46 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
CAN GOVERNMENTS ENSURE ADHERENCE TO THE
POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE IN THE LONG-TERM
CCS LIABILITY CONTEXT?
by Paul Bailey, Elizabeth McCullough, and Sonya Suter*
It is well-accepted within the scientiﬁc community that
global climate change is a real and urgent challenge
facing the planet.1 One technological method that has gained
signiﬁcant support from government and industry for reducing
global emissions of carbon dioxide (“CO2”), the most prevalent
anthropogenic greenhouse gas,2 is carbon capture and sequestration
(“CCS”).3 CCS is a process by which CO2 is isolated from an
emissions stream, compressed, and transported to a CO2 storage
facility deep underground where it is stored permanently.4 How-
ever, two regulatory barriers to widespread CCS deployment
include (1) the lack of comprehensive climate change legisla-
tion including a price on carbon and (2) the lack of regulatory
certainty surrounding long-term CCS liabilities.5 This ar ticle
focuses on the second of these two barriers.
This article analyzes possible regulatory frameworks to
address long-term CCS liabilities from the perspective of the
Polluter Pays Principle (“PPP”). The analysis begins with a brief
description of CCS’s role in reducing global CO2 emissions
and the regulatory barriers to CCS implementation. Next, the
article introduces the PPP, explaining its origins and inﬂuence
on environmental policy. The article then presents four possible
regulatory frameworks for long-term CCS liabilities within the
PPP context, providing examples of countries and programs
where these frameworks are either in place or proposed. The
frameworks analyzed are: (1) transfer of liability, (2) govern-
ment indemniﬁcation, (3) owner/operator retention of long-term
liabilities without ﬁnancial responsibility requirements, and (4)
an industry-funded pooled trust fund. Finally, this article con-
cludes that an industry-funded pooled trust fund is the frame-
work most in line with the PPP in the CCS context because it is
the scenario in which the polluter is most likely to pay for, and
the public is most likely to avoid, the greatest portion of long-
term CCS liability costs.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND CARBON CAPTURE AND
Climate change is a term that refers to major alterations in
the climate (i.e. temperature, extreme weather events, droughts,
and higher sea levels) that is attributed directly or indirectly to
human activity that alters the composition of the global atmo-
sphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability
observed over comparable periods of time.6 Although the Earth’s
climate has changed many times throughout its history, the rapid
warming seen today exceeds any changes over the past 650,000
years and cannot rationally be explained by natural processes.7
Many greenhouse gases, like water vapor and CO2, which trap heat
in the atmosphere, occur naturally.8 However, human activities,
including fuel burning, are adding large amounts of CO2 to the
natural mix of atmospheric gases at a rapid rate that is projected
to increase in the coming years.9 The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change in its 2007 Fourth Assessment Report
determined that “most of the observed increase in global aver-
age temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely
due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas
concentrations,” with the term “very likely” corresponding to at
least ninety percent certainty.10 According to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”):
Climate change is a real and urgent challenge that is
already affecting people and the environment world-
wide. Signiﬁcant changes are occurring on the Earth,
including increasing air and ocean temperatures, wide-
spread melting of snow and ice, and rising sea levels.
. . . For this reason, human-caused climate change
represents a serious challenge – one that could require
new approaches and ways of thinking to ensure the
continued health, welfare, and productivity of society
and the natural environment.11
CCS has emerged as viable a method to reduce these
detrimental GHG emissions.12 During the CCS process, CO2
is isolated from an emissions stream, compressed, transported,
and permanently stored underground in a CO2 storage facility.13
While reducing emissions will require multiple strategies,
according to the International Energy Agency’s (“IEA”) World
Energy Outlook for 2011, “[i]f CCS is not widely deployed in the
2020s, an extraordinary burden would rest on other low-carbon
technologies to deliver lower emissions in line with global
climate objectives.”14 The IEA estimates that CCS could account
for approximately ten percent of needed reductions in emissions
* Paul Bailey, J.D., M.P.P. Harvard University, is a Senior Fellow of ICF
International and has over thirty years of experience consulting on many
ﬁnancial assurance issues and programs. Elizabeth McCullough, J.D., American
University Washington College of Law, and Sonya Suter, B.A., in Public Policy
from the University of Michigan, are members of Mr. Bailey’s team consulting
on a variety of environmental policy issues including ﬁnancial assurance, carbon
capture and sequestration, and hazardous waste management.
Currently, there are ﬁfteen CCS projects around the world
that are under construction or in operation, with an additional
fifty-nine in the planning phases.16 These fifteen projects
have the capacity to sequester 35.4 million tons per year of
CO2—approximately the equivalent of Norway’s annual
emissions.17 There is, however, public concern about the safety
and viability of CCS projects. For example, the proposed
Vattenfall Jänschwalde plant in the Brandenburg region of
Germany was recently canceled due, in part, to opposition from
nearby residents, and, in part, to a lack of a legal framework for
CCS.18 Though the European Commission required countries
to establish national CCS legal frameworks, Germany’s 2011
parliament repeatedly failed to pass such a law despite a proposal.19
MAJOR BARRIERS TO WIDESPREAD DEPLOYMENT
OF INDUSTRIAL-SCALE CCS
In August 2010, the U.S. Interagency Task Force on Carbon
Capture and Storage (“Task Force”) identiﬁed several barriers to
the widespread deployment of CCS.20 Two regulatory barriers
that the Task Force identiﬁed include: (1) the lack of comprehen-
sive climate change legislation that establishes a price on carbon
and (2) the lack of regulatory certainty surrounding long-term
CCS liabilities.21 With respect to the ﬁrst, the Task Force stated:
Establishing a clear price signal on GHG emissions . . .
will also put established low-carbon technologies on a
level playing ﬁeld with conventional carbon-emitting
technologies, yield near-term opportunities for emerg-
ing technologies, and create greater market certainty for
long-term investments in new or improved low-carbon
energy technology development.22
Although the Task Force identiﬁed a price on carbon as
a “threshold barrier for further CCS technological develop-
ment,”23 this article focuses on the second barrier and assumes
that comprehensive climate change legislation will be developed
in those jurisdictions where it is currently absent.
The second barrier, the lack of regulatory certainty surround-
ing long-term CCS liabilities, is of particular concern because
financial resources sufficient to cover long-term liabilities
must be available over an indeﬁnite time-frame in order to (1)
fulﬁll CCS’s purpose—permanent storage of CO2—which may
require indeﬁnite stewardship of CCS sites and (2) ensure that
human health and the environment are not negatively impacted.
Following from these two long-term needs, relevant long-term
liabilities can be divided into two major categories: long-term
stewardship and long-term compensatory liability. Long-term
stewardship includes obligations to perform maintenance respon-
sibilities (e.g., long-term water quality monitoring or land use
controls). Long-term compensatory liability includes obligations
to reimburse parties for various types and forms of legally-
compensable losses or damage due to CO2 storage.
THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPAL
The Polluter Pays Principle (“PPP”) is an environmental
policy principle reﬂecting the idea that the costs of pollution
should be borne by those who cause it.24 The PPP has been said
to provide several beneﬁts including promotion of economic
efﬁciency, legal justice, harmonization of international policies,
and deﬁnition of cost allocation within an economy.25
The ﬁrst mention of the PPP at the international level
occurred in the 1972 Recommendation by the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Council on
Guiding Principles concerning International Economic Aspects
of Environmental Policies.26 There the OECD announced: “The
principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution preven-
tion and control measures to encourage rational use of scarce
environmental resources and to avoid distortions in international
trade and investment is the so-called Polluter-Pays Principle.”27
The 1972 Recommendation continued, stating that the polluter
should be responsible for costs associated with pollution preven-
tion and control.28 It also emphasized “the necessity for removal
of subsidies that would prevent polluters from bearing the full
cost of pollution which they caused.” 29
Since the 1972 Recommendation, the PPP has been reaf-
ﬁrmed by other international declarations. Its adoption by the
1992 Rio Declaration is one such example. Principle 16 of the
Declaration states: “National authorities should endeavor to
promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use
of economic instruments, taking into account the approach
that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution,
with due regard to the public interest and without distorting
international trade and investment.”30 As another example, the
Treaty Establishing the European Community provides that “[c]
ommunity policy on the environment [ . . . ] shall be based on
the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive
action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a
priority be rectiﬁed at source and that the polluter should pay.”31
The incorporation of the PPP in multiple international declara-
tions and treaties demonstrates its widespread acceptance as a
legitimate legal principle.
APPLYING PPP TO THE CCS CONTEXT
In the CCS context, CO2 is the pollution that the polluter
ought to pay for under PPP. The polluter in the CCS context
would likely, but not exclusively, be the owner/operator of a coal
or natural gas-ﬁred power plant, which emits CO2 as a byproduct
of producing electricity.32 The operation and maintenance of the
CO2 storage facility, including the cost of all liabilities associ-
ated with the capture, transport, and sequestration of CO2, is the
pollution prevention and control method.33 Despite international
acceptance of the PPP, many governments across the globe have
adopted regulatory frameworks that subsidize the long-term lia-
bility costs associated with CCS.34 Government subsidization of
long-term CCS liabilities transfers a portion of the responsibility
to pay for CO2 pollution away from the CO2 storage facility
owner/operator and onto the public.35
Internationally, regulatory frameworks to deal with long-
term CCS liabilities or long-term liabilities for industries
analogous to CCS come in many different forms, including:
(1) transfer of liability, (2) government indemniﬁcation, (3)
owner/operator retention of long-term liability, without ﬁnancial
48 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
responsibility requirements, and (4) industry funded pooled trust
One option for handling long-term CCS liability is to
transfer long-term CCS liabilities from the CO2 storage facility
owner/operator to the government. Under this arrangement,
the government agrees to accept liability after the CO2 storage
facility stops injecting CO2.36 Although the scope of transferred
liabilities varies, a transfer of liability in the CCS context would
typically include stewardship obligations, requiring indeﬁnite care
of the CO2 storage facility.37 Under these frameworks, certain
liabilities typically remain with the site owner/operator such as
tort liability for releases caused by gross negligence.38
In practice, liability transfer has been enacted by the CCS
regulatory frameworks in the United Kingdom (“UK”), Spain,
and France.39 The United States also takes a similar approach to
regulating long-term liabilities for radioactive waste.40
UK regulations enacted in 2011 allow a CO2 storage facility
operator to transfer responsibility for long-term compensatory
liability and stewardship of its CCS site to the government after
a twenty-year period of monitoring and performing corrective
action as necessary.41 Under this framework, long-term compen-
satory liability includes “any liabilities, whether future or present,
actual or contingent, arising from leakage from the storage com-
plex . . . and includes liabilities for personal injury, damage to
property and economic loss.”42 The operator retains liability for
leakages that occur prior to the transfer and leakages that occur
after the transfer but are due to negligence, deceit, or a failure to
exercise due diligence;43 in the case of a leak where the operator
is at fault, the government may recover its costs.44 The UK
requires operators to pay a ﬁnancial contribution prior to the site
transfer in order to cover the government’s expected post-transfer
costs.45 However, the European Commission guidance on post-
transfer cost estimates, referenced in the UK regulations, seems
to account for monitoring costs only, and not compensatory
liability costs.46 While the guidance explicitly requires that costs
of monitoring be covered for a thirty-year period, it does not
mention any costs related to potential compensatory liability.47
Spain and France employ similar liability transfer
approaches in order to comply with the European Commission’s
2009 Directive on the Geological Storage of CO2.48 Both coun-
tries require a minimum period of thirty years of post-closure
site care and require that an owner or operator meet certain
criteria prior to site liability transfer.49 Spain’s framework also
explicitly includes monitoring, maintenance, corrective action,
storage sealing, removal of the CO2 storage facilities, and com-
pliance with preventative measures and repairs.50 However, the
Spanish government does not assume liability for monitoring
and maintenance costs in cases of operator misconduct. 51
France transfers similar liabilities, including long-term
compensatory liability (for surrendering allowances to offset
leaks), monitoring and veriﬁcation of the safety of the CO2
storage facility, response costs of a post-closure accident, and
clean up after injections cease.52 France also requires the owner/
operator to pay a stewardship contribution to cover a minimum
of thirty years of monitoring.53
These CCS requirements mirror the U.S. approach to
handling long-term liability in its regulation of the disposal of
uranium or thorium byproduct materials, which also requires
indeﬁnite stewardship.54 Disposal sites for these radioactive
materials are covered by the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation
Control Act of 1978 (“UMTRCA”),55 which allows Department
of Energy (“DOE”), another agency, or a state to manage custody
and long-term care of the sites.56 In order for site liability to be
transferred, the operator must have closed the disposal facility
to reduce radioactivity at the site, and prepared a Long-Term
Surveillance Plan.57 Additionally, uranium mill operators must
pay “a minimum of $250,000 (1978 dollars) to cover the costs
of long-term surveillance,” although the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (“NRC”) may adjust this amount.58 Titles to both
the sites and the uranium byproduct material are transferred to
the government permanently59—six sites are currently managed
by DOE, which expects to manage up to twenty-seven60—but
site transfer does not relieve the prior license holder from liability
for fraud or negligence prior to transfer.61 Speciﬁcally, the
requirements for transfer hold that sites transferred to the gov-
ernment should “be such that ongoing active maintenance is not
necessary to preserve isolation.”62
All of these programs in some way incorporate the PPP by
requiring the owner/operator to cover the government’s stewardship
responsibilities and leaving some liability with the owner/opera-
tor in the event of misconduct. However, the degree to which
the cost of pollution will be borne by the owner/operator relies
heavily on both the government’s assessments of future costs
prior to transfer and on the government’s willingness to require
payment of the assessed amount. Additionally, in the event of
owner/operator misconduct, the framework relies on the courts
to enforce payment. Given that CCS is a novel technology with
uncertain costs, assessments of future costs are unlikely to be
consistently accurate and proving misconduct or negligence will
be far from straightforward in the courts. This leaves the strong
possibility that the government and taxpayers would support the
long-term liability of the CCS industry.
