Against a Bitter Pill: The Role of Interest Groups in Armed Forces Reform in Russia

• Author: Kirill Shamiev
• Published date: 01 April 2021
• Date: 01 April 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X19852648
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Against a Bitter Pill:

The Role of Interest

Groups in Armed

Forces Reform in Russia

Kirill Shamiev

1

Abstract

From 2007 to 2012, Russian armed forces faced unprecedented changes that

affected their structural, economic, social, and ideological elements. However, not

all aims were fulfilled, and some changes were rolled back, despite the political and

financial support from Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev for the defense minister

Anatoly Serdyukov. Using the data from 11 interviews with former high-ranking

military officers, scholars, and insider press workers, the research shows that the

unsustainability of the reform was caused by the radicality of changes, the interest

groups influence, and the technocratic policymaking in nondemocratic Russia. In

addition, the research demonstrates the strategies the reformers used in order to

overcome the resistance from mobilized interest groups. They had not succeeded,

that ultimately led to the resignation of the defense minister, which stopped further

radical changes in the contemporary Russian armed forces.

Keywords

civil military relations, defense policy, military organization, public policy, Russia

Policy makers have two distinct approaches to ensure the policy sustainability

regarding the influence of interest groups. They may push for their proposal regard-

less of interest groups and political opposition, or they may include interest groups in

1

Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

Corresponding Author:

Kirill Shamiev, Central European University, Nador u. 9, Budapest 1051, Hungary.

Email: shamiev_kirill@phd.ceu.edu

Armed Forces & Society

2021, Vol. 47(2) 319-342

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X19852648

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the decision-making process. While the former needs sufficient state autonomy, the

latter allows stakeholders to hold a stake in policy continuation. As a consequence,

the final policy proposal itself implicitly secures its implementation in exchange for

the achievement of socially desired goals (Skocpol, 1995), though these are the two

diametrically opposing strategies, in practice, the policy is a constantly changing

mixture of coercive implementation and agreements with interest groups.

In the case of military policies, their sustainability is additionally affected by the

variations in military elite autonomy and the need to use specific military expertise

(Avant, 2007; Huntington, 1957). Therefore, military agencies (armed forces,

defense industries, security councils) could affect the government’s policies, some-

times leading to unexpected results and policy failures, even despite the low level of

military autonomy.

In the case of the Russia’s military reform of 2007–2012, the initial plan of the

reform was not implemented, which is surprising considering the influence of the

war in Georgia in 2008. The proposed reform caused massive criticism and finally

led to the resignation of the defense minister in 2012. Some decisions were not

implemented while Serdyukov was in office or rolled back when he was ousted,

despite a publicly acknowledged support of the top elite. Thus, this article answers

the question: How did interest groups influence the military policies in Russia in

2007–2012?

The prior experience of military reforms in Russia is heavily contested (Renz,

2018). The system had been led by senior servicemen from the Soviet era and had

almost entirely inherited the Soviet security institutions that increased the reluctance

to changes. Moreover, the strategic nuclear capabilities and socioeconomic devel-

opment goals initially decreased Kremlin incentives for the military reform

(M. Kramer, 2019). However, rising economic might and centralizing political

power enabled Moscow to start reforming its military by the end of the Putin’s

second term in accordance to its perception of the global security environment and

as an “attribute of a strong state and global actor” (Renz, 2016). This article, though,

is far beyond the top-down perspective on the security poli cy change in Russia

(Kosnik, 2016; Marshall, 2014). It rather corresponds to Renz’s (2014) argument

that both the initiation and the results of military policies in Russia lie in the inter-

section of agency, rationality, and numerous structural factors limiting Kremlin’s

capacity to unilaterally dominate the policymaking arena.

The capacity of the state to implement p olicies in Russia i s closely associa ted

with the process of building “the power vertical” under President Vladimir Putin.

The centralization of state powers and increasing the state capacity and autonomy

gradually closed the political system making any external pressure on the policy

process harder (Sakwa, 2010). Still, the centralization of power and authoritarian

backlash did not make the policy process more sustainable. Numerous structural

and institutional obstacles, interest groups, as well as the neo-patrimonial nature of

administrative and political relationships negatively affected policy outcomes

(Gel’man, 2016; Starodubtsev, 2010). Although enjoying unquestionable political

320 Armed Forces & Society 47(2)