Administering the National Environmental Policy Act

Date01 April 2015
Author
4-2015 NEWS & ANALYSIS 45 ELR 10287
A R T I C L E S
Administering
the National
Environmental
Policy Act
by Jamison E. Colburn
Jamison E. Colburn is Joseph H. Goldstein Faculty
Scholar and Professor of Law at Penn State University.
Summary
In practice, the Council for Environmental Quality
(CEQ) has been treated as the โ€œadministering agencyโ€
for the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
and courts and most action agencies have regarded
its rules as binding law. Yet, a close examination of
NEPAโ€™s language and evolution reveals that CEQ
authority is grounded more in the presidentโ€™s Article II
power than in any statutory delegation from Congress.
๎€žis executive-branch authority to implement NEPA
has garnered strong judicial deference and remained
unquestioned despite prevailing๎€ doctrine to the
opposite e๎€Ÿect. ๎€že paradox of NEPA also creates an
opportunity, as the presidentโ€™s constitutional authority
could likewise be used to put NEPAโ€™s more substan-
tive elements into e๎€Ÿect. NEPAโ€™s administration can
and should inform a refocused approach by the White
House that executes NEPA to its fullest potential: the
making of America into a sustainable๎€civilization.
I. Introduction
A. Questions Plague CEQโ€™s Role
๎€že Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was cre-
ated by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),1
which by its terms casts CEQ as an advisor to the presi-
dent. President Richard M. Nixon ๎€rst ordered CEQ in
1970 to create gu idelines for federa l agencies to follow in
discharging their duties under the statute. ๎€žose guidelines
also in๎€Œuenced the courts that ๎€rst interpreted NEPA in
some obvious and some subtle ways.
In 1977, President Jimmy Carter ordered that CEQ
issue rules binding on all agencies, replacing the informal
guidelines with purportedly binding regulations imple-
menting NEPA. Did that make CEQ NEPAโ€™s adminis-
tering agency? Can presidential action of this sort entitle
CEQโ€™s interpretations of NEPA to Chevron2 deference? If
so, what of the โ€œagencies of the Federal Governmentโ€ that
are charged by the statute with generating its โ€œdetailed
statementsโ€ and pursuing its โ€œnational policyโ€?
In practice, CEQโ€™s ru les have been regarded by courts
and most action agencies as law, at least in a sense. Yet, the
CEQ rules cover only a tiny fraction of NEPAโ€™s domain.
๎€žey say virtually nothing about the priorities t hat deci-
sionmakers should set, the types of environmental damage
we must strive to avoid, or the ways that environmental
risks and bene๎€ts should be balanced. ๎€že U.S. Supreme
Court has ad monished the lower federal courts repeatedly
that it is not the courtsโ€™ place to opine on any of that, and
has done so emphatically and often enough that virtually
no one contends otherwise. ๎€žis leaves NEPAโ€™s substance
virtually ignored by both CEQโ€™s interpretations and those
of reviewing courts.
CEQ and its rules are more than some errant departure
from prevailing doctrine, though. ๎€žey demonstrate some-
thing fundamental about our presidentโ€™s authority in the
administrative state and perhaps how presidents exert their
most enduring in๎€Œuences. If a n administration hopes to
utilize NEPA to its fullest potential in setting the nationโ€™s
environmental agenda, it would do well to understand the
paradoxes of NEPAโ€™s administration to date.
B. Background on NEPAโ€™s Administration
NEPAโ€™s administration has been full of paradox. ๎€že
authority of the president and CEQ to implement NEPA,
garnering strong judicial deference in doing so, remain
unquestioned despite prevailing doctrine to the opposite
1. 42 U.S.C. ยงยง4321-4370f, ELR S๎€š๎€—๎€š. NEPA ยงยง2-209.
2. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 14
ELR 20507 (1984).