The second option is government indemniﬁcation of the
owner/operator’s long-ter m CCS liabilities. Under this arrange-
ment, the government agrees to reimburse the owner/operator
for actual liabilities sustained.63 Here, the indemnifying govern-
ment could limit an indemnity in cases of gross negligence or
misconduct.64 Governmental indemniﬁcation could be provided
for a pre-determined number of demonstration projects, which
would be phased out as CCS commercializes, the cost of CCS
lowers, and liabilities become more predictable.65
Government indemniﬁcation is currently used to regulate
long-term CCS liabilities in Australia.66 Additionally, federal
indemniﬁcation of long-term CCS liabilities was proposed by
U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) in the 112th Congress
on March 31, 2011, which, after having been approved by the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, is awaiting
full Senate consideration.67
The Australian Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas
Storage Act 2006 (“OPGGS Act”) provides mandatory indemniﬁ-
cation by the Australian Government for speciﬁed long-term CCS
liabilities.68 Liability under this law rests with the holder of the
CO2 injection license during the course of the licensed injection
and storage activities.69 Following the cessation of injection
and storage activities, the licensee must apply for a site closure
Assuming the Australian Government is prepared to issue a
site closure certiﬁcate, the licensee will receive a pre-certiﬁcate
notice.71 This notice sets out the ﬁnancial contribution that
must be paid by the owner/operator, which is equivalent to the
estimated costs to be incurred by the Australian Government in
carrying out long-term stewardship of the storage formation.72
Following a site closure, the licensee will continue to
remain at risk for liabilities arising from its operations.73 At least
ﬁfteen years after issuing a site closure certiﬁcate, the Australian
government may declare that the closure assurance period has
been reached.74 Based on the ﬁfteen year period of monitoring,
the Australian government must be satisﬁed that:
1 The injected CO2 is behaving as predicted in the approved
2 there is “no signiﬁcant risk” that the substance will have a
“signiﬁcant adverse impact” (SRSAI) on the geotechnical
integrity of whole or part of the storage formation, the envi-
ronment, or on human health and safety; and
3 no injection operations have taken place since the recorded
Once there is a valid site closure certiﬁcate and a declared
closure assurance period, the Australian government then indem-
niﬁes the injection licensee against speciﬁed liabilities.76 The
scope of the Australian government’s indemniﬁcation is limited
by the following four conditions:
1 the liability is a liability for damages;
2 the liability is attributable to an act done or omitted to be
done in the carrying out of operations authorized by the
3 the liability is incurred or accrued after the end of the
closure assurance period; and
4 such other conditions (if any) as are specified in the
The licensee will continue to be at risk of incurring the full
costs of liabilities that fall outside of the scope of these indemniﬁ-
cation conditions.78 For example, the licensee will continue to be
fully responsible for acts or omissions in carrying out activities
that were not authorized under the OPGGS Act.79
In the U.S., the Anti-Deﬁciency Act prevents the U.S.
government from agreeing to open-ended indemnification
arrangements absent speciﬁc Congressional authorization, which
has rarely been granted.80 However, The Department of Energy
Carbon Capture and Sequestration Program Amendments Act
of 2011 (S. 699) provides an opportunity for indemniﬁcation
in the domestic CCS regime.81 This bill directed the Secretary
of Energy (DOE) to conduct a program to demonstrate the
commercial application of CCS and authorized the Secretary
of Energy to enter into cooperative agreements with up to ten
demonstration projects for indemniﬁcation of liabilities up to
$10 billion collectively.82 Essentially, the bill proposes a waiver
of the Anti-Deﬁciency Act that would allow the DOE to sign
indemniﬁcation agreements and would provide a permanent,
indefinite appropriation for any costs incurred by DOE to
indemnify sponsors of demonstration projects and remediate
sites.83 Exceptions to federal indemnities include any liabilities
that result from gross negligence or intentional misconduct by
the site operator.84 To be eligible, each large-scale demonstration
project must inject over one million tons of carbon dioxide each
year from “industrial sources” (not naturally occurring CO2) for
a period of ten years.
The bill also authorizes the collection of indemniﬁcation
fees.85 With this authority the DOE will be able to collect fees
in amounts to be determined by the Secretary of Energy from
operators receiving indemniﬁcation based on the likelihood of
incidents resulting from speciﬁc risk-based hazards during post-
closure stewardship.86 The fees will be collected in an amount
equal to the estimated amount of payments expected to be made
by the United States to cover liability under the indemniﬁcation
agreements.87 This bill was introduced on March 31, 2011 and
received approval from the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources on May 26, 2011.88 However, as of March
26, 2012, the Senate has not considered or voted on the bill and
immediate consideration is unlikely given an upcoming election
and the current congressional climate.89
Similar to the transfer of liability framework, both of
these indemniﬁcation frameworks serve as a subsidy that could
prevent polluters from bearing the full costs of the pollution they
have caused.90 When compared to transfer of liability, indem-
niﬁcation provides a lower level of subsidy because the owner/
operator is responsible to initially bear the cost of liability and
then seek reimbursement.91 However, indemniﬁcation, as seen
in Senator Bingaman’s bill, could provide an appropriate legal
framework if CCS can garner sufﬁcient governmental support.
OWNER/OPERATOR RETENTION OF LONG-TERM
LIABILITIES WITHOUT FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Another option for handling long-term CCS liability is
for the owner/operator to retain liability indeﬁnitely without
requiring a demonstration of ﬁnancial responsibility. Under this
arrangement, the owner/operator is responsible for long-term
compensatory liability for the CO2 storage facility, but does
not have explicit long-term stewardship obligations and is not
required to act until damages occur.92
The United States currently employs a CCS regulatory
framework that requires owner/operator retention of long-term
CCS liabilities without a ﬁnancial responsibility requirement.93
The Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”), the U.S. federal law
regulating CCS, does not provide authority to any government
agency to transfer liability for a CO2 storage facility from
50 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
one entity (i.e., owner/operator) to another (i.e., a government
agency).94 Under the SDWA, owners/operators of CO2 storage
facilities must ensure protection of underground sources of
drinking water from endangerment and are subject to liability
for enforcement under the Act.95 Once an owner or operator has
met all regulatory requirements and received approval for site
closure, the owner/operator will generally be free from liability
under the SDWA.96 However, even after site closure, the owner/
operator will always be required to comply with governmental
orders to protect human health if, for example, there is ﬂuid
migration at a CO2 storage facility that causes or threatens
imminent and substantial endangerment to an underground
source of drinking water.97 Furthermore, after site closure, an
owner/operator remains liable under tort and other remedies, or
under other statutes such as the Clean Air Act.98
Owner/operator retention of long-term CCS liability is
a regulatory framework closely in-line with the PPP because
each owner/operator, theoretically, is independently responsible
for the total costs of long-term CCS stewardship and liability.
However, in the CCS context, which occurs over an indeﬁnite
timeframe, it is likely that the CO2 storage facility owner/operator
will go out of business, experience severe ﬁnancial problems,
or otherwise desert their responsibilities prior to the end of the
relevant long-term liability period.99 For example, gas compa-
nies could declare bankruptcy without leaving sufﬁcient funds to
cover the long term cost of their actions.100 Under scenarios such
as this, long-term liabilities which arise when the owner/operator
is no longer a viable entity become the responsibility of the
public. Therefore, over the indeﬁnite time-frame associated with
CCS activities, owner/operator retention of long-term liabilities
without ﬁnancial responsibility requirements, in practice, is not
as closely in-line with the PPP as one may initially believe.
INDUSTRY-FUNDED POOLED TRUST FUND
A ﬁnal option for addressing long-term CCS liability is to
use an industry-pooled trust fund to generate resources to cover
long-term liabilities associated with a group of CCS facilities.
Under this approach, CCS storage facility owner/operators
would be required to pay into a fund that the government would
hold in trust for use in paying for long-term CCS liabilities.
