Notes on the Ahl al-Diwan: the Arab-Egyptian army of the seventh through the ninth centuries C.E.
Author | Mikhail, Maged S.A. |
Position | Report |
In his foundational study of caliphal armies, Hugh Kennedy provided a thorough, interpretative framework for the profuse evidence relating to the early Islamic military establishment. (1) Repeatedly, however, he necessarily emphasized the tentative nature of the sources in general, but particularly those pertaining to Egypt, which are in several respects inconclusive, sparse, or demonstrative of idiosyncratic tendencies. Here the intent is to refine the discussion relating to the Egyptian army by contextualizing the Ahl al-Diwan, the chief Arab military force in the province from the late seventh through the early ninth centuries C.E. (2)
Generally, when referring to soldiers, early Arabic sources employ the generic term muqatila, but jund and 'askar are also used. Specific regiments are further identified through a number of constructions that focus on either the geographical origin of the troops (e.g., Ahl al-Sham) or the name of the commanding general (e.g., al-Hafsiyya). (3) Egyptian sources, particularly al-Kindi's Kitab al-Wulat, frequently reference regional troops that are identified as the Ahl al-Diwan (4) (also called Ahl Misr). (5) Typically, the Ahl al-Diwan designation is lacking in the works of non-Egyptian authors such as Yaqut and al-Tabari, who fail to document many of the pivotal events that enable an historical assessment of this martial force. (6)
ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF THE ARAB-EGYPTIAN ARMY
As the narrative sources would have it, 'Amr ibn al-'As founded the Egyptian diwan shortly after the conquest of the province on the model established by the caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (634-644 C.E.). (7) At that early juncture, the diwan was multifunctional. On the one hand, it functioned as a revenue-sharing system; thus, the immovable spoils of the conquered territories (i.e., the annual tax revenue of the province) would be distributed among the conquerors and their progeny. On the other hand, it was the means through which regular soldiers were paid. Initially, the diwan appears to have been a simple roster composed of names and a corresponding payment. (8) The original size of the diwan is difficult to ascertain. Numbers are certainly not difficult to come by, but they are problematic and thus at best, mere estimates. (9) What can be noted with confidence is the ever-expanding size of the Egyptian "register." (10) Subsequent to its inauguration, Arabic sources highlight four official editions of the rosters in the first century of Islamic rule. (11)
Enumerating the diwan editions, however, may be deceptive. It would lead one to envision distinct periods of growth while the evidence suggests a constant state of flux as the Arab population increased in Egypt by official and unofficial means. One such factor was procreation. During the seventh century C.E., when the diwan still functioned as a revenue-sharing system, a census-taker was assigned to register births and incorporate the newly born into the diwan. (12) Often cited, this tradition demonstrates that inclusion in the early diwan did not require an official government edict or actual military service. (13)
A second means of expansion--seldom documented in the narrative sources--was through the pietistic "emigration" of Arabs to the province. Throughout the first Islamic century, the Arabs of the Peninsula were encouraged to emigrate--to make a hijra--to any of the amsar (military garrisons) of the caliphate. (14) A majority answered this call and became known as al-muhajirun or "emigrants"--the same designation earlier applied to the Mec-can supporters of the Prophet Muhammad who accompanied him to Medina. The esteem held for these later muhajirun was proportional to the distance they had traveled. The farther the garrison to which they emigrated, the more pious and devout they were believed to have been--traits that were financially rewarded by the hierarchical diwan system. Conversely, those who did not leave the Peninsula, the a 'rab, were discriminated against as uncultured and uncivilized. (15)
In Egypt, these muhajirun (the [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] of seventh-and early eight-century papyri) flocked to the two main garrison towns of al-Fustat and Alexandria. Some joined the muqatila and reinforced the amsar (garrisons), while others served as soldiers on the ships of the annual cursus against the Byzantines. (16) In time, entire clans would relocate to Egypt. Most notably, scores of Judham and a third of the Quda'a tribe emigrated to the province soon after the conquest. (17) Typically, most early immigrants settled in the Delta. (18)
A major shift in this pattern occurred in 109/728. As the powerful sahib al-kharaj (Chief of Finance), 'Ubayd Allah ibn al-Habhab, a Qaysi, took advantage of his post, a close relationship with the caliph Hisham, and a revolt in Egypt to make the case for the relocation of Qaysi tribesmen to the province. (19) Consequently, the caliph approved the first official Arab migration to Egypt. By way of providing for the new arrivals, Hisham ordered their inclusion in the diwan. This was the impetus for the fourth edition of the Egyptian register, Thus, a significant Qaysi population was settled in the eastern Hawf and, in addition to enrollment in the diwan, was granted various tax relief measures that remained in effect through the first decade of 'Abbasid rule. (20)
It was a curious act on several fronts, not least of which was that the new immigrants were deliberately settled as farmers, not soldiers--a hitherto unprecedented act, (21) Additionally, this agrarian population was incorporated into the Egyptian diwan at a time when, in other regions of the caliphate, 'ata' was directly linked to military service. It is likely that this was the last Arab faction to join the diwan and that later immigrants did not have the right to enroll. (This was the last diwan edition enumerated by ninth- and tenth-century historians.) This would resolve some oddities in the narratives of late eight-and early ninth-century revolts, in which both the rioters and those commissioned to quell them appear to have been Arabs from the Hawf.
