Advanced Reactors and Nuclear Terrorism: Rethinking the International Framework

• Author: Cameron Tarry Hughes
• Position: J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 2023
• Pages: 521-551

STUDENT NOTES

Advanced Reactors and Nuclear Terrorism:

Rethinking the International Framework

Cameron Tarry Hughes*

Nuclear technology. . . embodies a nearly unbelievable power to destroy, but

at the same time an extraordinary power to create—to enrich our lives, to pro-

vide the electric power by which we may read at night, to produce potable

water from the ocean’s brine, to help cure deadly diseases, and to enable sci-

ence and industry to advance in innumerable ways that can improve the qual-

ity of life for people in all societies.

1

Christopher Ford, U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, The Promise and

Responsibilities of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Remarks to 19th Annual Conference on

Disarmament Issues (Aug. 26, 2007) (transcript available online at https://perma.cc/LVT7-VURV).

INTRODUCTION

While nuclear energy today provides about 10% of global electricity genera-

tion in reliable, carbon-free form,

2

Nuclear Electricity, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Sept. 2022), https://perma.cc/9PAG-ENTF.

the immense destruction tied to its origins

casts a long shadow. Nuclear reactors were first promoted as a means to turn the

terrible power of the atomic weapon into a tool of “universal, efficient, and eco-

nomic usage.”

3

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Atoms for Peace Speech, Address Before the General Assembly

of the United Nations in New York City (Dec. 8, 1953) (available online at https://perma.cc/2CMH-

B97X).

This tension between terrible and peaceful power underlies the

expansive nonproliferation regime of international law, a framework meant to

keep nuclear technology from being diverted from this peaceful use to weapons-

making.

Now, with the advent of advanced reactors—a new class of nuclear reactor

technology billed as cleaner, cheaper, and safer than traditional reactors—it is

time to ask again: how do we keep this technology from being misused? This

paper will address how advanced reactors will fit into the existing international

legal framework that is meant to combat nuclear terrorism. It will argue that the

international treaties, resolutions, and conventions which safeguard nuclear

* J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 2023; B.A. University of Virginia, 2018; Student Editor-

in-Chief of the Journal of National Security Law and Policy, vol. 13. This note was adapted from the

author’s dissertation for the diplôme d’université at the International School of Nuclear Law 2021. As

Student Editor-in-Chief of this volume, the author took no part in any stage of the consideration and

selection of this note, which was conducted by the journal’s independent peer review board. The author

sincerely thanks the entire JNSLP staff for their tireless work on both this article and volume 13, as well

as Todd Huntley for his guidance; stewarding the Journal has been the highlight of her law school

career. © 2023, Cameron Tarry Hughes.

1.

2.

3.

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technology from terrorist acquisition must be modified to fully account for the

technological differences of advanced reactors from traditional reactors.

Advanced reactors are intended to and likely will be deployed to countries

without existing nuclear programs, countries which may also be outside the realm

of traditional nonproliferation-focused treaties or multistate organizations.

4

See, e.g. , Alan Ahn, Josh Freed, Jake Kincer, Jessica Lovering, Todd Moss, Ryan Norman, &

Lindsey Walter, 2022 Map of the Global Market for Advanced Nuclear: Emerging International

Demand, THIRD WAY (Oct. 24, 2022) https://perma.cc/MG8Z-RFKJ.

However, while some reactor designers claim that their design inherently sup-

ports nonproliferation regardless of an external protective regime, the focus of

such “safer” designs is reducing accidents that cause release of radioactive mate-

rial into the environment, either through passive cooling or fuel that withstands

higher temperatures without cracking.

5

See, e.g., Molten Salt Reactors, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, https://perma.cc/7NTB-X776 (last

updated May 2021) (“When tests were made on the [molten salt reactor], a control rod was intentionally

withdrawn during normal reactor operations at full power (8 MWt) to observe the dynamic response of

core power. Such was the rate of fuel salt thermal expansion that reactor power levelled off at 9 MWt

without any operator intervention.”).

Whether such designs inherently make it

more difficult to proliferate nuclear weapons is far less clear; in fact, some

advanced reactor characteristics meant to increase safety likely require more

attention to properly safeguard the technology.

At the same time, although the threat of proliferation has remained steady, the

threat of terrorist acquisition and use of nuclear weapons has increased over the

past few decades. While some states, namely North Korea, Iran, and Syria, have

violated their nonproliferation commitments and tried to acquire nuclear weap-

ons, their neighboring signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have not fol-

lowed suit.

6

In preventing widespread acquisition of nuclear weapons, then, the

framework for nonproliferation has worked. On the other hand, terrorist groups

have shown increasing willingness to cause widespread, sometimes indiscrimi-

nate harm compared to their politically targeted 1980s counterparts who targeted

specific political organizations.

7

Since the turn of the century the world has seen

al Qaeda destroy the World Trade Center, North Caucasus dissidents bomb the

Boston Marathon, and the Islamic State (ISIL) execute coordinated attacks in Paris

in November 2015, among other European incidents in the past decade. Meanwhile,

the International Atomic Energy Agency received reports of 149 incidents of nu-

clear material going missing, some of which directly involved “illegal possession of,

and attempts to sell, nuclear material or radioactive sources, with four of these inci -

dents involving nuclear material” between 2013-2014 alone.

8

4.

5.

6. William Tobey, Squaring the Nonproliferation Circle, 26 J. OF INT’L SEC. AFFS. 47, 48 (2014).

7. See id. at 48 (citing a 1986 declassified intelligence report and explaining al Qaeda’s willingness to

cause wide damage). But see Christopher McIntosh & Ian Storey, Between Acquisition and Use:

Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, INT’L STUD. Q. 289 (2018) (rejecting the idea that

modern-day terrorists would use nuclear weapons).

8. Peri L. Johnson, Facilitating the Entry into Force and Implementation of the Amendment to the

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material: Observations, Challenges and Benefits, 94

NUCLEAR L. BULL. 9, 10 n.3 (2014).

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