All aboard the Bruton line.

• Jurisdiction: United States
• Date: 22 March 1999
• Author: Benadi, Gabrielle
• Published date: 22 March 1999
• Author: Benadi, Gabrielle

1. INTRODUCTION

   In Gray v. Maryland,(1) the Supreme Court held that the introduction, at a joint trial, of a codefendant's incriminating confession violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment fight of confrontation, even though the confession was redacted to replace the defendant's name with neutral, non-identifying terms such as "deleted."(2) Such a redaction was considered to be of the same legal consequence as the original confession.(3) The Supreme Court found that the blank spaces and words "deleted" or "deletion" were facially incriminating and simply invited the jury to fill in the blanks.(4)

   This Note argues that the majority's role for determining the admissibility of a codefendant's incriminating confession was correct. The majority's role permits the justice system to strive for, and achieve, competing goals.

   Next, this Note argues that the majority and dissent, in fact, agreed on the appropriate approach to determining the admissibility of redacted confessions. Both the dissent and majority employed a facially incriminating analysis.(5) Where the majority and dissent divided camps, however, is whether or not the confession in Gray v. Maryland was admissible under that approach.(6) The majority was correct in holding that the redacted confession in Gray v. Maryland was inadmissible under the facially incriminating analysis because the jury was compelled to link the confession to the codefendant, which violated Gray's Sixth Amendment constitutional guarantees.

2. BACKGROUND

   The Confrontation Clause commands that "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him."(7) The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,(8) includes the right of cross-examination.(9)

   In early cases examining the Confrontation Clause, the Court held that it was "reasonably possible for the jury to follow sufficiently clear instructions" to disregard a confessor's incriminatory statement against his codefendant.(10) In Delli Paoli v. United States, for example, five men were convicted of conspiring to "possess and transport alcohol in unstamped containers and to evade payment of federal taxes on the alcohol."(11) Codefendant Whitley did not testify at trial, but confessed to the crime in an out-of-court statement, which specifically implicated all four codefendants.(12) Whitley's confession was introduced into evidence in its entirety, along with limiting jury instructions.(13) Only codefendant Orlando Delli Paoli appealed his conviction based on the introduction of Whitley's unredacted statement into evidence.(14) The Court found that limiting jury instructions can adequately safeguard a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, even where a codefendant's incriminating confession is introduced in whole form.(15) The Court reasoned that if the jury truly disregarded the "reference to the codefendant, no question would arise under the Confrontation Clause, because by hypothesis the case [would be] treated as if the confessor made no statement inculpating the nonconfessor."(16) The key principle in Delli Paoli was that "unless we proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the court's instructions where those instructions are clear and the circumstances are such that the jury can reasonably be expected to follow them, the jury system makes little sense."(17)

   The Court next addressed a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation in Jackson v. Denno.(18) The Jackson Court examined a New York State procedure for determining whether a confession was made voluntarily.(19) The Court concluded that a defendant in a criminal case cannot be convicted based upon, in whole or in part, an involuntary confession, regardless of whether the statement is true or false, or whether other evidence supports the conviction.(20)

   The New York State procedure allowed the trial judge to exclude a confession if it was clearly made involuntarily.(21) Whether the confession was made voluntarily became a jury question, however, in situations where it could be reasonably disputed.(22) This procedure posed a significant danger in instances where a confession, albeit true, was found to have been made involuntarily, raising the question whether a jury would be able to disregard this real and incriminating information when determining a defendant's guilt.(23) The Court ultimately agreed that a jury, when deciding a confessor's guilt, could not be depended upon to ignore her confession of guilt should it find the confession involuntary.(24) For this reason, the Court concluded that the trial judge, and not the jury, must decide whether a confession was given voluntarily.(25)

   Eleven years later, Bruton v. United States expressly overruled Delli Paoli.(26) The Bruton Court relied on the rationale in Jackson to overrule Delli Paoli, even though the facts in Jackson were not directly analogous to the facts in Delli Paoli.(27) The basic premise of Jackson, according to Bruton, altogether repudiated the supposition behind Delli Paoli.(28)

   In Bruton, codefendant Evans' out-of-court oral confessions to a postal inspector were introduced into evidence at his joint trial for postal armed robbery with petitioner George Williams Bruton.(29) The trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction prior to the introduction of the confession and cautioned the jury at the close of the Government's direct case as well.(30) Evans and Bruton were both found guilty of armed postal robbery by the jury.(31) Bruton's conviction was affirmed on appeal, even though Evans' confession directly incriminated him, solely because the jury had been given a limiting instruction.(32) The Supreme Court, however, overturned Bruton's conviction due to the substantial risk that the jury had, indeed, considered Evans' confessions in determining Bruton's guilt.(33) The Court believed that "there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequence of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored."(34) The Court still acknowledged the reliability of the jury system in most circumstances.(35) The Court thus created the Bruton principle, which stands for the proposition that limiting instructions in this specific context have virtually the same effect as if no instructions had been given at all.(36)

   Justice White(37) dissented in Bruton from what he labeled as "an excessively rigid rule."(38) Justice White argued that the confession in Jackson was entirely distinct from the confession in Bruton and thereby raised extremely different questions of credibility and jury reliability.(39) The confession in Jackson came from the defendant himself, "the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct."(40) Thus it was no wonder that it might have been difficult, if not impossible, for the jury to disregard the statement in determining the defendant's guilt, especially if the statement was true.(41) The jury may not have fully understood the policy behind foregoing truthful, incriminating evidence in order to preserve other constitutional guarantees.(42)

   In contrast to the majority, Justice White noted that the confession in Bruton was made by Evans, Bruton's codefendant.(43) This, explained Justice White, raised a real issue of credibility.(44) A confessor's statements are less trustworthy than other hearsay evidence, according to Justice White, because he is tainted by the strong motivation to inculpate his codefendant and thereby absolve himself of all or any of the blame.(45) Justice White believed that a jury, with a proper limiting instruction, would be able to recognize and understand the need to ignore this category of particularly suspect hearsay.(46)

   Finally, Justice White's dissent in Bruton briefly addressed the future use of a redacted codefendant's confession, a topic not discussed by the majority.(47) The dissent's only guidance on this issue was that a redacted confession must not change the statement so as to unduly prejudice either the confessor or the Government.(48)

   The dissent's thought proved to be directly on target as the next stop on the Bruton line was an examination of the introduction of a codefendant's redacted confession. In Richardson v. Marsh, respondent Clarrisa Marsh, Benjamin Williams and Kareem Martin were charged with assaulting Cynthia Knighton and murdering her son and aunt.(49) Marsh and Williams were tried together despite Marsh's objection.(50) Williams did not testify at trial, but a confession given to the police after his arrest was admitted into evidence.(51) That confession detailed a conversation between Williams and Martin in the car on the way to the robbery and corroborated the events in Knighton's testimony.(52) The confession, however, was redacted so as to completely eliminate all reference to Marsh.(53) Additionally, the jury was cautioned only to use the confession against Williams.(54)

   At the trial, Marsh testified that she had been in the back seat of the car with Martin and Williams, but said that she could not hear the conversation because the radio was too loud.(55) Marsh admitted entering the Knighton home but stated that she had not intended to rob or kill anyone and did not have prior knowledge of Martin's and Williams' plan.(56) During his closing argument, the prosecutor linked Marsh to part of William's confession, when he stated "if [Marsh] admits that she heard the conversation and she admits to the plan, she's guilty of at least armed robbery."(57)

   The jury found Marsh guilty of one count of assault with intent to commit murder and two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of an armed robbery.(58) The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal and Marsh's motion for...