The Carbon Capture and Sequestration Deployment Act of
2010 (S.3589) 101 was introduced by Senator John Rockefeller
(D-WV) and proposed a pooled trust fund for post-closure
stewardship funded by per-ton fees on injected CO2.102 Although
not reintroduced in the 112th U.S. Congress, an examination
of the bill provides one possible direction for a U.S. approach
to long-term CCS liability.103 As proposed, the fee would be
based on a risk assessment of the type of CO2 injection site
(e.g., type of rock where the CO2 is being injected).104 As with
other approaches described here, the Rockefeller proposal would
have allowed for a transfer of site stewardship and liability to
the government, with exceptions for breach of contract, willful
violations of rules, and reckless or intentional misconduct on the
part of the operator.105 Currently, under federal regulations, a
certiﬁcate of closure is issued at a minimum of ﬁfty years after
operations cease, during which the operator is responsible for
monitoring the site.106
Under the Rockefeller proposal, damages arising from the
site could be paid for from three sources: (1) the Stewardship
Trust Fund; (2) the stewardship agency itself; or (3) the site
operator.107 Money in the stewardship fund would be used to pay
for administrative, monitoring, and remediation costs that arise
after the site was transferred to the government.108 The steward-
ship agency (a state government or the DOE) would be liable for
performance of its stewardship duties.109 The operator would be
liable only for claims, compensation, or reimbursement due to
gross negligence, intentional misconduct, and if the Stewardship
Trust Fund did not have sufﬁcient funds to pay for damages.110
Decisions on who would be liable in a particular circumstance
would be made by a public claims ofﬁce within the DOE.111
As with the liability transfer frameworks discussed above,
this approach has the potential to require the polluter to pay for
all damages or site care because the owner/operator would pay
for all government responsibilities upfront. The requirement that
the owner/operators pay for damages in the event that the fund
did not have enough money further aligns with the polluter pays
principle.112 A ﬁfty year post-closure period increases the likeli-
hood of the owner/operator paying for problems associated with
its CO2 storage facility prior to transfer, assuming that problems
would emerge in the years immediately after injection operations
cease. However, a pooled trust fund is effective only if the risk-
based fees collected from the owner/operators fully account for
the cost of CCS facilities’ long-term liabilities. Similarly, the
requirement that the owner/operators pay in the event of fund
insolvency is effective only where owner/operators still exist and
are solvent when the funds are required.113
The idea of an industry-funded pooled trust fund is not new,
with several used currently by the U.S. government to deal with
such issues as abandoned coal mines and nuclear waste.114 One
such existing fund is the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which is
ﬁnanced by an eight cents per barrel tax on petroleum.115 The
fund, created in 1990, has increased the tax once, from ﬁve to
eight cents, with an additional increase planned for 2017.116 The
trust fund is used to pay for oil spill cleanup costs and related
purposes.117 While this fund is currently solvent, recent events
such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 illustrate that the
fund alone is insufﬁcient to ﬁnance all oil spill liability; the Oil
Spill fund may not spend more than one billion dollars per inci-
dent, and the fund set up to handle Deepwater Horizon claims is
due to be funded to $20 billion by 2014.118
Given the indeﬁnite nature of long-term CCS liabilities, a
trust fund provides a way to ensure that the polluter pays for
at least a portion of the costs of future care of the CO2 storage
facility and any associated liabilities, even if the polluter
becomes insolvent or is no longer in business. Although there is
no guarantee that the trust fund will be viable for an indeﬁnite
amount of time, it is more likely that a portion of long-term CCS
liabilities will be borne by the polluters than under the other three
frameworks discussed. Therefore, in the long-term CCS con-
text, an industry-funded trust fund is the regulatory framework
most in-line with the PPP; it establishes a scenario in which the
polluter is most likely to take responsibility for long-term liabilities
and the public is the least likely to be stuck with the cost.
In its simplest terms, the PPP reﬂects the idea that the costs
of pollution should be borne by those who cause it. Of the four
frameworks discussed, an industry-funded pooled trust fund is
the framework most in-line with the PPP in the CCS context
because it is the scenario in which the polluter is most likely
to pay for and the public is most likely to avoid the costs of the
greatest portion of long-term CCS liabilities. However, currently,
the majority of governments who have chosen to establish a legal
framework regulating CCS have chosen to subsidize long-term
CCS liabilities, to some degree, through a regulatory framework
that includes transfer of long-term liabilities, while still requiring
some industry contribution or maintaining some industry liability.119
This partial acceptance of the PPP can be justiﬁed in two ways:
(1) the indeﬁnite timeframe associated with CCS liabilities,
which may not practically be paid for by an owner/operator with
a limited life-cycle, presents an unusual regulatory scenario that
many governments have limited experience addressing, and (2)
the national and global interest many governments recognize in
combating global climate change presents an immediate concern
that may outweigh the beneﬁts associated with strict adher-
ence to the PPP. However, as governments begin to gain more
information about the long-term liabilities associated with CCS,
the severity of potential impacts of global climate change, and
other technological options for mitigation, a regulatory system
that accounts for the PPP will perhaps be adopted in a greater
number of jurisdictions.
Endnotes: Can Governments Ensure Adherence to the Polluter Pays
Principle in the Long-term CCS Liability Context?
1 See generally Press Release, U.N. Env’t Programme Fin. Initiative, 2011
Global Investor Statement on Climate Change (2011), http://www.unepﬁ.org/
ﬁleadmin/documents/2011InvestorStatementClimateChange.pdf (explaining the
economic and environmental concerns related to climate change).
2 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC 2007].
3 Carbon Capture and Sequestration, ENV’T DEF. FUND, http://www.edf.org/
energy/carbon-storage (last visited February 22, 2012).
5 See Int’l Energy Agency, 3rd IEA Int’l CCS Regulatory Network Meeting,
Executive Summary, Mar. 1-2, 2011 (Mar. 2011), http://www.iea.org/work/2011/
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 1, May 5,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18, http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC].
7 See IPCC 2007, supra note 2.
8 See Greenhouse Gases, Climate Change, and Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapter1.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2012).
9 See CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion: Highlights, INT’L ENERGY
AGENCY (2011), http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/CO2highlights.pdf.
10 IPCC 2007, supra note 2.
11 U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY [U.S. EPA], CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE FACTS
12 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OVERVIEW OF CARBON STORAGE RESEARCH,
http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/sequestration/overview.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2012) (explaining the regional, national, and international efforts to promote CCS).
13 See ENV’T DEF. FUND, supra note 3.
14 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, COST AND PERFORMANCE OF CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE
FROM POWER GENERATION 7 (2011), www.iea.org/articles/2011/costperf_ccs_
16 GLOBAL CCS INST., GLOBAL STATUS OF LARGE SCALE INTEGRATED CCS PROJ-
ECTS: DECEMBER 2011 UPDATE 2 (2011), http://cdn.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/
(requiring projects to sequester 800,000 tons of CO2 or more per year for a coal
ﬁred power plant, or 400,000 tons of CO2 per year for other types of operations
in order to be included in this summary).
17 Id. at 5.
18 Id. at 2.
19 See generally Id. (explaining that Germany’s Vattenfall Jänschwalde project
to regulate CCS failed because of an inability to resolve regulatory hurdles
related to the program).
20 See U.S. EPA, REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON CARBON CAPTURE
AND STORAGE 53 (2010) http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/CCS-
21 Id. at 10.
22 Id. at 54.
24 Vito De Lucia, Polluter Pays Principle, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EARTH (Richard
Reibstein et al. eds., last revised 2010), http://www.eoearth.org/article/Polluter_
pays_principle (last visited Jan. 10, 2012) (citing H.C. Bugge, The Principles of
Polluter Pays in Economics and Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT
(E. Eide and R. van der Bergh eds., 1996)).
27 Id. (quoting Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Recommendation of the
Council on Guiding Principles of Concerning International Economic Aspects
of Environmental Policies, OECD Doc.No. C(72) 128 (May 26, 1972)).
31 Id. (quoting Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Union art. 174(2), Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 107-08).
32 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 8.
33 See Carbon Capture and Sequestration, ENV’T DEF. FUND, http://www.edf.
org/energy/carbon-storage (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
34 See generally Allan Ingelson, Anne Kleffner & Norma Nielson, Long-Term
Liability For Carbon Capture And Storage In Depleted North American Oil And
Gas Reservoirs - A Comparative Analysis, 31 ENERGY L.J. 431, 465-66 (2010)
(analyzing the different approaches taken by governments to shift liability for
36 Id. at 446.
37 Id. at 445–46 (noting that the state of Montana allows for permanent liability
transfer from the private company to the state).
38 Id. at 440.
39 See, e.g., Environmental Protection: Storage of CO2 (Termination of
Licenses), 2011, S.I. 2221/8, 7(2) (U.K.); Law 40/2010 of 29 December on the
geological storage of carbon dioxide, B.O.E. 2010, 317, Art. 23(5) [hereinafter
B.O.E. 2010, 317]; C. Env. Art. L 519-1.
continued on page 69
52 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
Endnotes: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
continued from page 5
15 See The Global Climate Change Regime, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
updated November 21, 2011); see generally REDD+ Social & Environmental
Standards Factsheet, REDD+SES, http://www.redd-standards.org/ (last visited
Apr. 2, 2012).
16 See U.N. Research Inst. for Social Dev., The Global Political Economy of
REDD+: Engaging Social Dimensions in the Emerging Green Economy, 7-10
(Dec. 2011)(Rocio Hiraldo and Thomas Tanner).
17 See Id. at 1-3, 7-11; see also UNEP Finance Initiative, REDDy Set Grow, Part 1:
A brieﬁng for ﬁnancial institutions: Opportunities and roles for ﬁnancial insti-
tutions in forest carbon markets, 28-30 (May 2011), www.unepﬁ.org/ﬁleadmin/
18 See CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK-INT’L, CAN-I SUBMISSION ON A NEW
MARKET-BASED MECHANISM (March 2012), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/
smsn/ngo/176.pdf; see generally Forum for Env’t, supra note 4, at 8-10.
19 See CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK-INT’L, VIEWS ON OPTIONS AND WAYS TO
FURTHER INCREASE THE LEVEL OF AMBITION 10 (March 5, 2012), http://
22 Robin Lancaster, Ready, Steady, Go: The Partnership for Market Readiness
is Sowing the Seeds for Carbon Trading in Several Developing Countries,
CARBON TRADING Feb. 2012, at 16, http://issuu.com/carbon-tradingmagazine/
23 See About the Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR), THE WORLD BANK
CARBON FIN. UNIT, http://wbcarbonﬁnance.org/Router.cfm?Page=PMR&FID=
61218&ItemID=61218&ft=About (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
24 See Durban Conference Delivers Breakthrough in International Community’s
Response to Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/wcm/content/
site/climatechange/pages/gateway/the-negotiations/durban (last visited Apr.
2, 2012); see generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Draft Dec. –/CP-17, Conference of the Parties, Green Climate
Fund-Report of the Transitional Committee, 17th Sess., Nov. 28-Dec. 9, 2011,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/L.9 (Dec. 10, 2011), http://unfccc.int/ﬁles/meetings/
25 See Ernst & Young, Durban dynamics: navigating for progress on climate
change, 1-15, http://www.ey.com/ZA/en/Newsroom/News-releases/2011—
45-billion-climate-change-funding-gap-ahead-of-COP-17 (last visited Apr. 2,
2012) (discussing ﬁnancial aspects of climate change from a global perspective).
26 See Forum for Env’t, supra note 4, at 8-11.
27 See CAN-International submission on how to address drivers of deforesta-
tion and forest degradation, Climate Action Network-International (Feb. 20,
measures necessary for REDD+ to succeed, including both domestic and
28 See Daniel Michaels, EU’s Airline-Emissions Fees Face Challenge, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 16, 2010 1:10 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970204059804577227173526305492.html; see generally UK
Environment Agency, EU Emissions Trading System – Aviation, http://www.
environment-agency.gov.uk/business/topics/pollution/107596.aspx (last updated
March 23, 2012).
