The adjudication of genocide: gacaca and the road to reconciliation in Rwanda.

• Author: Sosnov, Maya

INTRODUCTION

In 1994, Rwanda suffered one of the worst genocides in history. During 100 days of killing, 800,000 people died. (2) More people died in three months than in over four years of conflict in Yugoslavia; moreover, the speed of killing was five times faster than the Nazi execution of the Final Solution. (3) Unlike the killings that occurred during the Holocaust, Rwandaus engaged in "a populist genocide," in which many members of society, including children, participated in killing their neighbors with common farm tools (the most popular was the machete). (4) While not all Hutus engaged in killing and not all victims were Tutsi, Hutus executed the vast majority of the killings and Tutsis were largely the target of their aggression. (5)

Fourteen years after the genocide, Rwanda is still struggling with how to rebuild the country and handle the mass atrocities that occurred. During the first four years following the genocide, four types of courts developed to prosecute genocidaires: (6) the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, foreign courts exercising universal jurisdiction, domestic criminal courts, and a domestic military tribunal. Regrettably, none of these courts has been able to resolve the enormous problems related to adjudicating genocide suspects. In 2001, the government created gacaca, a fifth system for prosecuting genocidaires, to solve the problems it saw in the other courts. Gacaca is highly lauded by the government and many outside observers as the solution to Rwanda's genocide. A researcher, who studied two gacaca pilot programs for five months, noted that "[t]he official discourse is so passionate about gacaca and its anticipated outcome that the system is almost granted a mythical status." (7)

Unfortunately, gacaca cannot fully operate as either a court or a customary dispute resolution mechanism because of its twin goals: retribution and reconciliation. Moreover, Rwanda's limited resources and the astounding number of suspects require enormous revisions to gacaca. This paper explores why Rwanda implemented gacaca, the reasons for gacaca's failure and possible solutions for moving forward. Part I presents an overview of the history of ethnic tension in Rwanda, the events leading up to genocide, and the genocide itself. Part II examines the four courts created before gacaca to adjudicate genocide, their failures in the eyes of the Rwandan government and international observers, and the government's creation of gacaca. Part III explores the goals of the Rwandan gacaca model, and whether they are attainable or desirable. Part IV examines gacaca courts' failure to implement criminal procedure protections. Part V suggests revisions to the current adjudication of genocide suspects, including an alternative model of gacaca. Additionally, this section highlights the importance of addressing Rwandans' economic struggles, as a necessary element of reconciliation. Part VI concludes the article.

1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF RWANDA

   Disagreement among Rwandans on critical aspects of the nation's history continues to be a major impediment to reconciliation. The Organization of African Unity remarks that "there are hardly any important aspects of the story that are not complex and controversial; it is almost impossible to write on the subject without inadvertently oversimplifying something or angering someone." (8) One of the most controversial issues is the origin of ethnic groups in Rwanda. (9) Before the genocide, the ethnic make-up of Rwanda was 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa. (10) Although these ethnicities were clearly defined, it is unclear how they developed. (ll) Since the end of genocide, the government has promoted a version of history in which Tutsi and Hutu peacefully co-existed before colonialism. (12) The government's official website claims that "[w]hile the relationship between the king and the rest of the population was unequal, the relationship between the ordinary Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa (13) was one of mutual benefit mainly through the exchange of their labour. The relationship was symbiotic." (14) However, many Hutus believe that Tutsi herders were foreigners to Rwanda who considered themselves superior to the Hutu pastoralists and took control of the region between the eleventh and fifteenth century. (15) The failure of the Tutsi-controlled government to address the Hutu version of history further highlights the significant ideological split between Tutsis and Hums. Hutus and Tutsis view themselves as different ethnic groups, even though they share the same language (Kinyarwanda), culture, clan names, customs, taboos, and have intermarried for centuries. (16) The government has avoided confronting these conflicting beliefs between ethnic groups and has banned the use of ethnic categories because it is afraid of inflaming ethnic tensions. (17) However, the government's lack of healthy outlets in society for Rwandans to face these differences and resolve them has forced these tensions to erupt in courtrooms and gacaca. Since 1994, no history lessons have been taught in Rwandan schools because no consensus exists on the past, and government publications refuse to include an ethnic breakdown of society. (18)