๎€ข๎–๎•๎‰๎๎“๎€ˆ๎”๎€๎€ฏ๎๎•๎†๎€›๎€๎€ช๎€๎•๎‰๎‚๎๎Œ๎€๎€ฃ๎Š๎๎๎€๎€ข๎๎…๎“๎†๎†๎๎€๎€๎€ณ๎๎ƒ๎€๎€ง๎Š๎”๎„๎‰๎Ž๎‚๎๎€๎€๎€ด๎‚๎Ž๎€๎€ฌ๎‚๎๎†๎๎€๎€๎€ฌ๎Š๎•๎€
๎€ฌ๎Š๎๎‘๎๎“๎•๎”๎€๎€๎€ซ๎–๎…๎€๎€ฎ๎‚๎•๎•๎‰๎†๎˜๎”๎€๎€๎€ซ๎†๎ƒฌ๎€๎€ฑ๎๎‹๎‚๎๎๎˜๎”๎Œ๎Š๎€๎€๎€ฃ๎Š๎๎๎€๎€ณ๎๎…๎ˆ๎†๎“๎”๎€๎€๎€ฅ๎‚๎๎€๎€ต๎‚๎“๎๎๎„๎Œ๎€๎€
๎‚๎๎…๎€๎•๎‰๎†๎€๎๎‚๎•๎†๎€๎€ซ๎๎†๎€๎€ด๎‚๎™๎€๎‡๎๎“๎€๎‰๎†๎๎‘๎‡๎–๎๎€๎„๎๎Ž๎Ž๎†๎๎•๎”๎€๎‚๎๎…๎€๎„๎๎๎—๎†๎“๎”๎‚๎•๎Š๎๎๎”๎€
Copyright ยฉ 2015 Environmental Law Instituteยฎ, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELRยฎ, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
45 ELR 10288 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 4-2015
e๎€Ÿect. NEPA nowhere vests the authority to โ€œadministerโ€ it
as a whole, yet it is precisely the sort of policyma king stat-
ute that courts know is not for their administration. NEPA
is renowned for its oft-copied procedural innovation: the
environmental impact statement (EIS). Yet, the statuteโ€™s
real goals are no less than the remaking of America into a
sustainable civilization.
Finally, the authority that has made NEPA regulations
โ€œlawโ€โ€”the presidentโ€™s power to guide and supervise o๎€œcers
of the United States who execute the lawโ€” also estranges
them from NEPAโ€™s champions. NEPAโ€™s typical champions
are environmental progressives who regard the โ€œimperia l
presidentโ€ skeptically and have attacked White House reg-
ulatory review for a generation.3 To them, executive power
is usually cravenly political and anti-environment.
Yet, it is the presidentโ€™s constitutional powers that
ground the very NEPA rules forming t he basis of contem-
porary NEPA law. Indeed, as I arg ue here, only the presi-
dentโ€™s constitutional authority to see that laws are executed
can put NEPAโ€™s more substantive elements into e๎€Ÿect. Part
II of this Article explains what it means for an agency to be
the administering authority of a goal statute. Part III traces
the evolution of NEPA from nonbinding CEQ guidelines
to CEQโ€™s regulations and their place in contemporary law.
Part IV reconciles NEPAโ€™s administration with prevail-
ing Supreme Court doctrines on agency authority. Part V
argues that NEPAโ€™s administration can and should inform
a refocused approach by the White House that executes
NEPA to its fullest potential.
II. An Agencyโ€™s Authority to Administer
๎€žis part introduces key terms and relationships in under-
standing NEPA and its implementation since 1970. Section
A describes what modern courts have cal led the authority
to administer a statute. Section B traces the outlines of a
typical regulatory agency and the ways that it makes law.
A. Authority to Administer a Statute
Whether an agency is empowered with what might be
called jurisdictional authorityโ€”the authority to govern
others with the binding force of lawโ€”was long overlooked
in court.4 Only where a challengerโ€™s case or controversy5
3. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, ๎€ค๎‰๎†๎„๎Œ๎”๎€๎€ธ๎Š๎•๎‰๎๎–๎•๎€๎€ฃ๎‚๎๎‚๎๎„๎†๎€›๎€๎€ฆ๎™๎†๎„๎–๎•๎Š๎—๎†๎€ ๎€ฐ๎ƒฏ๎„๎†๎€๎€ฐ๎—๎†๎“-
๎”๎Š๎ˆ๎‰๎•๎€๎๎‡๎€๎•๎‰๎†๎€๎€ฆ๎๎—๎Š๎“๎๎๎Ž๎†๎๎•๎‚๎๎€๎€ฑ๎“๎๎•๎†๎„๎•๎Š๎๎๎€๎€ข๎ˆ๎†๎๎„๎š, 54 L. ๎€ƒ C๎€•๎€›๎€š๎€™๎€‰๎€. P๎€˜๎€•๎€“๎€‘. 127
(1991); ๎€ฑ๎“๎†๎”๎Š๎…๎†๎๎•๎Š๎‚๎๎€๎€ฎ๎‚๎๎‚๎ˆ๎†๎Ž๎†๎๎•๎€ ๎๎‡๎€๎•๎‰๎†๎€๎€ข๎…๎Ž๎Š๎๎Š๎”๎•๎“๎‚๎•๎Š๎—๎†๎€๎€ด๎•๎‚๎•๎†, 51 D๎€Ž๎€†๎€™ L.J.
