Allocation of Fault and Products Liability: a Comment on Safety Products and Human Error

• Jurisdiction: Alaska,United States
• Publication year: 2002
• Citation: Vol. 19

§ 19 Alaska L. Rev. 141. ALLOCATION OF FAULT AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A COMMENT ON SAFETY PRODUCTS AND HUMAN ERROR

Alaska Law Review
Volume 19
Cited: 19 Alaska L. Rev. 141

ALLOCATION OF FAULT AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A COMMENT ON SAFETY PRODUCTS AND HUMAN ERROR

THOMAS V. VAN FLEIN ^[*]

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THE DECISION IN GMC V. FARNSWORTH AS A CASE STUDY

A. The Facts and Ruling

B. Reasoning Behind the Decision in GMC v. Farnsworth

C. Implications of the Decision in GMC v. Farnsworth

III. AN OVERVIEW OF ALLOCATION OF FAULT IN ALASKA

A. The Genesis of Safety Products

B. History of Allocation of Fault in Alaska

C. Conflict Between Allocation of Fault and Strict Liability

D. Current Application of Comparative Fault Principles in Products Liability Cases Involving Safety Products

IV. SAFETY PRODUCTS: CONSUMER MARKETING AND PRODUCT DESIGN THAT ANTICIPATES NEGLIGENCE

A. Role of Human Error in Product Development

B. The Role of Human Error and Safety Helmets

V. CONCLUSION

FOOTNOTES

This Comment examines Alaska law regarding products liability and the application of allocation of fault principles. It begins with an analysis of products liability as a non-fault based doctrine that nevertheless encounters fault-based principles when comparative fault is evaluated. The Comment describes a subcategory of products that the author calls "safety products," those products that are specially designed and conceived to account for human error or negligence. The author contends that within this product subcategory lies the potential to virtually immunize safety product manufacturers for manufacturing defective products when pure allocation of fault principles are applied. The author questions whether the legislature or the courts should examine if such a reduction in potential liability comports with the purposes of products liability law and fundamental fairness.

I. INTRODUCTION

In most litigation involving injury from a defective product, an attempt to allocate fault represents the judicious weighing of factors that allows the trier of fact to assess blame for the real cause of an incident and impose liability for damages. If more than one defendant caused the injuries, then more than one defendant shall be liable. Under Alaska law, each defendant will be allocated a specific percentage of fault. ^[1] Similarly, if the plaintiff is found through carelessness, drunkenness or some other mistake in judgment to be [*pg 142] responsible (in whole or part) for his or her injuries, the trier of fact reduces the recovery accordingly. ^[2]

While such pure allocation of fault has its supporters and its opponents, for the moment at least, it is the law in Alaska. ^[3] However, this mechanism for allocating fault does produce an unintended consequence. By reducing the potential damages or eliminating them altogether, the allocation of fault principles may convey partial or whole immunity on safety product manufacturers. ^[4]

Examples of safety products include airbags, ^[5] seat belts, ^[6] gun safeties, safety goggles, machine guards, railings, "child-proof" lids, [*pg 143] lighters ^[7] or matches, safety harnesses, helmets or hard hats, ^[8] safety glass, safety valves (e.g., pressure release valves), smoke detectors, automatic headlights for motorcycles and cars, roll-bars, fire-extinguishers or sprinkler systems, garage door sensors and emergency locator beacons. Although many more safety products undoubtedly exist, this list conveys the types of products at issue here. ^[9]

Each of these products was designed (or the main product was redesigned) and manufactured as a result of documented and consistent human error. If people obeyed all traffic laws, the need for seat belts would be minimal. ^[10] If people obeyed proper gun safety [*pg 144] procedures, even a gun safety mechanism would be superfluous. ^[11] The product design thus has its genesis in human ignorance or just plain carelessness -- the usual defenses offered before the trier of fact when arguing comparative fault. Yet these human attributes are the same faults that would, under a pure allocation of fault analysis, reduce, if not eliminate, liability in the event the safety product failed or was otherwise defective.