   Whether or not the ethnic divisions began in pre-colonial times, they were exploited during colonialism. Colonists considered Tutsis to be the missing link between blacks and whites because many Tutsi were lighter skinned, thinner, and taller than the Hutus. (19) As a result, Tutsis were placed in positions of authority over Hums. In 1935, Belgian colonists introduced ethnic identity cards ("tribal cards") to Rwandans. (20) Ironically, these cards provided the lists of Tutsis to be targeted for killing during the genocide. (21) Prior to the introduction of identity cards, Hutus could become Tutsis with the acquisition of cattle; however, ethnic identity cards ended this practice. (22) For the majority of the colonial period, up until 1959, Tutsis dominated local government and the educational arena. (23) In 1959, Hutus forcibly took power following the death of the Tutsi monarch, killing Tutsis and forcing many others into exile, (24) By 1962, when Belgium granted independence to Rwanda, Hutus controlled the government and more than 200,000 Tuttis were in exile. (25)

   Since independence, there have been several power struggles between Hutus and Tutsis, including a series of massacres that occurred in 1963, 1964, 1973, 1990, 1992, and 1993. (26) In August 1993, Hutus and Tutsis signed the Arusha Peace Accord and appeared to reach a power sharing agreement. (27) The United Nations (UN) Security Council sent 2,500 UN troops to Rwanda to monitor the treaty. (28) Although peace seemed near to the outside world, as early as January 1994, Major General Romeo Dallaire, UN commander in Rwanda, notified the UN that the Hutu government planned to exterminate the Tutsis. (29) On April 6, 1994, the airplane of President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, was shot down and genocide began within the hour. (30) Rather than increasing the number of soldiers, as requested by Major General Dallaire, the UN withdrew troops, leaving 270 UN soldiers in Rwanda under a mandate only to "monitor" the situation. (31) Over the next three months 800,000 people died in the genocide. (32)

2. A RWANDAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE FOUR COURTS ESTABLISHED TO ADJUDICATE GENOCIDE

   1. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

      Shortly after the genocide, the Rwandan government requested the help of the UN to form an international tribunal to prosecute genocide suspects because there were hardly any lawyers or judges in the country. (33) In November 1994, the UN Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). (34) The UN based its authority to create the ICTR on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (35) The ICTR has the power to "prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighboring states." (36) The jurisdiction of the ICTR extends to individuals (37) suspected of committing genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. (38) Although the Rwandan government initially supported formation of the international tribunal, Rwanda was the only member of the UN Security Council to vote against the ICTR. (39)

      There are several reasons why Rwanda voted against the ICTR. One of its main objections was the ICTR's lack of a death penalty. (40) The Rwandan government feared that the masterminds of the genocide would receive prison terms, while subordinates and lower-ranked perpetrators, found guilty in national court, would receive the death penalty. (41) Second, the government was not in favor of the limited temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal to handle incidents that occurred between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994. (42) The Rwandan government was unhappy with the ICTR's time frame because genocide planning began in 1990. (43) Third, the government wanted the ICTR to have the power to prosecute groups and organizations responsible for promulgating the genocide, rather than its limited ability to prosecute only "natural persons." (44) Lastly, the government felt strongly that the ICTR should be located within Rwanda, rather than in Arusha, Tanzania. (45)

      In April 1998, Rwanda issued a formal position paper to the UN entitled The Position of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). (46) The government criticized the ICTR for poor organization, personnel problems, lack of a prosecutorial and investigation strategy, poor conduct in investigations (failure to investigate some of the areas where the worst atrocities were committed), and poor prosecutorial conduct. (47) In conclusion, the...