963 (2001); and ๎€ธ๎‰๎๎€ˆ๎”๎€๎Š๎๎€๎€ค๎‰๎‚๎“๎ˆ๎†๎€ ๎€๎€ฅ๎๎†๎”๎€๎•๎‰๎†๎€๎€ฑ๎“๎†๎”๎Š๎…๎†๎๎•๎€๎€ฉ๎‚๎—๎†๎€๎€ฅ๎Š๎“๎†๎„๎•๎Š๎—๎†๎€๎€ข๎–๎•๎‰๎๎“-
๎Š๎•๎š๎€๎€ฐ๎—๎†๎“๎€ ๎€ข๎ˆ๎†๎๎„๎š๎€๎€ณ๎†๎ˆ๎–๎๎‚๎•๎๎“๎š๎€ ๎€ฅ๎†๎„๎Š๎”๎Š๎๎๎”๎€ , 79 F๎€•๎€˜๎€ˆ๎€๎€—๎€‰ L. R๎€™๎€‹. 2487 (2011)
[hereinafter Percival, ๎€ธ๎‰๎๎€ˆ๎”๎€๎Š๎๎€๎€ค๎‰๎‚๎“๎ˆ๎†๎€ ].
4. See ๎€žomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, ๎€ข๎ˆ๎†๎๎„๎š๎€ ๎€ณ๎–๎๎†๎”๎€๎€ธ๎Š๎•๎‰๎€ ๎•๎‰๎†๎€
๎€ง๎๎“๎„๎†๎€๎๎‡๎€ ๎€ญ๎‚๎˜๎€›๎€ ๎‡ฒ๎†๎€ ๎€ฐ๎“๎Š๎ˆ๎Š๎๎‚๎๎€ ๎€ค๎๎๎—๎†๎๎•๎Š๎๎, 116 H๎€—๎€˜๎€‹. L. R๎€™๎€‹. 467, 529-37
(2002). ๎€žomas Merrill and Kathryn Watts identi๎€ed at least eight di๎€Ÿerent
Supreme Court opinions of the last century where the Court ignored the
granting or withholding of agency jurisdictional authority. Id. at 528 n.306.
๎€žey singled out Mourning v. Family Pubs. Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 373-77
(1973), and ๎‡ฒ๎๎“๎‘๎†๎€๎—๎€๎€๎€ฉ๎๎–๎”๎Š๎๎ˆ๎€๎€ข๎–๎•๎‰๎€๎€ ๎๎‡๎€๎•๎‰๎†๎€๎€ค๎Š๎•๎š๎€๎๎‡๎€ ๎€ฅ๎–๎“๎‰๎‚๎Ž, 393 U.S. 268,
274-81 (1969), as โ€œthe low-water mark in terms of attention to congressio-
nal delegations of power to agencies to act with the force of law.โ€ Id. at 537.
5. U.S. C๎€•๎€›๎€‘๎€š., art. III, ยง2.
turns on the matter must a court reach a determination.6
Indeed, in pa rt because of the structure of our judicial
power, three distinct questions of agency authority have
often run together here: (1)๎€the availability a nd scope of
judicial review of agency action; (2)๎€ the degree of defer-
ence, if any, owed by courts to agenciesโ€™ interpretations of
law; and (3)๎€whether agency actions possess the properties
of law. ๎€že โ€œsystem of judicial remedies,โ€ as Prof. Louis L.
Ja๎€Ÿe called it,7 has worked as a powerful constraint on the
judiciaryโ€™s attention to these issues.
