Affective Polarization and Support for the U.S. Supreme Court

• Author: Miles T. Armaly,Adam M. Enders
• DOI: 10.1177/10659129211006196
• Published date: 01 June 2022
• Date: 01 June 2022

2022, Vol. 75(2) 409 –424

Article

https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211006196

Political Research Quarterly

© 2021 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/10659129211006196

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The American mass public largely support the U.S.

Supreme Court, even when it makes decisions with which

they disagree (Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Nelson and

Tucker, forthcoming; Tyler 2006). As Gibson (2007) dem-

onstrates, the Court has maintained its store of support,

even as many other aspects of politics have sharply polar-

ized. Although polarization influences other public per-

ceptions that may, in turn, influence the Court (e.g.,

believing the justices to be partisan), little evidence points

to drastic differences in views of the judiciary across dis-

parate political groups. And while there is some debate

about the role various political predispositions (e.g., ide-

ology) play in assessments of the Court (Bartels and

Johnston 2013; Gibson and Nelson 2015) and dynamics of

support may be changing over time (Rogowski and Stone,

forthcoming), historically, it has been “. . . reasonably well

established that institutional support for the U.S. Supreme

Court is not polarized along partisan and/or ideological

lines,” as Gibson and Nelson (2014, 208) note.

However, polarization is not an entirely ideological

affair. A burgeoning literature finds that, where only some

members of the mass public are ideologically polarized

(Rogowski and Sutherland 2016; Webster and Abramowitz

2017), many are polarized along affective (Iyengar,

Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015;

Mason 2015) and perceptual (Enders and Armaly 2019;

Levendusky and Malhotra 2016) grounds, which do not

require ideological sophistication or constraint. Thus, that

the traditional, ideological variant of polarization seems

not to influence attitudes toward the Court is not an alto-

gether surprising discovery. Here, we reconsider the

hypothesis that polarization fails to influence public eval-

uations of the Supreme Court, diverging from previous

studies by examining affective polarization. We argue that

affective polarization—Americans’ increasingly diver-

gent emotional orientations toward in- and out-groups—

influences attitudes toward the Supreme Court. Indeed,

affective polarization does not simply produce great dis-

dain of the out-group, its candidates, and policies. Rather,

its consequences extend to political stimuli unaffiliated

with either group, shaking confidence in government and

the political system, more generally. Simply put, there are

non-group consequences (e.g., for institutions) to group

politics. General political divisions can impact support for

the institutions that make democratic decisions.

To investigate this proposition, we first use (1)

American National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative

1006196PRQXXX10.1177/10659129211006196Political Research QuarterlyArmaly and Enders

research-article2021

1The University of Mississippi, University, USA

2University of Louisville, KY, USA

Corresponding Author:

Miles T. Armaly, The University of Mississippi, 233 Deupree Hall,

University, MS 38677, USA.

Email: mtarmaly@olemiss.edu

Affective Polarization and Support

for the U.S. Supreme Court

Miles T. Armaly1 and Adam M. Enders2

Abstract

Support for the U.S. Supreme Court does not appear to be polarized on ideological or partisan lines. However, the

form of polarization for which the mass political behavior field has amassed substantial support is affective in nature.

We reconsider the hypothesis that polarization does not bear on Court support by examining the role of affective

polarization. Using three sources of nationally representative survey data, we consistently find a negative relationship

between affective polarization and both diffuse and specific support for the Court. Moreover, neither general nor

Court-specific political sophistication mitigates the negative effect of affective polarization; rather, sophistication

exacerbates affective polarization’s influence on support. Finally, panel data show that affective polarization precedes

negative evaluations of the judiciary, though there is no support for the converse relationship. Evaluations of the

Court are not free from the forces of polarization but are influenced by diverging extra-judicial emotional orientations

toward in- and out-groups.

Keywords

affective polarization, Supreme Court, legitimacy, support

410Political Research Quarterly 75(2)

2 Political Research Quarterly 00(0)

File data from 1988 to 2016 and (2) the 2012 ANES time

series to examine individual-level relationships between

affective polarization and both diffuse support (or the

unwillingness to fundamentally alter the institution) and

specific support (or short-term reactions to the institution

and its outputs). We find that those reporting greater

levels of affective polarization feel the Court is less legit-

imate and express less immediate satisfaction. Then,

using data from the 2000–2004 ANES panel study,

we show that affective polarization in 2000 leads to

decreased support for the Supreme Court in 2004,

although no reciprocal effect is observed. Thus, affective

polarization seems to cause, or at the very least precede,

negative evaluations of the Supreme Court. Finally, we

consider whether knowledge of the Court or general

political sophistication condition the negative influence

of affective polarization, finding that neither knowledge

nor sophistication mitigates affective polarization’s neg-

ative effect. The Supreme Court seems to be impacted by

mass-level polarization.

