protest, undo decisions they disapprove, and place limits on government's powers.

The Nature and Function of Political Authority

As an element of political theory, authority is one of the few fundamental concepts. As an element of the social order, it performs a crucial function. Yet it is shrouded in mystery and surrounded by controversy. To discuss authority fruitfully, we must know what we are talking about.(1) Given the complexity and fundamentality of the concept of authority, no brief definition will do. We must arrive at understanding by gradually recognizing its characteristics.

Authority is a special social status enjoyed by an institution or person. Someone in authority speaks with a particular weight that can move people to concerted action. Authority thus enables leadership and social order. It is not the mere possession of superior strength, or power: essentially a social and spiritual fact, it depends on attitudes and perceptions and rests on legitimacy, that is, on the consent or respect or awe of the people.

Authority can be tied to a person, position, office, institution, or doctrine. It can also reside in particular persons because of their character or background, perhaps their determination, farsightedness, justice, charity, charm, family, fame, or fitness for the times.

Authority is needed, and found, in many fields. Pastors have religious authority, based on their insight into religious issues, personal fitness for such office, place in an ecclesiastical organization (the ordainment lends authority), and commitment to their flock. Judges have legal authority based on training, impartiality, and place in a court system. Similarly, authority can be possessed by businessmen, teachers, landowners, and other professionals.

Authority, as discussed here so far, is a broad social phenomenon. Political authority, which involves the right to use force, is a special variety of the broader thing. Needed for political work, it flows from persons and from their offices or positions. Its core is weight and tradition--we are more likely to defer to an institution of long standing. Other kinds of authority, such as spiritual or moral authority, rest more or less on the power of example, and do not presume the right to use force.

As a style of communication, authority lies between coercion and persuasion. In coercing, one says, "Do as I say, or else...!" In persuading, one says, "Look here, you really should...." One with authority essentially says, "Do it because I say so." Authority does not give reasons, nor does it threaten; it speaks weightily and expects obedience. For example, a teacher who tells a pupil to be quiet and pay attention is exercising authority; she neither threatens nor pleads nor gives reasons; she speaks firmly and with a sense of conviction of her right to act as she does, and the pupil tends to do as he is told. Similar expressions of authority occur when an employer gives an instruction to an employee, a parent lays down the law to a child, or a jury renders a verdict.

The word authority is of Latin origin. The Roman Republic distinguished among three related political qualities: potestas was the ensemble of an official's rights and powers; imperium was the power to issue commands in legal form backed by coercive sanction; and auctoritas was the right of the Senate to issue weighty counsel to the executive. In his Romisches Staatsrecht, Theodor Mommsen described the auctoritas of the Roman Senate as "less than command [Befehl] and more than consultation [Rathschlag]" (1888, 3:1033ff.). It carried significant weight but no absolute binding power.

Legitimacy and authority reflect each other: the legitimacy of one's rule confers authority on it. Authority is exercised by the ruler; legitimacy is granted by the subjects. A crisis of authority, then, is equally a crisis of legitimacy. In both cases the issue is the relation between rulers and ruled.

Both profound and highly readable, Guglielmo Ferrero's The Principles of Power (1942) is a commendable analysis of the social function of legitimacy. According to Ferrero, "Principles of legitimacy are justifications of power, that is, of the right to rule" (22). He defines government as "legitimate if power is conferred and exercised according to principles and rules accepted without question by those who must obey" (135). The two essential principles of legitimacy are the monarchic or aristocratic, in which power is transferred according to rules of succession, and the democratic, in which it is transferred according to election. Each can function well if adhered to correctly. Legitimacy's valuable social function is to civilize and humanize government by removing the reciprocal fear between the governors and the governed, thereby reducing their destructive mutual use of naked force to oppress or to rebel (chap. 4). Legitimacy implies a measure of mutual trust between the rulers and the ruled and largely replaces force with authority. Ferrero therefore calls the principles of legitimacy "the invisible genii of the city" (that is, of the political community). But neither principle of legitimacy is entirely rational and neither can remove fear and reduce force at a stroke. Each needs time to establish itself, being essentially psychological and subjective in its effect.

Political leadership is the exercise of political authority to seize the initiative and move policy in a certain direction. Political leaders seek to give direction to the masses, who cannot be commanded, only swayed. The leaders use the legitimacy of their positions to exercise influence on the course of political and perhaps social and economic affairs.

Pure force does not constitute authority; force and authority are different and complementary...