This Comment questions that result as a normative judgment and posits that neither the legislature nor the judiciary intended this undesirable result as it undermines the basic goals of products liability. The touchstone of products liability is risk allocation. ^[12] Liability imposed against the product manufacturer for economic and non-economic harm caused to consumers transfers the real costs of defective products to the manufacturers and retailers ^[13] (who profit from the products) rather than the injured consumers or society as a whole. The Alaska Supreme Court has emphasized that the fundamental policy supporting products liability is "to insure that the cost of injuries resulting from defective products are [sic] borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." ^[14]

The manufacturer is obligated to design a product that considers not only its intended use, but also any reasonably foreseeable product use. ^[15] For safety product manufacturers, this includes the [*pg 145] potential negligence of the consumer or a third party. As noted by some courts, manufacturers "are charged with the knowledge that their automobiles will sometimes be involved in an accident or collison, including accidents involving negligent and sometimes even drunk drivers, and to reasonably design and build safe vehicles based upon that knowledge." ^[16]

II. THE DECISION IN GMC V. FARNSWORTH AS A CASE STUDY

A. The Facts and Ruling

The Alaska Supreme Court's decision in GMC v. Farnsworth ^[17] presents a good example of what may be at issue when comparative fault principles, particularly pure allocation of fault among all parties, are applied to safety products cases. In Farnsworth, the consumer plaintiff -- a passenger in a vehicle -- sued the vehicle manufacturer for designing a defective seat restraint system. ^[18] She claimed that the seat belts in the vehicle were defective for shorter than average people and that her indisputably serious injuries "resulted from 'submarining' under her lap belt." ^[19] The court explained:

Farnsworth argued that she had submarined under the lap belt because GM's defective design only protected individuals the size of an average man or larger. Therefore, she claimed, Fennie [the driver], who at 175 pounds and 5'11" was slightly larger than an average sized man, walked away from the accident, whereas she, at 129 pounds and 5'3", nearly died. ^[20]

After a trial, the consumer prevailed with a substantial verdict. ^[21] The manufacturer primarily defended under a product misuse theory, contending that the consumer's injuries resulted "from the severity of the accident and her own misuse of the belt." ^[22]

[*pg 146]

B. Reasoning Behind the Decision in GMC v. Farnsworth

In reversing the verdict, the supreme court made several rulings that form the basis for the safety products issue here. The court held that the trial court "erred in rejecting a comparative negligence instruction and refusing to require the jury to allocate fault to the driver who caused the accident." ^[23] The court appropriately concluded that the trial court should have included a jury instruction regarding product misuse, i.e., whether the consumer improperly wore the seat belt. ^[24] Alaska law had previously recognized product misuse as a defense, however, so this aspect of the ruling was predictable.

The court broke new ground, however, on the allocation of fault issue. The court described the manufacturer's assertion of the following defenses:

GM stressed that even if its seat restraint system were defective, Farnsworth's injuries were largely the fault of Fennie [the driver of the vehicle with Farnsworth] and Walters [the oncoming driver]. GM argued that Farnsworth did not contest that Walters was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the accident and that his negligence in driving in the wrong lane was the immediate cause of the collision. In fact, GM claimed, Walters had admitted that he was drug impaired, and he was tried and convicted of criminal assault in the fourth degree for causing personal injury to Fennie and Farnsworth. GM also attributed fault to Fennie, arguing that the collision would have been less severe if he had braked more quickly. GM claimed that Fennie's own driving had been impaired by alcohol. ^[25]

The court held that these facts warranted an instruction that the oncoming driver was liable as a matter of law for the consumer's injuries since the oncoming driver was the original tortfeasor. The court reasoned:

No one disputed that Walters's negligence in fact caused the accident. Analogizing to other areas of tort law, GM argues that the original tortfeasor is always considered a legal cause of a plaintiff's further injuries unless there is a superseding cause . . . . GM's position is consistent with related tort principles. [For example,] [a]n original tortfeasor is considered a proximate cause, as a matter of law, of injuries caused by subsequent negligent medical treatment. ^[26]

[*pg 147]

Thus, the court transplanted a tort doctrine from medical malpractice cases to...