These findings are important for several reasons. First,

integrating affective polarization into studies of the judi-

ciary is necessary to determine how the Court will fare in

a highly polarized environment. Although there is uncer-

tainty regarding mass ideological polarization (e.g.,

Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Fiorina and Abrams

2008), the masses are polarized (Enders and Armaly

2019; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). Should mass

polarization influence support for the Court—as we find

it does—researchers should consider the appropriate

forms of polarization. Relatedly, whether ideological dis-

agreement matters when it comes to public evaluations of

the Court remains unresolved (Bartels and Johnston

2013; Gibson and Nelson 2015). Contention about this

finding makes sense given the long-standing “ideological

innocence” of the American mass public (Kinder and

Kalmoe 2017), letalone low levels of knowledge about

the Court (Gibson and Caldeira 2009b). Affective polar-

ization, however, does not rely solely on ideological con-

cerns,1 but group-centric, emotional ones—the types of

orientations that even non-ideologues possess. It may,

therefore, provide a more justifiable link between mass

political orientations and Court support.

The final—and most normatively significant—impli-

cation of our findings is that, although the Court is gener-

ally seen as protected from political or hyperpartisan

strife (Gibson 2007), the wide and growing gulfs in

American politics may impact attitudes toward the judi-

ciary absent any behavior on the part of the justices them-

selves. When the Court’s reservoir of goodwill ebbs,

compliance with Court decisions may decrease (Gibson

and Caldeira 1995; Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968), and

Congress may be less willing to provide resources and

independence to the judiciary (Ura and Wohlfarth 2010).

In addition, if, as Baird (2001) suggests, repeated dis-

appointment with the institution ultimately leads to

decreased diffuse support, the relationship between affec-

tive polarization and specific support has long-run conse-

quences for institutional legitimacy. Even though latent

public support for the Court is generally a function of the

Court’s own traditions, rulings, and behaviors (Gibson,

Lodge, and Woodson 2014; Hoekstra 2003), we show

that levels of support are also a function of existing divi-

sions among the mass public that are not created by,

but reflect upon, the judiciary. If these divisions continue

to grow, support for the institution—and, subsequently,

compliance and independence—can decrease, even

though the Court’s rulings may not be controversial, its

procedures are perceived to be fair, and the traditionally

support-inducing judicial symbols are still prominent.

Mass Polarization and Perceptions of

the Court

By and large, the U.S. Supreme Court enjoys public sup-

port, at least when compared with other political institu-

tions. According to Gibson (2007), this support “has little

to do with ideology or partisanship.” This is, perhaps,

surprising given the existing and growing divisions in the

upper echelons of American politics (McCarty, Poole,

and Rosenthal 2006) and the way that elite polarization

translates to the mass public (Levendusky 2010). This is

not to say, however, that the Supreme Court is entirely

free from the consequences of increasing political polar-

ization. As Hasen (2019) notes, there are several ways

that ideologically driven elite polarization can influence

public attitudes toward the judiciary. For instance, nomi-

nations and confirmations are motivated by the desire to

appoint more extreme judges (see Devins and Baum

2017; Epstein etal. 2006). In addition, decisions on

salient cases frequently reflect the left–right split that

typifies other branches of government (Bartels 2015;

Devins and Baum 2017). While this elite polarization

may ultimately filter down to influence the average citi-

zen (Hasen 2019), the masses’ evaluations of the Court

seem relatively unfazed by such polarization among

elites (Gibson 2007).

Even though elite ideological polarization may (indi-

rectly) impact views of the judiciary, the masses are not,

themselves, particularly polarized on policy grounds. The

form of mass polarization for which there is broad con-

sensus is affective in nature. Thus, it is perhaps sensible

to find little relationship between ideological polarization

and public support for the judiciary. Mass polarization is

rooted in identity-based emotional responses to group

stimuli, as opposed to overarching, left–right orientations

(Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). Although members of

the mass public from across the political spectrum