Administrative Accountability to Congress: the Concurrent Resolution

• Author: Cornelius P. Cotter,J. Malcolm Smith
• DOI: 10.1177/106591295600900411
• Date: 01 December 1956
• Published date: 01 December 1956
• Subject Matter: Articles

955

ADMINISTRATIVE

ACCOUNTABILITY

TO

CONGRESS:

THE

CONCURRENT

RESOLUTION

CORNELIUS

P.

COTTER

Stanford

University

AND

J.

MALCOLM

SMITH

University

of

California,

Riverside

The

problem

of

the

responsibility

of

administrative

officials

in

a

democracy

is

the

very

crux

of

the

prob-

lem

of

the

maintenance

of

the

democratic

system.

1

INTRODUCTION

DMINISTRATIVE

accountability

and

the

circumscription

of

ad-

ministrative

discretion

take

on

a

new

importance

in

an

age

in

which

2~t

the

objectives

of

administrative

regulation

have

been

extended

beyond

the

economic

sphere

of

human

activity

to

include

the

suppression

of

political

disloyalty.2

One

consequence

of

this

development

and

of

the

war-

time

expansion

of

administrative

powers

has

been

a

rededication

of

the

Congress

to

the

proposition

that

&dquo;the

proper

office

of

a

representative

assembly

is

to

watch

and

control

the

government.&dquo;

3

This

reawakened

interest

can

be

traced

in

the

1945

hearings

of

the

Joint

Committee

on

the

Organization

of

Congress,

and

in

a

spate

of

litera-

ture

emanating

from

congressmen

and

students

of

the

national

legislature.4

4

Its

fruit

can

be

seen

in

the

Legislative

Reorganization

Act

of

19465

and

the

Administrative

Procedure

Act

of

that

year.6

Some

participants

in

this

process

of

evaluation

and

innovation

have

emphasized

the

overriding

necessity

for

complete

revision

of

our

party

system

precedent

to

attempting

to

strengthen

Congress

as

an

organ

for

maintaining

responsible

administration.7

7

Others

are

content

to

suggest

1

David

M.

Levitan,

"Responsibility

of

Administrative

Officials

in

a

Democratic

Society,"

Political

Science

Quarterly,

LXI

(December,

1946),

562-98,

566.

2

See

the

Internal

Security

Act

of

1950,

64

Stat.

987

(1950)

which,

among

other

things,

sets

up

the

Subversive

Activities

Control

Board

and,

in

Title

II,

makes

provision

for

emergency

detention

of

individuals

at

the

discretion

of

administrative

officers.

3

J.

S.

Mill,

Representative

Government

("Everyman’s

Library";

New

York:

E.

P.

Dutton

Co.)

p.

239,

cited

in

Rinehart

J.

Swenson,

Federal

Administrative

Law

(New

York:

Ronald

Press

Co.,

1952),

p.

330.

4 Joint

Committee

on

the

Organization

of

Congress,

Hearings,

79th

Cong.,

1st

Sess.

(1945).

5

60

Stat.

812

(1946).

6

60

Stat.

237

(1946).

7

See,

e.g.,

E.

E.

Schattschneider,

Party

Government

(New

York:

Farrar

and

Rinehart,

1942);

American

Political

Science

Association,

Committee

on

Political

Parties,

Toward

A

More

Responsible

Two-Party

System

(New

York:

Rinehart

&

Co.,

1950).