Endnotes: UNCONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY IN THE DURBAN CLIMATE DEAL OF COP 17 / CMP 7
continued from page 11
4 The two most notable decisions implementing the Cancun Agreements
were the decision launching the Green Climate Fund and the decision on many
operational modalities that were under discussion on the Ad-Hoc Working
Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (“AWG-LCA”). See UNFCCC, Draft
Dec. –/CP-17, Conference of the Parties, Green Climate Fund-Report of the
Transitional Committee, 17th Sess., Nov. 28-Dec. 9, 2011, U.N. Doc. FCCC/
CP/2011/L.9 (Dec. 10, 2011); UNFCCC, Draft Dec. -/CP/17, Outcome of the
Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under
the Convention (Advance Unedited Version), http://unfccc.int/ﬁles/meetings/
5 UNFCCC, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/L.10 (Dec. 10, 2011).
6 See Janet Redman, Durban’s Climate Debacle, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS
(Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.fpif.org/articles/durbans_climate_debacle; Politicians
Listen to the Polluters at UN Climate Talks, GREENPEACE INT’L (Dec. 11, 2011),
7 Nina Chestnet & Jon Herskovitz, UN Climate Talks Reach Modest Deal,
REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/11/us-
8 See John M. Broder, In Glare of Climate Talks, Taking on Too Great a Task,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/science/earth/
climate-change-expands-far-beyond-an-environmental-issue.html; Fitrian Adri-
ansyah, Mixed Results from Durban Climate Talks for Indonesia, THE JAKARTA
POST (Dec. 16. 2011), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/12/16/mixed-
results-durban-climate-talks-indonesia.html; David Crossland, The Durban
Climate Agreement is Almost Useless, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Dec. 12, 2011),
9 See Broder, supra note 8; Crossland, supra note 8.
10 UNFCCC, Draft Dec. –/CP-17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (Advance Unedited Version),
11 See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY & ELLIOT DIRINGER, THE PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EVOLUTION OF MULTILATERAL REGIMES (2010) (explaining
the reasons international regimes often develop in an evolutionary manner);
K. Levin et al., Playing it Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incremental-
ism, and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Global Climate Change, 6 IOP CONF.
SERIES: EARTH AND ENVTL. SCI. 502002 (2009).
12 The expression “constructive ambiguity” is generally attributed to Henry
Kissinger and is widely used in the ﬁeld of diplomacy. It has been deﬁned
as “the deliberate use of ambiguous language on a sensitive issue in order to
advance some political purpose. See G. R. Berridge & Alan James, A Dictionary
of Diplomacy (July 21, 2008), http://grberridge.diplomacy.edu/dict_comp_a_e.htm.
13 See HE Patricia Espinosa, Sec’y of Foreign Affairs, Mex., Address at the
Chathham House: From Cancun to Durban: Implications for Climate and
Multilateral Diplomacy (June 30, 2011), http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/
14 Scientiﬁc estimates indicate that emission pathways consistent with a “likely”
chance (i.e. greater than sixty-six percent) of meeting the two degree Celsius goal
“generally peak before 2020, have emission levels in 2020 around 44 GtCO2e
(range: 39-44 GtCO2e), have steep emission reductions afterwards and/or reach
negative emissions in the longer term.” See UNEP, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT:
ARE THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD PLEDGES SUFFICIENT TO LIMIT GLOBAL WARMING TO
2° C OR 1.5°? (Nov. 2010), http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsga-
15 See id. (noting the concern revealed in the recent UN reports regarding the
difﬁculty maintaining the average temperature rise within two degrees Celsius).
16 See Summary of the Durban Climate Change Conference, EARTH
NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (Dec. 2011), http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12534e.
pdf; Wolfgang Sterk et al., On the Road Again: Progressive Countries Score
Realpolitik Victory in Durban While the Real Climate Continues to Heat Up,
WUPPERTAL INST. FOR CLIMATE, ENV’T AND ENERGY (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.
wupperinst.org/uploads/tx_wibeitrag/COP17-report.pdf; Edward Cameron &
Jennifer Morgan, Reﬂections on COP 17 in Durban, WRI INSIGHTS (Dec. 16,
17 See Remi Moncel et al., Building the Climate Change Regime: Survey and
Analysis of Approaches (World Resources Inst., Working Paper, 2011), at 53,
available at http://www.unep.org/PDF/PressReleases/UNEP-WRI_Building
18 See id.
19 See MARY ROBINSON FOUND., HIGHLIGHTS FROM MEETING ON POSSIBLE LEGAL
FORM OF A NEW CLIMATE AGREEMENT, http://www.mrfcj.org/pdf/Highlights_
pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
20 See id.
21 A top-down climate regime typically refers to a regime in which a global
agreement, generally of a legally binding nature, governs international cooperation
among countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by setting commitments for
each country in such a way as to meet, in aggregate, a mutually agreed and scien-
tiﬁcally driven global reduction goal. By contrast, a bottom-up system generally
refers to a more loosely structured regime in which an international agreement
that is not legally binding contains voluntary pledges that each country puts
forward unilaterally. See Daniel Bodansky, A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once
and Future U.N. Climate Change Regime, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 697 (2011).
22 See UNFCCC Dec. 2/CP.15, Report of the Conference of the Parties, 15th
Sess., Dec. 7-9, 2009, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010).
23 See UNFCCC Dec. 1/CP.16, Report of the Conference of the Parties, 16th
Sess., Nov. 29-Dec. 10, 2010, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011)
[hereinafter Cancun]; UNFCCC Dec. 1/CMP.6, Report of the Conference of the
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, 6th Sess., Nov.
29-Dec 10, 2010, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011).
24 On the ﬁnal day of the conference, Ms. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Minister
of International Relations and Co-operation of the Republic of South Africa
proposed for adoption during a ﬁnal stocktaking plenary the “Durban Package”
composed of a second commitment of the Kyoto Protocol, decisions on the
implementation of the Cancun Agreements, and a decision on the Durban Platform
for Enhanced Action. See Sergio Abranches, The Durban Package Begins to
Take Shape, ECOPOLITY (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.ecopolity.com/2011/12/08/
25 See E3G.ORG, E3G BRIEFING - THE DURBAN PACKAGE 1 (2011), http://www.
27 UNFCCC Draft decision, supra note 3 (Paragraph 1 notes that the second
commitment period will extend to either 2017 or 2020. The end date of the
second commitment period will be negotiated over the coming months and
agreed to at the seventeenth session).
28 See Daniel Bodansky, W[h]ither the Kyoto Protocol? Durban and Beyond,
HARV. PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS (Aug. 2011), http://belfercenter.ksg.
29 Estimates based on 2008 data. See Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, WORLD
RESOURCES INST. (2011), http://cait.wri.org/.
30 See Eileen Claussen & Catherine N. Stratton, Climate Change and
Kyoto: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND
ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Oct. 6, 1999), http://www.c2es.org/press-center/speeches/
31 See Bodansky, supra note 28; Laea Medley, Kyoto Protocol Lives On, DAILY
NEWS (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/kyoto-protocol-lives-on-
32 Submission on Shared Vision by India on behalf of the African Group,
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand
and Uruguay, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/CRP.5 (2011).
33 UNFCCC Dec. -/CP/17, supra note 3.
35 See Remi Moncel et al., Summary of UNFCCC Submissions (World
Resources Inst., Working Paper, 2009), http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/
36 Statement on Behalf of the Group of 77 and China by H.E. Ambassador
Mr. Alberto Pedro D’Alotto, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, At
the Joint High-Level Segment of the Seventeenth Session of the Conference
of the Parties of the Climate Change Convention and the Seventeenth Session
of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.
37 See Press Release, United States Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd
Stern, Talk and Action: the Role of International Negotiations in Addressing
the Climate Challenge (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.state.gov/s/climate/releases/
38 See Dan Bodansky, The Negotiations that Would Not Die, OPINIO JURIS
(Dec. 11, 2011, 10:28 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/11/
39 See Brieﬁng, United States Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd Ster n
(Dec. 13, 2011), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/12
/20111213184856su0.2956965.html#axzz1oqspacl6; Fiona Harvey, Ex-UN
Climate Chief Says Business Should Get Ready for Low-Carbon World, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jan/05/
business-must-get-ready-for-low-carbon-world; Michael Jacobs, Climate
Policy, NATURE (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v481/
n7380/full/481137a.html; T. Jayaraman, Post-Durban, India has its Task
Cut Out, THE HINDU (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/
lead/article2729539.ece; Mary Robinson, Robinson Welcomes Durban
Roadmap on How to Ensure Climate Justice, IRISH TIMES (Dec. 12, 2011),
html; Winners and losers in the Durban climate deal, OXFAM (Dec. 12,
40 See Connie Hedegaard, European Comm’r for Climate Action, Statement
at the Opening of the High-Level Segment of COP 17 (June 12, 2011), http://
41 See UNFCCC Dec. 1/CP.1, Report of the Conference of the Parties, 1st
Sess., Mar. 28-Apr. 7, 1995, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June 6, 1995)
[hereinafter Berlin] .
42 See Jacob Werksman, Q & A: the Legal Aspects of the Durban Platform
Text, WRI INSIGHTS (Dec. 14, 2011), http://insights.wri.org/news/2011/12/
43 See id. At COP 13 in Bali, Parties to the UNFCCC agreed to adopt by 2009
“an agreed outcome.” The ambiguity around the meaning of this phrase has led
to intense negotiations to this day on the legal form of the agreement that will
conclude the work plan launched in Bali. Werksman also notes that the “Convention
speaks of legally binding instruments such as protocols and amendments as ‘entering
into force’ when they become binding on Parties.” He also argues that “[i]n the
context of the Durban Platform negotiations, this choice of words seems to signal
something different, and softer, than a legal instrument requiring ratiﬁcation.”
44 See Dan Bodansky, Evaluating Durban, THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE (Dec. 13,
45 See Werksman, supra note 42.
46 See id.
47 See Umi Goswami, Durban Climate Summit: Let’s Agree
to Put in Place New Global Deal, THE ECON. TIMES (Dec. 15,
48 In the months leading up to the Durban conference, a growing number of
countries coalesced around a proposal to adopt a roadmap in Durban to work
towards a legally binding agreement under the Convention to complement or
replace the Kyoto Protocol. The main countries in opposition were Brazil, India
and China. The United States, although theoretically open to signing up to such
agreement as long as it included all major economies, was also believed to be
skeptical and expressed several times its belief that such a decision was not
ripe for Durban. In the ﬁnal hours of the conference, China, Brazil and the
United States expressed openness to the proposal and did not object when the
South African Presidency formally submitted it to Parties for approval. See
also Lavanya Rajamani, Legal Form and the Future of the Kyoto Protocol:
Can Durban Deliver?, CLIMATE & DEV. KNOWLEDGE NETWORK (Nov. 2011),
49 See Goswami, supra note 47 (explaining the “red line” as the “’[c]ommon
but differentiated responsibility’” which India has “stressed on differentiations
between developed and developing countries as a function of the industrialized
world’s historical responsibility for global warming); Lavanya Rajamani,
Deconstructing Durban, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.
50 Press Release, India Minister of State for Environment Minister of State
for Env’t and Forests Shrimati Jayanthi Natarajan, Suo Moto Statement in Lok
Sabha by Minister of State for Environment and Forecasts on Durban Agree-
ments (Dec. 16, 2011), http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=78811
53 Id. (The phrase “allows India the necessary ﬂexibility over the choice
of appropriate legal form to be decided in future. This choice will be guided
by [India’s] national development imperatives and the principles of the
54 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
54 Hedegaard, supra note 1.
55 Natarajan, supra note 50.
56 See COP 17: India to Champion Equity and Access to Sustainable
Development in Durban, THE CLIMATE GROUP (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.
equity-and-access-to-sustainable-development-in-durban/ (describing India’s
intention to clarify the meaning of “equity” left undeﬁned in the Cancun Agree-
ments by pushing for a ‘facilitative intellectual property right regime’, linking
equity with access to sustainable development.”)
57 See Jacob Weksman, Law and Disorder: Will the Issue of Legal Character
Make or Break a Global Deal on Climate?, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 672-77 (July
2010),. Werksman distills the concept of legal character into four components:
the legal form of the agreement; the legal form of the commitments within
the agreement; the speciﬁc and prescriptive nature of these commitments; and
the institutions and procedures designed to hold parties accountable for these
58 See id.; Alex Lenferna, COP17: Nothing to Celebrate, THOUGHT LEADER
(Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/mandelarhodesscholars/
2011/12/13/cop17/ (noting that various interpretations may arise).