Another possible means by which the diwan registers swelled was through the bulky entourages that often accompanied new governors to the province. The status of such individuals is not altogether clear, but their provisions--directly or indirectly--were attained from the diwan (particularly during the seventh century). (22) 'Abdallah ibn Sa'd provides an early example. In accepting the governorship of Egypt in 25/646, he brought a large constituency with him to settle in the province. (23) Later, in 64/684, another governor, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Utba al-Fihri, brought a sizable faction of Kharijites with him from Mecca. (24)
NATURE OF THE FORCE AND ITS COMPENSATION
Immediately after the inauguration of the Egyptian diwan, Arab Muslims (and initially some mawali) registered to guarantee their 'ata'. (25) Enrollment was primarily along tribal lines that would, in time, give way to regional designations. The nature of the payment received by those on the rosters, whether it was a stipend or a salary, has occupied the energies of medieval and modern scholars alike. To some extent, whether the 'ata' was perceived as fay'--proceeds or spoils of the conquests that were distributed to the conquerors and their progeny irrespective of military service--or a salary paid in recompense for military service, was a product of time and place. In the early decades after the conquests, when conquerors and soldiers were one and the same, the distinction simply did not exist. But as those two categories came to designate distinct populations, confusion set in. (26) By the second half of Umayyad rule, common practice increasingly defined 'ata' as a salary. Nonetheless, the perception of the payment as fay' among a segment of Arabs in Egypt is attested until the second quarter of the ninth century C.E. (27)
The longevity of this perspective in Egypt is peculiar and is best understood as a reflection of Egypt's socio-political environment. Geographically, aside from Alexandria, which was a ribat (frontier fortress), the province was far from the caliphate's frontiers. Egypt's military importance was not in supplying soldiers, (28) but in providing the naval yards that manufactured the caliph's fleet and the ports from which the annual cursus was equipped, manned, and launched. Shipbuilding, however, was not a soldier's prerogative, and the cursus was a seasonal, regional, and often limited expedition. (29) On the political front, unlike Damascus, Baghdad, or Khurasan, al-Fustat--and by extension, Egypt--was on the periphery of political power. Individuals in the province who succeeded in amassing funds and troops typically strove to be autonomous from the caliphate, not to take it over. And by and large, Egypt's political marginality spared it much of the turmoil and factional strife that plagued the politically dominant centers.
Beyond the occasional bonus, two payments combined to compensate the soldiers of the Umayyad period. The 'ata'/[rho]o[gamma][alpha] was payable in gold, while the rizq/[rho]o[upsilon][zi][iota][kappa]ov was a ration of wheat paid from the embole, the Byzantine wheat tax that persisted throughout the early Umayyad period. (30) As Kennedy has noted, the bureaucracy in Egypt was fairly centralized, and under the Umayyads, payments were consistent; the ata was paid in the spring, while distribution of the rizq followed the harvest. (31) Government requisitions supplied various other commodities to the soldiers. Increasingly, under the 'Abbasids rizq would designate a salary paid in cash.
When compared with the traditional narrative sources, Egyptian papyri of the mid-Umayyad period provide the historian with an opportunity to distinguish between the idealistic and actual mechanisms of taxation and the requisitioning of goods. The pertinent narrative sources--all written over...
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