Albert Camus: the Nature of Political Rebellion

• Author: Terry Hoy
• Date: 01 September 1960
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296001300301
• Published date: 01 September 1960
• Subject Matter: Articles

ALBERT CAMUS: THE NATURE OF POLITICAL REBELLION
TERRY HOY
University of Maryland
T
IS OFTEN OBSERVED that the modern age is characterized by a decline
t of belief in supernatural authority or higher law, as well as a growing dis-
illusionment with scientific reason as a means of defining the ethical founda-
tions of political life. This has fostered the growth of relativist, subjective inter-
pretations of political value which has been viewed with both optimism and
alarm. On the one hand, it is defended by those who point to the fact that it has
meant the emancipation of man from ideological traditions and dogmas which
have often been utilized as defense of political injustice and tyranny; it has nour-
ished libertarian, individualist tendencies in modern life. On the other hand,
the rejection of belief in higher law or objective moral standards, it is often
argued, paves the way for nihilist ideologies, which would enthrone the suprem-
acy of irrational impulse and force as the ultimate arbiter of political value.
Thus a basic problem of modern man is whether or not it is possible to give
rational meaning and value to his existence in an age where there is no longer
confidence that reason can establish absolute or objective truths. This problem
takes on special significance where it is concerned with defining the nature and
conditions of political revolt and protest. That is, if man, alone, is the sole
creator of his values and purposes, does this mean that his freedom is unlimited?
Does it imply the nihilist logic that anything is therefore possible -
including
revolutionary violence and terrorism? Is it possible, in other words, to recognize
limits on the exercise of freedom without appeal to higher law or objective truth?
Is it possible to define the positive, humane substance of rebellion, as a protest
against injustice and tyranny, without embracing the logical extreme of nihilist
rebellion?
It is this problem which has been given significant expression in the writings
of Nobel prize winner Albert Camus. What is of special significance in Camus’
analysis of this question is his effort to show that political rebellion, as the de-
mand for freedom against tyranny and oppression, is incompatible with the
ideology of revolutionary nihilism; and that although rebellion involves the nega-
tion of belief in God or higher law, it is not a doctrine that sanctions the nihilist
creed that everything is possible -
including murder or suicide. For authentic
rebellion, as opposed to revolutionary nihilism, is an affirmation, as well as nega-
tion ; an affirmation that the individual person has a worth that should be re-
spected and valued. Revolutionary movements, by deifying the state or &dquo;historical
destiny,&dquo; by justifying political terrorism and violence, thus betray the true mean-
ing of rebellion.
In considering Camus’ treatment of this problem it is convenient to consider
separately three phases of his general argument: first, his characterization of the
human condition as an encounter with &dquo;absurdity&dquo;; secondly, his discussion of
revolutionary political nihilism as a false or perverted deduction from the aware-
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ness of the absurd; thirdly, his attempt to reconcile absurdist reasoning with the
principle of human dignity and limited freedom.
I
The central concern of Camus is the question of how man can give meaning
to his life in an &dquo;absurd&dquo; universe; where the individual becomes conscious that
life has no meaning or objective value. The first step, in attempting to answer
this problem, is for the mind to distinguish what is true from what is false, but
this proves to be a futile endeavor. It was Aristotle, Camus contends, who has
best demonstrated this futility. For by asserting that all is true, we assert the
truth of the contrary assertion and consequently the falsity of our own thesis.
And if we say that all is false, that assertion is itself false. If we declare that
solely the assertion opposed to ours is false, or else that solely ours is not false, we
-
are nevertheless forced to admit an infinite number of true or false judgments.
For the one who expresses a true assertion proclaims simultaneously that it is
true and so on ad infinitum. Today people despair of absolute knowledge. Nor
can one place any confidence in science:
You enumerate its laws and in my thirst for knowledge, I admit they are true. You take apart
its mechanism and my hope increases. At the final stage you teach me that the wonderous and
multi-colored universe can be reduced to the atom, and that the atom itself can be reduced to
the electron. All this is good and I wait for you to continue. But you tell me of an invisible
planetary system in which electrons gravitate around a nucleous. You explain this world to me
with an image. I realize that you have been reduced to poetry. I shall never know. Have I time
to become indignant? You have already changed theories. So that science that was to teach me
everything ends up in hypothesis, that lucidity founders in metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved
in
’
a work of art.’
:
Thus man is confronted with an absurd universe; a horde of irrationals has sprung
up and surrounds him until his ultimate end. And what is absurd is the con-
fronting of this irrational, and the wild longing for clarity. The plane of history,
...