59 UNFCCC Dec. -/CP/17, supra note 3.
60 See id. (explaining “countries regularly enter into agreements that take
a legally binding form but that contain ‘commitments’ that are softly worded
or highly contingent.”)
61 See id. (noting the UNFCCC is an example of a “soft law” approach with
no formal status).
62 See id. (noting a tension between an insistence by developed countries
on “legal symmetry” and an equally strong demand by developing countries
for “legal differentiation” which has allowed for this difference in the Kyoto
63 See Berlin, supra note 41, ¶ 2(b) (excluding the adoption of quantiﬁed
mitigation commitments for developing countries and stating that the new
agreement will “not introduce any new commitments for Parties not included
in Annex I . . . .”)
64 See Werksman, supra note 42.
65 See UNFCCC Dec. -/CP/17, supra note 3; Cancun, supra note 23, at ¶ 80.
66 See UNFCCC Dec. -/CP/17, supra note 3.
67 Compilation of Information on Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
to be Implemented by Parties Not Included in Annex I to the Convention,
UNFCCC U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/INF.1 (Mar 18, 2011), http://
68 See UNEP, supra note 14.
69 UNFCCC Dec. -/CP/17, supra note 3.
70 See Moncel, Building the Climate Change Regime: Survey and Analysis of
Approaches, supra note 17. For examples of options to increase ambition within
71 See, supra, Cancun, note 23, paras. 4.138–140; UNFCC Draft dec.
[-/CP/17], supra note 4, at paras. 157-67.
72 UNFCC Draft dec. [-/CP/17], supra note 4 at para. 6.
73 See Kelly Levin & Remi Moncel, Ambition in the Durban Climate
Deal, WRI INSIGHTS (Feb. 13, 2012), http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/02/
74 See, e.g., Common Statement by the European Union, Least Developed
Countries and Association of Small Island States, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
(Dec. 9, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/
75 See Jeff Tollefson, Durban Maps Path to Climate Treaty,
NATURE (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.nature.com/news/
76 Tobias Rapp, Christian Schwagerl & Gerald Traufetter, Copenhagen Protocol:
How China and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit, SPIEGEL ONLINE (May
5, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,692861-2,00.html.
77 See, e.g., Report of the Environmental Regulation Commission, 32 Energy
L. J. 637, 654-55 (2011).
78 See Louise Gray, Durban Climate Change: Last Minute Talks Produce
‘Historic Deal to Save the Planet,’ TELEGRAPH (Dec. 11, 2011), http://www.
79 See id.
80 Charlie Dunmore, Durban Talks a Victory for Europe’s Climate Chief,
REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/
81 See Jayaraman, supra note 39; Oxfam, supra note 39.
82 Cameron & Morgan, supra note 16.
83 See Levin & Moncell, supra note 73.
84 UNFCCC Draft Dec. [-/CP/17], supra note 4, at paras. 1-2.
85 See, e.g., Parliamentary Brieﬁng: Outcomes of 2011 UN Climate Talks,
Durban, South Africa, World Wildlife Fund U.K. (Jan. 10, 2012) (“[T]he
decision to postpone entry into force until 2020 is an unacceptable delay.”).
86 See UNEP, supra note 14.
87 UNFCCC Draft Dec. [-/CP/17], supra note 4, at paras. 5-44; see Kelly
Levin & Remi Moncel, Transparency and Accountability (MRV) in the
Durban Climate Deal, WRI INSIGHTS (Feb. 13, 2012), http://insights.wri.org/
a more detailed discussion of the content and implications of the Durban
decisions with regard to transparency.
88 See Andrew Light, The Cancun Compromise: Masterful Diplomacy Ends
with Agreement, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.
89 See id.
90 See Levin & Moncell, supra note 79.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See Dean Kuipers, Progress at the End of Durban COP17 Climate Talks,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/12/local/
la-me-gs-progress-at-end-of-durban-cop17-climate-talks-20111212 (“It’s the
fact that [Parties] have other issues on which they want to deal with each other,
and the name-and-shame aspect that will push countries to at least negotiate,”
according to Jake Schmidt, International Climate Policy Director for Natural
Resources Defense Council).
95 Compare UNFCCC Draft Dec. [-/CP/17], supra note 4, with UNFCCC,
Dec. 1/CP.13, Conference of the Parties, 13th Sess., Dec. 3-15, 2007, para. 11,
U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008).
96 See id.
97 See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Design Options for Interna-
tional Assessment and Review (IAR) and International Consultations and
Analysis (ICA), U.N. DOC. COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2011) 4 (Nov. 17,
2011) (analyzing mechanisms in other regimes which allows stakeholders to
contribute to or observe the review process).
98 See Taryn Fransen & Jennifer Hatch, GHG-Framed Mitigation Actions
by Developing Countries (World Resources Inst., Working Paper, June 2011),
developing_countries.pdf ; Levin et al., Remedying Discord in the Accord:
Accounting Rules for Annex I Pledges in a Post-2012 Climate Agreement
(World Resources Inst., Working Paper, Nov. 2010), http://pdf.wri.org/
99 See Strategy on Climate Change for 2020 and Beyond, EUROPA (Aug. 31,
l28188_en.htm; Australian Government, Australia’s Nationals Emissions
Target: Fact Sheet (Dec. 2008).
100 See China Announces Targets on Carbon Emission Cuts, CHINA VIEW (Nov.
26, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/26/content_12544181.htm.
101 See Levin & Moncell, supra note 73.
102 See UNEP, supra note 14.
103 See Cameron & Morgan, supra note 16.
104 UNFCC Draft Dec. [-/CP/17], supra note 4, at para. 5.
105 Kelly Levin & Jared Finnegan, Assessing Non-Annex I Pledges: Building
a Case for Clariﬁcation (World Resources Inst., Working Paper, Dec. 2011),
106 Kelly Levin & Remi Moncel, Transparency and Accountability (MRV) in
the Durban Climate Deal, supra note 88.
107 Ad Hoc Working Group On Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Con-
vention, Fourteenth Session: Work of the AWG-LCA Contact Group, Nationally
Appropriate Mitigation Commitments or Actions by Developed Country
Parties (Oct. 14, 2011) (possible elements of draft decision for adoption of the
guidelines for biennial reports of developed country Parties), http://unfccc.int/
(paras. 4, 5bis, 5ter).
108 See United Nations Climate Change Conference in Durban: 28 November-
9 December 2011: A Brief History of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol,
EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., 2 (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop17/
109 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action under the Convention, UNFCC Draft Dec. [-/CP/17]
(advance unedited version), http://unfccc.int/ﬁles/meetings/durban_nov_2011/
decisions/application/pdf/cop17_lcaoutcome.pdf (para. 9) (“Acknowledges
the value of information, and the need to elaborate rigorous, robust and trans-
parent approaches in a systematic manner to measure progress towards the
achievement of economy-wide emission reduction targets, building on existing
processes, practices and experiences.”).
110 Levin et al., Remedying Discord in the Accord: Accounting Rules for Annex
I Pledges in a Post-2012 Climate Agreement, supra note 99.
112 See UNEP, supra note 14.
113 See generally Benito Muller, Equity in Climate Change: The Great
Divide (2002), http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/documents/
The_Great_Divide-Executive_Summary.pdf (discussing equity as a point of
contention posing problems for bringing developing countries on board for
agreements to mitigate climate change).
114 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3.1, Mar.
24, 1994, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/
115 See, e.g., Douglas Bushey & Sikina Jinnah, Evolving Responsibility?
The Principal of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in the UNFCC, 6
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 1, 1 (2010), http://bjil.typepad.com/Publicist
06-Bushey-Jinnah-ﬁnal.pdf (“At their core, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations can be understood as a
series of attempts to operationalize the international legal principle of “common
but differentiated responsibilities.”).
116 U.N. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SECOND ASSESSMENT
SYNTHESIS OF SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL INFORMATION RELEVANT TO INTERPRETING
ARTICLE 2 OF THE UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 48 (1995),
assessment-en.pdf (“The IPCC can clarify scientiﬁcally the implications of
different approaches and proposals, but the choice of particular proposals is a
117 Bushey & Jinnah, supra note 116, at 9 (discussing the “persistent puzzle” of
operationalizing the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities”).
118 See, e.g., EDWARD A. PAGE, CLIMATE CHANGE, JUSTICE AND FUTURE GENERATIONS
17-18 (2006) (discussing 21st Century concerns with equity in climate change
mitigation); Aaditya Matoo & Arvind Subramanian, Equity in Climate Change:
An Analytical Review 5-11 (The World Bank Dev. Research Grp. Trade and
Integration Team, Working Paper No. 5383, 2010) (discussing four common
proposals for allocating emissions to promote equity); Cameron, “HUMAN
RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE”; Winkler and Beaumont, “Fair and
effective multilateralism in the post-Copenhagen climate negotiations.”
119 See generally Kevin Baumert et al., Great Expectations: Can International
Emissions Trading Deliver an Equitable Climate Regime? 3 CLIMATE POL’Y
137 (2002), http://ethree.com/downloads/Climate%20Change%20Readings/
20Emission%20Trading%20Equitable.pdf (discussing the allocation of
emission rights among countries as an equity debate).
120 Remi Moncel et al., Building the Climate Change Regime: Survey and
Analysis of Approaches 41-46 (U.N.E.P. World Resources Institute, Working
121 Baumbert, supra note 120, at 139 (discussing the failure of governments
to address long-term agreements on international trade).
122 The other requested additions related to technology transfer and unilateral
trade measures. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Proposals
by India for Inclusion of additional agenda items in the provisional agenda
of the seventeenth session of the Conference of the Parties 2 (2011), http://
123 Id. at 2.
124 See generally id.
125 Prabir Purkayastha & Tirthakankar Manda, A Note on Carbon Space as
Development Space, in CONFERENCE ON GLOBAL CARBON BUDGETS AND EQUITY IN
CLIMATE CHANGE 18, 18 (Tata Institute of Social Science & Ministry of Environ-
ment & Forests eds., 2010), http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/
tiss-conference-cc-2010.pdf (“The developed countries are arguing that coun-
tries such as India should work out a low carbon low energy path.”).
126 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TODD STERN’S BRIEFING ON THE U.N. CLIMATE
CHANGE CONFERENCE (Dec. 13, 2011), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/
the idea of equity as a distraction).
127 Kelly Levin & Remi Moncel, Ambition in The Durban Climate Deal,
WRI INSIGHTS (February 13, 2012), http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/02/
ambition-durban-climate-deal (“At the request of India, Parties at COP17
decided to organize a workshop in 2012 on “equitable access to sustainable
development,” which will focus on this important question.”).
128 See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, W[H]ITHER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL? DURBAN AND BEYOND 4 (2011), http://
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ﬁles/Bodansky_Viewpoint-Final.pdf (“The United
States would be willing to negotiate a legally-binding agreement, but only if
the mandate provided that the agreement would apply with equal legal force to
all of the major emitters (including China and India). Although it accepts that
developing country commitments should be differentiated from those of devel-
oped countries as to content, it insists on symmetry of legal form, meaning that
the provisions for major-emitting developing and developed countries should
have the same legal character.“).
130 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference
of the Parties Seventeenth Session, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28-Dec. 9, 2011,
Establishment of an Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for
Enhanced Action, FCCC/CP/2011/L.10 (Dec. 10, 2011).
131 Lavayna Rajamani, Deconstructing Durban, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Dec. 15,
132 Stern, supra note 127.
133 See, e.g.,Bodansky, supra note 131, at 4 (“They insist on maintaining the
Kyoto “ﬁrewall” between developed countries (which have emissions limitation
commitments), and developing countries (which don’t).”).
