Air power: Where's the Love?

• Author: O'Brasky, Jim
• Position: READER'S FORUM: VIEWS ... COMMENTS ... SUGGESTIONS - Letter to the editor

* I enjoyed your August 2009 editorial. It certainly conveys the whining tone of many air power advocates. I suspect that tone will continue at even higher amplitude and pitch as the QDR progresses.

The secretary of defense is trying to rebalance the department to better deal with the continuous force employment of stability and support operations. This rebalancing must come at the expense of expeditionary operations. Expeditionary warfare capabilities are used once a decade but must be responsive and of high quality. The basic issue is balance. A careful review of the potential expeditionary warfare employment opportunities will reveal only about 30 to 35 percent of the force structure needs to be dedicated to this employment mode over the next two decades. Prior to 9/11, 95 percent of the U.S. conventional capability was so dedicated, and the Pentagon's acquisition planning reflected this bias until fiscal 2010.

In a real sense, the tac-air advocates are the victims of their own success in broadly propagating precision strike capability. These initiatives deserve the praise of a grateful nation. At this point, the Air Force will see some real programmatic blows because the extension of some programs is simply unjustified.

The F-35A program will probably be reduced from 1,600 to about 1,200 aircraft. The C-17 program will probably be ended. Given the C-5A/B legacy, this decision would seem to be less justified.

The fact that the Air Force has reluctantly but effectively embraced UAVs for reconnaissance, surveillance and attack missions means that the complexion of the tac-air culture will change substantially over the next two decades. The heart of the change is that 250 flight hours per PAA aircraft per year will no longer be necessary to maintain pilot proficiency. The force will eventually fly much less, training will become even more synthetic, and cockpits will be on the ground halfway around the world. Large-scale complex training exercises such as Red Flag will still be necessary and perhaps may grow in frequency and complexity.

The joint force aviation component will continue to provide air superiority in contested air space, persistent surveillance and precision attack throughout the battle space, and air transport within and between theaters. The love is there but the infatuation with precision strike as the major leg upon which the stool of transformation stood has passed. Dominant battle space knowledge met counterinsurgency...