Agents of Representation: The Organic Connection between Society and Leftist Parties in Bolivia and Uruguay

• Author: Santiago Anria,Verónica Pérez Bentancur,Rafael Piñeiro Rodríguez,Fernando Rosenblatt
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00323292211042442
• Published date: 01 September 2022
• Date: 01 September 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292211042442

Politics & Society

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DOI: 10.1177/00323292211042442

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Article

Agents of Representation:

The Organic Connection

between Society and Leftist

Parties in Bolivia and Uruguay

Santiago Anria

Dickinson College

Verónica Pérez Bentancur

Universidad de la República, Uruguay

Rafael Piñeiro Rodríguez

Universidad Católica del Uruguay

Fernando Rosenblatt

Universidad Diego Portales

Abstract

Parties are central agents of democratic representation. The literature assumes

that this function is an automatic consequence of social structure and/or a product

of incentives derived from electoral competition. However, representation is

contingent upon the organizational structure of parties. The connection between

a party and an organized constituency is not limited to electoral strategy; it

includes an organic connection through permanent formal or informal linkages

that bind party programmatic positions to social groups’ preferences, regardless

of the electoral returns. This article analyzes how the Movimiento al Socialismo

(Movement toward Socialism, MAS) in Bolivia and the Frente Amplio (Broad

Front, FA) in Uruguay developed two different forms of relationship with social

organizations that result from the interplay of historical factors traceable to the

parties’ formative phases and party organizational attributes. Party organizational

features that grant voice to grassroots activists serve as crucial mechanisms for

bottom-up incorporation of societal interests and demands.

Keywords

organic connection, social actors, popular sectors, political parties

Corresponding Author:

Fernando Rosenblatt, Escuela de Ciencia Política, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile.

Email: fernando.rosenblatt@mail.udp.cl

1042442PASXXX10.1177/00323292211042442Politics & SocietyAnria et al.

research-article2021

2022, Vol. 50(3) 384–412

Parties are central agents of interest intermediation in democracies. The party politics

literature and the democracy literature hold that elections provide the way for citizens

and organized interests (principals) to keep party leaders (agents) accountable.1 This is

the basic assumption that underpins different approaches to the study of political par-

ties and democratic competition. In the Downsian approach, electoral incentives,

derived from citizens’ preferences, drive the parties’ policy positions.2 In the structural

approach, party stances reflect social structures and cleavages.3 Both approaches have

important limitations and blind spots. While the Downsian approach fails to recognize

that parties’ policy positions are also explained by parties’ organic connection with

societal organized interests, the structural approach assumes this connection is auto-

matically determined by the social structure. However, the type of party-society con-

nection and the way organized interests can hold party leaders accountable are

contingent upon parties’ organizational structure. How do party organizational struc-

tures shape interest incorporation in modern democracies?

According to interparty competition theory, democratic political competition is set

by institutions, the political economy, and the preferences of the electorate at large.

These three components are crucial in determining parties’ electoral decisions.

Especially in dependent economies, parties are more prone to tensions between

remaining responsive to their core constituency and retaining positive electoral returns

and policy outcomes.4 However, under similar institutional and political economy

contexts, some parties remain responsive to their core constituency whereas others

undertake policy switches that differ sharply from the preferences of their social

bases.5 In turn, it is also possible to find parties that, under very dissimilar conditions,

remain responsive to their core constituency. What, then, are the mechanisms that

make this continued responsiveness possible?

There has been little systematic comparative analysis of these organizational fea-

tures, and, yet, the features of a party organization and the type of linkages it has with

organized social interests shape the way parties carry out intermediation and represen-

tation. More broadly, the policies that parties pursue in government and in opposition

are neither exclusively strategic decisions oriented to win elections nor the direct

translation of the preferences of its core constituency. Parties’ behavior in government

and in opposition depends on their organizational traits and their organic linkages with

social organizations. Parties that have organic connections constrain the ability of

party leaders to adopt short-run electoral strategies that affect the long-term legitimacy

of the party in the electorate. Strong organic connections reduce the likelihood of “bait

and switch” decision making and sustain the consistency of the party “brand,” which

may affect the stability of the overall party system.6

Roberts specified three models of party-movement connections: the “vanguard”

model rooted in the Leninist tradition; the “electoralist” model, or vote-maximizing

parties that reach beyond organized social constituencies “to attract the mass of unor-

ganized and often independent voters”; and the “organic” model, in which parties

function as a direct expression of social movements.7 We take this typology a step

further and theorize about the importance of organic connections. The connection

between a party and an organized constituency is not limited to electoral strategy or

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Anria et al.