Alliance Politics in Asia.

• Author: White, James W
• Position: 'Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia' - Book review

Alliance Politics in Asia

Thomas J. Christensen, Worse Than A Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0-691-14260-9, hard cover, (ISBN 978-0-691-14261-6 paperback), 2011, 306 pp., $70.00, ($24.95). [Also available on Kindle for $9.95-ed.]

In this study of security and diplomacy in Asia since 1949, Thomas Christensen argues that, geopolitics, realpolitik, and domestic politics notwithstanding, it is alliance politics that best explains the success or failure of coercive diplomacy, and the consequent extent of stability in the region. By "coercive diplomacy" he means the use of threats and assurances to influence the behavior of one's enemies short of war. Once the shooting starts, he argues, the more disunified one's enemies the better; short of war, on the other hand, he asserts--with exhaustive documentation and persuasive analysis--a monolithic alliance is both the best to be, and the best to deal with. This is because threats and assurances, to be effective, must be clear and credible. When an alliance is uncoordinated, divided, and undisciplined, it is unable to speak with one voice or either to act or react coherently, with dangerous implications for all.

The author focuses on two types of disunity: general inability to agree and act in concert, which renders an alliance opaque, uncoordinated, and low in credibility, and enhances misperceptions and often overconfidence by the other side; and specific: when there is rivalry within an alliance for leadership--especially ideological leadership--then there is often an escalation of belligerence by the rivals, and simultaneously an opportunity for lesser members of the alliance to manipulate the putative leading actors. Monolithic, hierarchical alliances, even if mutually hostile, maximize the possibility peaceful resolution of conflict. Dividing the postwar history of Asia into six approximate periods, he makes a solid--though no doubt debatable--case for his model.

In the late 1940s both the Sino-Soviet communist and US-led anti-communist alliances in Asia were taking shape in fits and starts, and not all actors were, or could be forced to be, on the same page. The communists--reasonably--feared attack by both the Republic of (South) Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan and--less reasonably--a resurgence of Japanese militarism. In the face of this, the U.S. feared entrapment by the bellicose ROK and ROC...