An exception is Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, where the
entire controversy turned on whether an agencyโ€™s rule
was โ€œlawโ€ within the meaning of the governing statute.8
To resolve the issue, the Supreme Court had to establish
whether and which of the agencyโ€™s rules could possess the
properties of law. ๎€že preemption of inconsistent state law,
the creation or revision of โ€œsubstantive .๎€.๎€. individual rights
and obligations,โ€ and other similar properties were held up
as the indicia of agency rules that ๎€t the description of law.9
In order for agency rules to โ€œhave โ€˜the force and e๎€Ÿect of
law,โ€™โ€ the Court held, โ€œit is necessar y to establish a nexus
between the [rule] and some delegation of the requisite leg-
islative authority by [the U.S.] Congress.โ€10 An executive
order directing that agencies pursue some policy or take
other action was not su๎€œcient to the task, according to the
Chrysler Court.11
๎€že Courtโ€™s drift on this set of issues long left its prec-
edents virtually irreconcilable.12 Several of the precedents
cited in Chevron13 had con๎€Œated the Chrysler issue with
what deference is owed to an agencyโ€™s interpretation of
law.14 Chevron itself was less about U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) delegations of authority in the
Clean Air Act (CAA)15 than it was about EPAโ€™s particular
CAA interpretation being challenged.16 EPAโ€™s interpreta-
6. See, e.g., National Petroleum Re๎€ners Assโ€™n v. Federal Trade Commโ€™n, 482
F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973); National Nutritional Foods Assโ€™n v. Weinberger,
512 F.2d 688, 694-98 (2d Cir. 1975); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Adams Fruit
Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990); Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 24 ELR
20511 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
7. L๎€•๎€Ž๎€–๎€‘ L. J๎€—๎€„๎€„๎€™, J๎€Ž๎€ˆ๎€–๎€’๎€–๎€—๎€” C๎€•๎€›๎€š๎€˜๎€•๎€” ๎€•๎€„ A๎€ˆ๎€‰๎€–๎€›๎€–๎€‘๎€š๎€˜๎€—๎€š๎€–๎€‹๎€™ A๎€’๎€š๎€–๎€•๎€› 152
(1965).
8. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 294-316.
9. Id. at 295-302.
10. Id. at 304.
11. Id. at 303-08; see also United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212, 219 (1957).
12. Inconsistency by the Court is perhaps to be expected. See Frank H. Easter-
brook, ๎€ธ๎‚๎š๎”๎€๎๎‡๎€๎€ค๎“๎Š๎•๎Š๎„๎Š๎›๎Š๎๎ˆ๎€๎•๎‰๎†๎€๎€ค๎๎–๎“๎•, 95 H๎€—๎€˜๎€‹. L. R๎€™๎€‹. 802, 823-31 (1982)
(arguing that the Court is bound to exhibit inconsistency over time). But see
M๎€–๎€’๎€๎€—๎€™๎€” J. G๎€™๎€˜๎€๎€—๎€˜๎€ˆ๎€š, T๎€๎€™ P๎€•๎€…๎€™๎€˜ ๎€•๎€„ P๎€˜๎€™๎€’๎€™๎€ˆ๎€™๎€›๎€š 79 (2008) (judges โ€œgen-
erally know from experience, training, and temperament [that] they cannot
be too disdainful of precedents or else they risk having other justices show
the same, or even more, disdain for their preferred precedentsโ€) Michael
Gerhardt calls this โ€œthe golden rule.โ€
13. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
14 ELR 20507 (1984).
14. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-25 (1977); Morton v. Ruiz,
415 U.S. 199, 231-37 (1974); Mourning v. Family Pubs. Serv., Inc., 411
U.S. 356, 369-70 (1973); see Merrill & Watts, supra note 4, at 528-87; ๎„๎‡๎€
Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury ๎‚๎๎…๎€๎•๎‰๎†๎€๎€ข๎…๎Ž๎Š๎๎Š๎”๎•๎“๎‚๎•๎Š๎—๎†๎€๎€ด๎•๎‚๎•๎†, 83 C๎€•๎€”๎€Ž๎€‰. L.
R๎€™๎€‹. 1, 5-6 (1983).
15. 42 U.S.C. ยงยง7401-7671q, ELR S๎€š๎€—๎€š. CAA ยงยง101-618.