134 See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, NATIONS: Top China climate negotiator says
Durban talks did not resolve Kyoto issues NEWS ON-DEMAND (Jan. 12, 2012),
eID=525773_19970_11834414 (“The [Chinese] interpretation is starkly different
from that of U.S. negotiators.”).
135 Id. (“Su, speaking yesterday on the sidelines of a World Resources Institute
(WRI) event in Washington, D.C., said the implicit in the reference ‘under the
convention’ is an embrace of all the convention’s principles, including that of
common but differentiated responsibilities.”).
136 Id.; Shrimati Jayanthi Natarajan, Minister of State for Environment and
Forests, Suo Moto Statement in Lok Sabha by Minister of State for Environment
and Forests (I/C) on Durban Agreements (Dec. 16, 2011), http://pib.nic.in/
137 Department of State, Ofﬁce of Electronic Information, Remarks As
Prepared by Todd Stern, Special Envoy for Climate Change at the MIT Earth
Week Colloquium in Boston, STATE.GOV (April 21, 2011), http://www.state.
gov/s/climate/releases/168098.htm (“But there are multiple problems with [the
ﬁrewall paradigm]. First, though I’ll spare you the details here, it is wrong as a
matter of textual analysis; the Framework Convention – the foundational treaty
for climate – never created a ﬁrewall.”).
138 Jennifer Morgan & Edward Cameron, Reﬂections on COP 17 in Durban
WRI INSIGHTS (Dec. 16, 2011), http://insights.wri.org/news/2011/12/
reﬂections-cop-17-durban (“Overall, the Durban outcome is mixed, but provides
elements of a strong foundation to build upon as long as countries continue to
push for short-term ambition and to move toward low-carbon development.”).
139 See generally id.
140 See, e.g., id.
141 Council on Foreign Relations, The Global Climate Change Regime, CFR.ORG
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/global-climate-change-
regime/p21831 (explaining that while some countries are making progress
in meeting Kyoto targets, there are not enough commitments).
142 Michael Jacobs, The World is Running Out of Time TAIPEI
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/
archives/2011/12/05/2003519952 (relaying the message from multiple agencies
that there are only a few years left to make signiﬁcant changes to mitigate
143 See, e.g., id. (describing the timeframe for making signiﬁcant changes to
mitigate the worst effects of climate change).
144 See, e.g., Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 142 (“This will require
a variety of ﬂexible partnerships among national, bilateral, and multilateral
actors, and a combination of short-term and long-term strategies.”).
145 See Territorial Approach to Climate Change, http://www.uncclearn.org/tacc
(last visited Mar. 11, 2012) (describing the different roles played by actors at
different levels of government).
146 DEBORAH BLEVISS ET AL., A NEW ROLE FOR THE UNFCC: THE MATCHMAKER
OF GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 30-31 (2011), http://www.globalutmaning.se/
the role that remains for the UNFCCC).
56 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
147 Morgan & Cameron, supra note 139 (giving an optimistic report of COP
17, saying that while there was much work to be done, things are moving in the
148 Territorial Approach to Climate Change, supra note 146 (“Climate change
mitigation and adaptation requires concerted action at multiple levels and by
149 CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, BREAKING THROUGH ON TECHNOLOGY:
OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND WIDE DEPLOYMENT OF
LOW CARBON TECHNOLOGY 19 (2009), http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2009/07/pdf/gcn_report.pdf (discussing the private sector as the solution
to innovation barriers).
151 Morgan & Cameron, supra note 139 (“Tackling climate change will be
a multi-generational effort requiring sustained political engagement and a
complete transition to a low-carbon economy.”).
152 See generally DANIEL BODANSKY, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, MULTILATERAL CLIMATE EFFORTS BEYOND THE UNFCCC (2011),
(setting forth a series of regimes touching on the subject of climate change).
Endnotes: WHAT LITIGATION OF A CLIMATE NUISANCE SUIT MIGHT LOOK LIKE
continued from page 14
18 See JAN PAUL ACTON & LLOYD S. DIXON, INST. FOR CIV. JUSTICE,
RAND CORP., SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS: THE EXPERI-
ENCES OF INSURERS AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS (2002),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/ R4132.pdf (ﬁnding
on average that transaction costs were 88% of total expendatires; individual
expendatures ranged from 80% to 96%).
19 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (codifying the establishment of multidistrict
20 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). But see Sosa v. Alvarez-Mach-
ain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (holding that, in establishing a valid Alien Tort Statute,
“courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest
on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and deﬁned
with a speciﬁcity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we
have recognized”); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.
2010) (imposing liability on corporations for violations of customary inter-
national law “has not attained a discernible, much less universal, acceptance
among nations of the world in their relations inter se” and would therefore not
meet the requirements of Sosa).
Endnotes: AN UN-CONVENTIONAL APPROACH: ECUADOR’S YASUNÍ-ITT INITIATIVE IS IN DISCORD WITH THE UNFCCC
continued from page 18
63 COAL. FOR RAINFOREST NATIONS, http://www.rainforestcoalition.org
(last visited Apr. 20, 2012).
64 Abate, supra note 60, at 97 (citing About REDD+, UN-REDD Programme,
en-US/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2012).
65 Bali Delegates Agree to Support Forests-for-climate (REDD) Plan,
MONGABAY.COM (Dec. 16, 2007), http://news.mongabay.com/2007/1215-redd.html.
67 See generally, United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
Sixth Policy Board Meeting, Mar. 21-22, National Programme Document –
Ecuador, U.N.R.E.D.D./PB6/2011/V/1 (Feb. 28, 2011).
68 Id. at 2.
69 Id. at 69-74.
70 Id. at 2.
71 Id. at 41.
72 Id. at 43.
73 See infra, notes 14 – 17. (The proposal does not mention REDD+, and
proposes a compensation system predicated on the market value of the foregone
oil, rather than the beneﬁts of deforestation and reduction in greenhouse gas
74 Davis, supra note 8, at 247 (citing Lucas, supra note 6).
75 See PAUL VARGHESE, THE ENERGY AND RES. INST., AN OVERVIEW OF REDD,
REDD PLUS AND REDD READINESS AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNITY
RIGHTS, FORESTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2009).
Endnotes: THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE AGENDA: AN INVENTORY OF THE PROGRESS,
HURDLES, AND PROSPECTS
continued from page 24
6 See generally Rene N’Guettia Kouassi, The Itinerary of the African
Integration Progress: an Overview of the Historical Landmarks, 1(2) AFR.
INTEGRATION REV. 1 (2007), http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Newsletter/
7 See EAC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 2.
8 EAC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 5(2)(a),(c),(g).
9 Id. art. 3.
10 See generally East African Community Protocol on Environment and Natural
Resources Management, Nov. 30, 2006, (not in force), http://www.eac.int/
(The Protocol has been ratiﬁed by all EAC Partner States, save for Tanzania)
[hereinafter Environment & NRM Protocol].
11 See generally EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY [EAC], DEEPENING AND ACCELERATING
INTEGRATION, EAC DEV. STRATEGY (2011/2012 – 2015/2016) (Aug. 2011),
12 EAC, EAC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (2011/12 – 2015/16) 17 (2011),
NY0GuVzTKNoxBkA&sig2=5TrZInAjPA0Xi6gxZ5g_Jg [hereinafter EAC
13 DIODORUS BUBERWA KAMALA, THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE NEW
EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY CO-OPERATION 3 (2006), http://www2.hull.ac.uk/hubs/
14 See generally PETER COOPER, WALKER INST., EVIDENCE-BASED ADAPTATION TO
CLIMATE CHANGE IN EAST AFRICA: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
15 Baruti Katembo, Pan Africanism and Development: The EAC Model, 2
PAN AFR. STUDIES no. 4 107, 109 (2008), http://www.jpanafrican.com/docs/
16 Mothae Maruping, Challenges for Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Macroeconomic Convergence & Monetary Coordination, in AFRICA
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY - THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
CHALLENGES 137 (2005), http://www.fondad.org/uploaded/Africa%20in%20
17 History of the EAC, EAC, http://www.eac.int/about-eac/eac-history.
html?showall=1 (last visited March 23, 2012).
19 See EAC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 5(1).
20 Id., at prmbl. paras. 12, 15 & 16.
21 Id; see id., art. 3(2)-(6) (stating the procedure for granting membership status).
22 See, e.g., Dave Opiyo & PPS, East Africa: Rwanda and Burundi Join EAC,
ALLAFRICA.COM (June 19, 2007), http://allafrica.com/stories/200706190458.
html; Angelo Izama, Emmanuel Gyehazo & Risdel Kasasira, East Africa:
Rwanda, Burundi Join EAC Today, ALLAFRICA.COM (June 18, 2007), http://
23 See, e.g., EAC, Admission to the Community, http://www.eac.int/
about-eac/admission-to-the-eac.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012); see also
David Muwanga, East Africa: South Sudan Ready to Join EAC – Salva Kiir,
ALLAFRICA.COM (Jul. 24, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201107261840.
html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012); East Africa: South Sudan ‘Free to Join EAC’,
ALLAFRICA.COM (Jul. 12, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201107130907.
html; Zephania Ubwani, East Africa: Why EAC Doors Are Wide Open to Juba,
ALLAFRICA.COM (Jul. 8, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201107110002.html.
24 See, e.g., EAC, Admission to the Community, http://www.eac.int/about-eac/
admission-to-the-eac.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012); Sudan’s bid to join EAC
rejected as South Sudan’s deferred, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.
sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-bid-to-join-EAC-rejected,40873; Sudan’s bid to join
EAC quashed by Uganda & Tanzania, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Nov. 27, 2011), http://
25 See generally EAC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 5(2)(a),(c),(g).
26 Id., art. 111(1).
27 Id., art. 111(2)(a).
28 Id., art. 111(2)(b).
29 Id., art. 111(2)(c).
30 WWF, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON EAST AFRICA 2 (2006), http://www.
31 See, e.g., STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST., ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: KENYA
3-9 (2009); NICK HEPTWORTH & MARISA GOULDEN, CLIMATE CHANGE IN UGANDA:
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLICATIONS AND APPRAISING THE RESPONSE (2008); George
Obulutsa, Climate change to Hit Tanzania GDP, Farmers: Study, REUTERS
(Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/01/us-tanzania-climate-
idUSTRE59033D20091001; Finnigan wa Simbeye, Tanzania: Climate Change
Dogs Economic Growth, ALLAFRICA.COM (Nov. 14, 2011), http://allafrica.com/
32 Dr. Moses Amweelo, Africa: Climate change could affect our growth,
ALLAFRICA.COM (June 18, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201006210578.html.
33 See, e.g., CHARLES EHRHART & MICHELLE TWENA, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
POVERTY IN TANZANIA: REALITIES AND RESPONSE OPTIONS FOR CARE, CARE INT’L
POVERTY-CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVE (2006).
34 See, e.g., ACTIONAID, East Africa Drought (describing recurrent droughts),
east-africa-drought (last visited Feb. 10, 2012); Felicity Lawrence, Drought in
East Africa the result of climate change and conﬂict, THE GUARDIAN, 4 (July 4,
change; Tanzania: Zanzibar Helps Flood Victims, ALLAFRICA.COM (Feb. 13, 2012)
(describing raging ﬂoods) http://allafrica.com/stories/201202140448.html.
35 See, e.g., Katy Migiro, East Africa: Region Should Be Prepared for Further
Food Insecurity – Weather Forecasters, ALLAFRICA.COM (Feb. 13, 2012), http://
36 According to the Washington-based International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI), the sub-region’s aggregate hunger index is worrying, with the
hunger situation in Kenya and Uganda ranked as “serious”, that in Tanzania and
Rwanda “alarming”, and Burundi’s stubbornly remaining “extremely alarming”.