16. ๎€že U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit had
twice previously construed the CAAโ€™s term โ€œstationary source,โ€ both times
Copyright ยฉ 2015 Environmental Law Instituteยฎ, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELRยฎ, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
4-2015 NEWS & ANALYSIS 45 ELR 10289
tion was contrary to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit precedent construing the
CAA, and that courtโ€™s reversal of EPA was, in largest part,
protecting its judicial power to settle the law.17 But stat-
utes like the C AA, the Supreme Court warned,18 do more
to charge administrative agencies with missions and goals
than they do to create standards of conduct by which any-
oneโ€”including the agencyโ€”shall be judged.19
Chevronโ€™s directions proved much easier to signal than
to follow. Precedents addressing our three di๎€Ÿerent ques-
tions (with less than perspicuous reasoning) had long
seemed virtually interchangeable.20 For years a fter Chev-
ron, commentators and courts focused on whether and to
what extent t he decision had overruled the mountain of
precedents factoring out whether and to what degree courts
should defer to agenciesโ€™ interpretations of law.21 Statutes
must, af ter all, grant federal courts jurisdiction to review
administrative agency action.22 So, the di๎€Ÿerences between
rejecting EPAโ€™s interpretation. See ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 8
ELR 20164 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323,
10 ELR 20001 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
17. ๎€žen-Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburgโ€™s opinion in ๎€ฏ๎‚๎•๎–๎“๎‚๎๎€๎€ณ๎†๎”๎€๎€ ๎€ฅ๎†๎‡๎€๎€
Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720, 12 ELR 20942 (D.C. Cir.
1982), began by noting that โ€œ[i]n ruling upon EPAโ€™s regulatory change, we
do not write on a clean slate.โ€ After describing the holdings in ๎€ข๎€ด๎€ข๎€ณ๎€ค๎€ฐ
and ๎€ข๎๎‚๎ƒ๎‚๎Ž๎‚๎€๎€ฑ๎๎˜๎†๎“, the D.C. Circuit panel found itself โ€œimpelledโ€ by those
precedents to overrule EPAโ€™s interpretation of the term stationary source.
Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 720 & n.7 (quoting Potomac Alliance v. NRC, 682
F.2d 1030, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Curiously, even as it disclaimed any
view or judgment not dictated by ๎€ข๎€ด๎€ข๎€ณ๎€ค๎€ฐ or ๎€ข๎๎‚๎ƒ๎‚๎Ž๎‚๎€๎€ฑ๎๎˜๎†๎“, the court
then took eight pages to explain why EPAโ€™s regulations were contrary to the
Actโ€™s structure and legislative history. Id. at 721-28.
18. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (โ€œIf Congress has explicitly left a gap for
the agency to ๎€ll, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a speci๎€c provision of the statute by regulation.โ€).
19. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, ๎€ญ๎‚๎˜๎€๎‚๎๎…๎€๎€ญ๎†๎ˆ๎Š๎”๎๎‚๎•๎Š๎๎๎€๎Š๎๎€๎•๎‰๎†๎€๎€ข๎…๎Ž๎Š๎๎Š๎”๎•๎“๎‚๎•๎Š๎—๎†๎€๎€ด๎•๎‚๎•๎†,
89 C๎€•๎€”๎€Ž๎€‰. L. R๎€™๎€‹. 369 (1989).
20. ๎€ค๎‡๎€ Frank C. Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35 C๎€—๎€”. L. R๎€™๎€‹.
509, 513 (1947) (โ€œ๎€že Supreme Court has decided hundreds of cases which
relate to regulations. In most, the dispute has involved only validity; or
words of a regulation were quoted merely to justify some other .๎€.๎€. hold-
ing.โ€) (citations omitted). Frank Newman reviewed dozens of cases involv-
ing interpretive, jurisdictional, or both types of authority and concluded
that โ€œ[t]he rule of deference casesโ€ had come to ser ve as โ€œprecedents for
nearly all other cases.โ€ Id. at 528. In decisions relaxing the restrictions on
interpreting delegations of lawmaking power, it has been commonplace to
cite precedents that involve deferring to agenciesโ€™ interpretations of their en-
abling statutes. See, e.g., National Petroleum Re๎€ners Assโ€™n v. Federal Trade
Commโ€™n, 482 F.2d 672, 676-97 (D.C. Cir. 1973); National Nutritional
Foods Assโ€™n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 695-99 (2d Cir. 1975); Santise v.
Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 933-34 (3d Cir. 1982).
21. Compare Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 Y๎€—๎€”๎€™
J. ๎€•๎€› R ๎€™๎€‡. 283, 299 (1986) (โ€œ[I]t is not clear to what extent the โ€˜sliding
scaleโ€™ [factored] approach is still appropriate, or to what extent any of the
factors usually employed in that analysis [of whether a court should defer
to an agencyโ€™s interpretation] are still relevant.โ€), with Stephen Breyer, Ju-
๎…๎Š๎„๎Š๎‚๎๎€๎€ณ๎†๎—๎Š๎†๎˜๎€๎๎‡๎€ ๎€ฒ๎–๎†๎”๎•๎Š๎๎๎”๎€๎๎‡๎€๎€ญ๎‚๎˜๎€ ๎‚๎๎…๎€๎€ฑ๎๎๎Š๎„๎š, 38 A๎€ˆ๎€‰๎€–๎€›. L. R๎€™๎€‹. 363, 373
(1986) (โ€œTo read Chevron as laying down a blanket ru le, applicable to a ll
agency interpretations of law, such as โ€˜always defer to t he agency when
the statute is si lent,โ€™ would be seriously overbroad, cou nterproductive and
sometimes senseless.โ€).
22. Whether by way of express or implied preclusion of review, the default po-
sition in availability of review has long been that some statute must both
authorize and locate the appropriate forum of judicial review. See, e.g.,
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 15 ELR 20335 (1985); Block v. Com-
munity Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984); FTC v. Standard Oil of Cal.,
449 U.S. 232 (1980); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); FCC v.
Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); United States v. Los Angeles &
S.L.R. Co., 373 U.S. 299, 308-13 (1927). On the gradual transition from
jurisdictional and interpretive authority had confounded
reviewing cour ts not merely in how to review an agencyโ€™s
interpretation of legislation23; the di๎€Ÿerences had also con-
founded courts in how they interpret their own authority
to act.24 Put simply, Chevronโ€™s precedentโ€”whether syn-
thesis or revolution25โ€”could scarcely have prevented our
three issues from intermixing.26
Finally, the Chevron case was an odd vessel of change:
๎€že opinionโ€™s author, Justice John Paul Stevens, seems not
to have been onboard27; the opinion simply ignored con-
trary authority28; and in retrospect, its grounds seem satu-
rated w ith irony if not mistaken.29 Deriving legal norms
from judicial reasoning is never easy.30 In practice, โ€œ[t]he
Court has no rules for determining the breadth or narrow-
ness of a particular ruling, how much or how little defer-
ence a justice ought to give a prior decision, the requisite
conditions for determining error,โ€ or โ€œhow to prioritize
sources of decision, or how to read prior cases, including
the appropriate level of generality at which to state the
principles set forth within precedents.โ€31
๎€že Court is well aware of its duty to settle the law.32
Using a sequence of opinions to elaborate, the Court even-
the common-law writs to the 20th centuryโ€™s statutory regime, see J๎€™๎€˜๎€˜๎€Š L.
M๎€—๎€‘๎€๎€—๎€…, C๎€˜๎€™๎€—๎€š๎€–๎€›๎€‡ ๎€š๎€๎€™ A๎€ˆ๎€‰๎€–๎€›๎€–๎€‘๎€š๎€˜๎€—๎€š๎€–๎€‹๎€™ C๎€•๎€›๎€‘๎€š๎€–๎€š๎€Ž๎€š๎€–๎€•๎€›: T๎€๎€™ L๎€•๎€‘๎€š O๎€›๎€™
H๎€Ž๎€›๎€ˆ๎€˜๎€™๎€ˆ Y๎€™๎€—๎€˜๎€‘ ๎€•๎€„ A๎€‰๎€™๎€˜๎€–๎€’๎€—๎€› A๎€ˆ๎€‰๎€–๎€›๎€–๎€‘๎€š๎€˜๎€—๎€š๎€–๎€‹๎€™ L๎€—๎€… (2012).
23. ๎€ค๎‡๎€ General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-44 (1975) (holding that
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) lacked author-
ity to issue guidelines interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
contrary to the Supreme Courtโ€™s interpretation).
24. Compare FCC v. American Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284, 286-96 (1954)
(holding that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) exceeded
the scope of its authority to enforce its statute and that, therefore, the chal-
lengersโ€™ actions were properly heard in the district court), with Columbia
Broad. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 415-25 (1942) (๎€nding
that the order promulgating the regulations that the broadcasters challenged
was within the scope of the jurisdiction-conferring statute because the regu-
lations were determinative of the challengersโ€™ primary conduct rights).
25. ๎€ค๎‡๎€ S๎€š๎€™๎€๎€๎€™๎€› G. B๎€˜๎€™๎€Š๎€™๎€˜ ๎€™๎€š ๎€—๎€”., A๎€ˆ๎€‰๎€–๎€›๎€–๎€‘๎€š๎€˜๎€—๎€š๎€–๎€‹๎€™ L๎€—๎€… ๎€—๎€›๎€ˆ R๎€™๎€‡๎€Ž๎€”๎€—๎€š๎€•๎€˜๎€Š
P๎€•๎€”๎€–๎€’๎€Š 282 (7th ed. 2011) (beginning the discussion of Chevron by ques-
tioning whether the decision was a synthesis or a revolution).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Oโ€™Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (Securities
Exchange Commission entitled to Chevron deference in interpreting its gov-
erning statute because the statute gave the agency authority to adopt rules);
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392 (1999) (Chevron
cited for giving โ€œcontrolling weightโ€ to an agencyโ€™s interpretation of its own
regulation interpreting its statutes); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000) (Chevron deference was denied to the
Food & Drug Administrationโ€™s interpretation inferring jurisdictional au-
thority from one statute in part because of other, subsequent statutesโ€™ denial
of such authority).
27. See ๎€žomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens and the Chevron ๎€ฑ๎–๎›๎›๎๎†, 106 N๎€…. U.
L. R๎€™๎€‹. 551, 556-60 (2012) (noting evidence from retired Justiceโ€™s papers
and his own subsequent opinions that Justice John Paul Stevens had no
intention of changing the law through his Chevron opinion).
28. See Starr, supra note 21, at 298-300.
29. Chevron purports to be an interpretationโ€”or at least a constructive rehabili-
tationโ€”of congressional intent. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 14 ELR 20507 (1984); United
States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001). But the interpretation seems
based less on hard evidence than on intuition. See Cynthia Farina, Statu-
๎•๎๎“๎š๎€๎€ช๎๎•๎†๎“๎‘๎“๎†๎•๎‚๎•๎Š๎๎๎€๎‚๎๎…๎€ ๎•๎‰๎†๎€๎€ฃ๎‚๎๎‚๎๎„๎†๎€ ๎๎‡๎€๎€ฑ๎๎˜๎†๎“๎€๎Š๎๎€ ๎•๎‰๎†๎€๎€ข๎…๎Ž๎Š๎๎Š๎”๎•๎“๎‚๎•๎Š๎—๎†๎€๎€ด๎•๎‚๎•๎†, 89
C๎€•๎€”๎€Ž๎€‰. L. R๎€™๎€‹. 452, 471 (1989).
30. See F๎€˜๎€™๎€ˆ๎€™๎€˜๎€–๎€’๎€† S๎€’๎€๎€—๎€Ž๎€™๎€˜, T๎€๎€–๎€›๎€†๎€–๎€›๎€‡ L๎€–๎€†๎€™ ๎€— L๎€—๎€…๎€Š๎€™๎€˜, A N๎€™๎€… I๎€›๎€š๎€˜๎€•๎€ˆ๎€Ž๎€’๎€š๎€–๎€•๎€›
๎€š๎€• L๎€™๎€‡๎€—๎€” R๎€™๎€—๎€‘๎€•๎€›๎€–๎€›๎€‡ 36-60 (2009).
31. G๎€™๎€˜๎€๎€—๎€˜๎€ˆ๎€š, supra note 12, at 104-05.
32. Compare Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (โ€œIt is usually more important that a rule be settled, than that it
be settled right.โ€), with Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson,
Copyright ยฉ 2015 Environmental Law Instituteยฎ, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELRยฎ, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

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