See IFPRI, GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX 2011 1, 4 (2011), http://www.ifpri.org/sites/
default/ﬁles/publications/ghi11.pdf (showing a percentage increase in hunger
index of +21, Burundi was the biggest loser, globally).
37 See REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, CLIMATE CHANGE: UGANDA NATIONAL ADAPTATION
PROGRAMMES OF ACTION 12 (2007); see also ADAM CORNER, HIDDEN HEAT: COM-
MUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE IN UGANDA, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2011);
Adam Corner, Climate Change in Uganda: “The biggest unreported story of
our time”, THE CARBON BRIEF BLOG (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.carbonbrief.
38 NIDOS, KENYA CLIMATE CHANGE FACTSHEET 3 (2009), http://www.nidos.
org.uk/downloads/KenyaFactsheet.pdf; NIDOS, TANZANIA CLIMATE CHANGE
FACTSHEET 3 (2006), http://www.nidos.org.uk/downloads/TanzaniaFactsheet.pdf;
NIDOS, UGANDA CLIMATE CHANGE FACTSHEET 2 (2009), http://www.nidos.org.
39 For instance, the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”)
has noted the recent observations of malaria vector in the central highlands of
Kenya, where no such vectors have previously been recorded; this has largely
been attributed to observed micro-climate change due to land-use changes,
including reclamation of swamps for agricultural use. See IPCC, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND
III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC) (2007).
40 See Impacts of Climate Change, OXFAM, http://www.oxfam.org.au/explore/
climate-change/impacts-of-climate-change/ (last visited March 23, 2012).
41 THE WORKING GRP. ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEV., AFRICA, UP IN SMOKE? 18
42 See, e.g., Meera Selva, Kenyan Army Steps in as Cattle Rustling Turns Let.
hal, THE INDEPT. (July 23, 2005), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
Schools closed as cattle raids force thousands to ﬂee, IRIN (May 29, 2007),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=72430; Kenya: Hundreds
displaced in cattle rustling clashes, IRIN (May 14, 2007), http://www.irinnews.
org/report.aspx?reportid=72129; see also, Tens of thousands ﬂee northern
Kenya violence, AFP (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2012/02/
43 See, e.g., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (“USAID”), OFF. OF CONFLICT MG’T
& MITIGATION (CMM), CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT IN UGANDA: THE CATTLE
CORRIDOR AND KARAMOJA, CMM DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 3 (2011), http://www.
Uganda.pdf; Uganda: Climate Change and Conﬂicts, ALLAFRICA.COM (Feb.
23, 2009) (reporting on the “potent mix of the impact of climate change” in
the semi-arid Karamoja region in Northeastern Uganda — droughts, violent
conﬂicts and armed cattle raids), http://allafrica.com/stories/200902240702.
html ; see also, OLI BROWN & ALEC CRAWFORD, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV., CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: A STUDY FOR THE NORDIC-
AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (2009), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/
44 See, e.g., Tanzania: Pastoralists Conﬂicts Threaten Peace and Stability,
ALLAFRICA.COM (June 18, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201106220123.html.
45 See, e.g., 2,460 people affected by ﬂoods in Budalangi, RELIEF WEB
(Apr. 30, 2007), http://reliefweb.int/node/231950.
46 See, e.g., Adam Robertson, Colin Crowley, & Michael Tait, Kenya’s
Drought Crisis: Starving to Death, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2009), http://
INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487; see also, Xan Rice, Almost 4 million Kenyan on
food aid as drought deepens, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.
47 See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
[OECD], Development and Climate Change in Tanzania: Focus on Mount
Kilimanjaro, COM/ENV/EPOC/DCD/DAC(2003)5/FINAL (2003), http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/47/0/21058838.pdf; S. HASTENRATH, RECESSION OF EQUATORIAL
GLACIERS: A PHOTO DOCUMENTATION (2008); Andre Minarcek, Mount Kiliman-
jaro’s Glacier is Crumbling, NAT’L GEO. NEWS (Sept. 23, 2003), http://news.
html; Steve Connor, Climate change will melt snows of Kilimanjaro ‘within 20
years’, THE INDEP’T. (Nov. 3 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/
years-1813631.html; Climate Change Impacts in Tanzania, WWF GLOBAL
(noting that between 1962 and 2000, Mount Kilimanjaro lost about 55% of its
glaciers retreating), http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/aboutcc/problems/
rising_temperatures/hotspot_map/tanzania.cfm (last visited Feb. 7, 2012);
Glorious vision in Kenya’s sky melts away, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2009),
48 See, e.g., Uganda Climate Change Factsheet, supra note 38, at 3-4.
49 See Daniel Howden, The wildebeest river is running dry, THE INDEP’T.
(Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/
the-wildebeest-river-is-running-dry-1769959.html (reporting on the drying
up of the Mara River, a spectacular tourist attraction in Kenya’s Mara
Gama Reserve); Hassan Mjingo, In Tanzania, Climate Change, Wildlife
and People Are Tightly Linked, CLIMATE CHANGE MEDIA P’SHIP, (Dec.
9, 2011), http://www.climatemediapartnership.org/reporting/stories/
50 See, e.g., ABIY S. KEBEDE ET AL., IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SEA LEVEL
RISE: A PRELIMINARY CASE STUDY OF MOMBASA, KENYA, TYNDALL CENTRE WORKING
PAPER 146 (2010), http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/ﬁles/twp146.pdf; E.
Darling, T. McClanahan & I. Côté, Combined effects of two stressors on Kenyan
58 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
coral reefs are additive or antagonistic, not synergistic, 3(2) CONSERVATION
LETTERS 122 (2010).
51 So far, the sub-region has lost Tanzania’s Maziwe and Fungu la Nyani
islands to the “gluttonous” Indian Ocean. See, e.g., Ceven Shemsanga et al.,
The Cost of Climate Change in Tanzania: Impacts and Adaptation, 6 J. AM.
SCI. 3, 182-96 (2010); Deodatus Mfugale, Rising sea levels threaten safety of
Pangani residents, DAILY NEWS (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.dailynews.co.tz/
52 KENYA’S NAT’L ENV. MGMT. AUTH., KENYA’S CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNOLOGY
NEEDS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT (DRAFT) 36 (2005), http://unfccc.int/ttclear/pdf/
53 Id. at 27.
54 See generally EAC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 111(2).
55 Id. art. 111(1).
56 See generally Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of
Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Uganda for
Cooperation on Environment Management, Kenya-Tanz.-Uganda, Oct. 22,
1998, TRE-001332 (1998).
57 See EAC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 142(1)(i).
58 Id. art. 151(1).
59 See Environment & NRM Protocol, supra note 8, art. 51.
61 Id. arts. 3 & 9.
62 Id. arts. 3 & 10.
63 Id. arts. 3 & 11.
64 Id. arts. 3 & 13.
65 Id. arts. 3 & 14.
66 Id. arts. 3 & 15.
67 Id. arts. 3 & 19.
68 Id. arts. 3 & 20.
69 Id. arts. 3 & 22.
70 Id. arts. 3 & 23.
71 Id. arts. 3 & 24.
72 Id. arts. 3 & 25.
73 Id. arts. 3 & 30.
74 Id. arts. 3 & 31.
75 Id. arts. 3 & 32.
76 Id. arts. 3 & 34.
77 Id. arts. 3 & 35.
78 Id. art. 4(2)(a), (c)-(g), (i)-(k), (m), (n), (q), (t)
79 See Tanzania Yet to Sign Key Regional Protocol, TRADEMARK S. AFR.
(May 25, 2011), http://www.trademarksa.org/news/tanzania-yet-sign-key-
80 See EAC Secretariat, Multi-Sectoral Meeting on Food Security and Climate
Change (Permanent Secretaries’ Session), EAC Doc. EAC/SR/26/2011 (2011),
download&gid=152&Itemid=106, at 4; EAC Secretariat, Multi-Sectoral Meeting
on Food Security and Climate Change (Session of Ministers), EAC Doc. EAC/
SR/26/2011, at 5 (May 27, 2011), http://www.eac.int/environment/index.
81 EAC POSITION ON CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS (2009), http://www.eac.
82 EAC Secretariat & Republic of Burundi, Min. of Water, Env’t, Ter ritory
Mg’t & City Planning, Report of the Roundtable on Climate Change, Bujumbura,
Burundi (April 29-30, 2009), http://www.eac.int/environment/index.
83 Min. of Env’t & Mineral Resources (MEMR) & Off. of the Prime
Minister, Kenya Roundtable Workshop on Climate Change, Naivasha,
Kenya (Mar. 30-Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.eac.int/environment/index.
84 Republic of Rwanda, Rwanda Position on Climate Change,
Report From a Two Days Country Round Table on Climate
Change (May 7-8, 2009), http://www.eac.int/environment/index.
85 EAC Secretariat, Report of the National Climate
Change Round Table Meeting, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania
(June 15-17, 2009), http://www.eac.int/environment/index.
86 EAC Secretariat & Uganda Min. of Water & Env’t,
Uganda Round table on Climate Change, Kampala, Uganda
(Apr. 16-18 2009), http://www.eac.int/environment/index.
87 The ﬁve pillars of the Bali Action Plan are adaptation, mitigation, technology
development and transfer, capacity building and ﬁnancing. Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Bali, Indon., Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties in its
Thirteenth Session, Dec. 1/CP.13, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14,
2008), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf [hereinafter
Bali Action Plan].
88 Under the Adaptation pillar, the policy aims at, inter alia — strengthening
early warning systems; enhancing preparedness and disaster risk management;
scaling up efﬁcient use of water and energy resources; enhancing irrigation-based
crop agriculture and livestock production; protecting wildlife and key vulnerable
ecosystems; improve land use; and intensifying control of diseases, vectors and
pests. Bali Action Plan, supra note 87.
89 Among the key mitigation measures prioritized by the Policy are: afforesta-
tion, reforestation, forest conservation, access to carbon credit facilities, promo-
tion of energy efﬁciency, efﬁcient and sustainable crop and livestock production
systems, and promotion of efﬁcient transport and waste management systems.
Bali Action Plan, supra note 87.
90 The Policy focuses on, for instance, enhancing technology development and
transfer, addressing technology transfer barriers, enhancing research capacity,
and enhancing South-South and North-South cooperation for enhanced technol-
ogy development and transfer within the sub-region. Bali Action Plan, supra
91 The Policy aims to, for instance, introduce climate change issues into
education curricula, skills training in technology development and transfer, and
harnessing of indigenous knowledge on climate change. Bali Action Plan, supra
92 The policy envisages an elaborate ﬁnancing mechanism for climate change
actions in the sub-region, including the establishment of an EAC Climate
Change Fund. Bali Action Plan, supra note 87.
93 See EAC Secretariat, Communiqué of the 11th Ordinary Summit
of EAC Heads of State, Arusha, Tanzania, ¶ 10 (Nov. 20, 2009), http://
download&gid=84&Itemid=77; See, e.g., EAC Secretariat, Preparatory
Meeting for the Extra Ordinary Summit on Food Security and Climate
Change, Moshi, Tanzania (Feb. 15-19, 2010), http://www.eac.int/environment/
EAC Secretariat, 2nd Preparatory Meeting for the Extra Ordinary Summit on
Food Security and Climate Change, Nairobi, Kenya (Feb. 22-26, 2010),
94 East African Community, Declaration of the 9th Extraordinary Summit
of the Heads of State on Food Security and Climate Change, Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania (Apr. 19, 2011).
95 EAC CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2011), http://www.eac.int/environment/
96 EAC FOOD SECURITY ACTION PLAN (2010-2015), http://www.eac.int/
98 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN BURUNDI, EAC MINISTERS CALL FOR ACTION TO
ENHANCE FOOD SECURITY (2011), http://bnub.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid
99 See Id.
101 See EAC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, supra note 12.
102 See, EAC Secretariat, EAC-COMESA-SADC Launch Five-Year Climate
Change Initiative, EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY PORTAL (Dec. 8, 2011), http://
103 Generally, it aims to harmonize climate change programmes in the three
regional blocs, mainstream climate change in national and regional policies and
strategies, and particularly enhance investments in climate resilience and carbon
efﬁcient agriculture (“climate-smart agriculture”). Id.
104 See EAC, 21 Meeting of the Council of Ministers, Dec. 1, 2010, Decision
60, EAC/CM/21/Decision 60 (2010).
107 The establishment of the Fund was endorsed by the Summit at the Special
Retreat on Food Security and Climate Change, Dec. 2, 2003. EAC Ofﬁcial Calls
for Involvement of Regional Blocs in Climate Change Initiatives, S. AFR. TRADE
HUB (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.satradehub.org/in-the-news/sath-content/
108 Multi-Sectoral Tech Meeting of Experts on Preparation of Key Documents
for the 9th Extra-Ordinary Summit, Apr. 19-21, 2010, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
(Apr. 21, 2010).
109 See EAC Ofﬁcial Calls for Involvement, supra note 107.
110 The LVBC succeeded the Lake Victoria Development Programme, which
had been established in 2011 as a mechanism for coordinating the various inter-
ventions on the Lake and its Basin. Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC),
East African Community Portal, http://www.eac.int/lvdc.html?showall=1 (last
visited Mar. 23, 2012).
111 See, LVBC SECRETARIAT, HARMONIZATION OF REGIONAL POLICIES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS GOVERNING UTILIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES IN THE LAKE VICTORIA
BASIN: DRAFT REPORT 77-78 (July 2011).
112 Convention for the Establishment of the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization,
Kenya-Tanz.-Uganda (entered into force May 24, 1996), http://www.fao.org/
113 Id., art. II(2).
114 See, LVBC SECRETARIAT, supra note 111, at 79.
115 See, e.g., Annie Kelly, Uganda’s Response to Climate Change ‘Inadequate’,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/katineblog/
116 See id.
117 See GEMMA NORRINGTON-DAVIES & NIGEL THORNTON, OECD & AFR. DEV.
BANK (AFDB), CLIMATE FINANCING AND AID EFFECTIVENESS: KENYA CASE STUDY
(DRAFT) 7, 19 (Mar. 2011), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/8/48458443.pdf
(stating that climate change issues do not feature in Kenya’s long-term develop-
ment blueprint, “Vision 2030”, nor its initial Medium Term Plan for Delivery
(MTP), though the government has hinted that the issues will be incorporated
in the next delivery MTP).
118 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2011
(2011). See also, TRANSPARENCY INT’L – KENYA, THE EAST AFRICAN BRIBER
INDEX 2011 1 (2011) (indicating the Bribery Indices (BIs) in Rwanda, Kenya,
Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi as standing at 5.1%, 28.8%, 31.6%, 33.9% and
119 See, e.g., U.S. Embassy Nairobi, Visas Donkey: Corruption 212(F) Visa
Revocation (Sept. 1, 2009) (leaked cable giving an account of how former
Attorney-General Amos Wako reportedly beneﬁted from ofﬁcial corruption
in the government, while using his position to frustrate the anti-corruption
crusade), http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/09/ 09NAIROBI1830.html; U.S.
Embassy Nairobi, Visas Donkey: Corruption 212(F) Visa Denial (Sept. 16,
2009), http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/ 2009/09/09NAIROBI1938.html (leaking
cable giving an account of how a former Director of the KACC frustrated
120 See, e.g., Climate change spending ‘at risk of fraud and corruption,’ IN2EAS-
of-fraud-and-corruption%E2%80%99/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
121 See, generally, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: CLIMATE
123 See UNDP, SUSTAINABILITY AND EQUITY: A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL —
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011 (2012) (revealing that out of the 187
countries ranked — with an HDI of 0.509, Kenya ranked 143th; Tanzania came
152nd (HDI, 0.466); with an HDI of 0.446, Uganda was 161st; Rwanda, with
an HDI of 0.429, was 166th; and, with a dismal HDI of 0.316, Burundi ranked
125 See, e.g., Anthea Rowan, Africa’s charcoal burning problem, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 25, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8272603.stm; BURUNDI:
Shrinking lakes and denuded forests, IRIN (June 5, 2007), http://
www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=72543 UGANDA: Charcoal
boom a bust for forests, IRIN (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.irinnews.org/
report.aspx?reportid=94810; see also, IRIN, Life in northern Kenya:
‘We either burn charcoal or die of starvation,’ THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 20,
126 See, e.g., Green Africa Foundation, Spotlight on Kenya’s Environment,
http://www.greenafricafoundation.org/section.asp?ID=42 (last visited Feb.
14, 2012) (citing the period 1990-2005 as “the worst [time] for Kenya” as it
lost up to ﬁve percent of its forest cover through illegal lumbering and human
encroachment); 10 Most Endangered Forests on Earth, ITSNATURE.ORG, http://
visited Feb. 13, 2012) (ranking the Mau Forest as the second most endangered
forest in the world); see also IRIN, supra note 125.
127 See Seventh African Development Forum, Oct. 10-15, 2010, Acting on
Climate Change for Sustainable Development in Africa: Consensus Statement
(Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.uneca.org/adfvii/documents/ADF-VII-Consensus-
Statement.pdf, at 2.
130 See, e.g., SMITA NAKHOODA ET AL., OVERSEAS DEV. INST., REGIONAL BRIEFING:
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, BRIEF NO. 7 1 (2011), http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/
132 See generally Bali Action Plan, supra note 87 (showing that the concept
of “climate change ﬁnancing” emerged in response to the need for “adequate,
predictable and sustainable” mechanisms to support climate change actions in
133 See, e.g., Canada pulls out of Kyoto Protocol, CBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011),
html; Canada pulls out of, denounces Kyoto protocol, CBS NEWS (Dec. 13,
denounces-kyoto-protocol/; Anger at US climate retreat, BBC NEWS (Mar. 29,
134 See, e.g., NORRINGTON, supra note 117, at 7 (showing lack of institutional
and technical capacity in Kenya).
137 See generally OAKLAND INST., THE GREAT LAND GRAB (2011).
138 See, e.g., FIAN, LAND GRABBING IN KENYA AND MOZAMBIQUE (2010); see
also JEANETTE SCHADE, CENTER ON MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT,
HUMAN RIGHTS, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND CLIMATE POLICIES IN KENYA: HOW CLIMATE
VARIABILITY AND AGROFUEL EXPANSION IMPACT ON THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE TANA DELTA (2011), http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/tdrc/ag_comcad/
139 See, e.g., OAKLAND INST., UNDERSTANDING LAND INVESTMENTS DEALS IN
AFRICA: TANZANIA (2011).
140 See, e.g., Fred Ojiambo, Uganda Lawmakers to Mull Rainforest Allocation
to Sugar Company, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 5, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/
company.html; Uganda President Museveni proposes land giveaways to inter-
national business interests, WSWS.ORG (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.wsws.org/
142 See generally Olivier De Schutter, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food, Access to Land and the Right to Food, Report to the 65th General
Assembly of the United Nations, UN Doc. A/65/281 (Aug. 11, 2010) (on
the relationship between access to land and food security), http://www.
report_en.pdf; Olivier De Schutter, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food, Large-Scale Land Acquisitions and Leases: A Set of Minimum
Principles and Measures to Address the Human Rights Challenge, Report
presented to the UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/33/Add.2
(Dec. 28, 2009) (noting how human rights violations can be addressed in the
context of the global land rush), http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/
143 See Strategic Climate Fund, CLIMATE FUNDS UPDATE, http://www.
climatefundsupdate.org/listing/strategic-climate-fund (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
144 See Congo Basin Forest Fund, CLIMATE FUNDS UPDATE, http://www.
climatefundsupdate.org/listing/congo-basin-forest-fund (last visited Feb 10,
2012); see also, Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF), AFR. DEV. FUND (AFDB),
basin-forest-fund/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
145 See Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, CLIMATE FUNDS UPDATE, http://
visited Feb. 10, 2012).
146 See Global Climate Change Alliance, CLIMATE FUNDS UPDATE, http://www.
climatefundsupdate.org/listing/global-climate-change-alliance (last visited Feb.
147 See Least Developed Countries Fund, CLIMATE FUNDS UPDATE, http://www.
climatefundsupdate.org/listing/least-developed-countries-fund (last visited Feb.
10, 2012); Funded Projects, CLIMATE FUNDS UPDATE, http://www.climate
fundsupdate.org/projects (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
60 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
148 See Special Climate Change Fund, CLIMATE FUNDS UPDATE, http://www.
climatefundsupdate.org/listing/special-climate-change-fund (last visited Feb.
149 See, e.g., Ramesh Jaura, Africa Paves the Way for Climate for Development,
INDEPTHNEWS (Oct. 23, 2010) (arguing that while Brazil, Mexico, India and
China enjoy hundreds of projects funded under CDM, Africa has only a handful
of such projects), http://www.indepthnews.net/news.php?key1=2010-10-23%20
150 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21,
151 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertiﬁcation in Countries Experi-
encing Serious Drought and/or Desertiﬁcation, Particularly in Africa, Jun. 17,
1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 26, 1994), http://www.unccd.int/
152 Convention on Biological Diversity, Jun. 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered
into force Dec. 29, 1993), http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/.
153 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005), http://unfccc.
154 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208 (entered into force Sept. 11, 2003), http://
155 See Assembly of the African Union, Eighth Ordinary Session, Jan 29-30,
2007, Decision on Climate Change and Development, in Decisions and Decla-
rations, Assembly/AU/Dec.134 (VIII); Assembly of the African Union, Eighth
Ordinary Session, Jan. 29-30, 2007, Declaration on Climate Change and Devel-
opment in Africa, in Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/AU/Decl.4 (VIII).
156 Conference of African Ministers of the Environment, Algiers Declaration
on Climate Change (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.oss-online.org/index.
visited Feb. 14, 2012).
157 See First Meeting of the Conference of African Heads of State and Govern-
ment on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) and African Lead Experts on Climate
Change (Aug. 24, 2009), .
158 Tumusiime Rhoda Peace, A Brief on AUC’s Coordination and Engagement
in Climate Change Negotiation Process 2 (2010), http://www.google.com/
159 See, e.g., Assembly of the African Union, Seventeenth Ordinary Session,
June 30 – July 1, 2011, Decision on Africa’s Preparation for Seventeenth
Conference of the Parties/Seventh Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,
¶ 5, Assembly/AU/Dec.375(XVII), http://www.au.int/pages/sites/default/ﬁles/
(requesting the CAHOSCC to convene a meeting to consider and take forward
the updated African Common Position to CoP17/CMP7); Addis Ababa: Africa
prepares for Climate Change meet in Durban, AFR. REPORT (Nov. 16, 2011),
prepares-for-climate-change-meet-in-durban-50175382.html; Committee of
African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC)
Meeting, STARAFRICA.COM (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.starafrica.com/en/news/
160 See United Nations Environment Programme, Regional Off. for Afr.,
AMCEN at a glance, http://www.unep.org/roa/Amcen/About_AMCEN/default.
asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
161 See, e.g., AMCEN, Third Special Session, May 25-29, 2009, Decision on
the African Process for Combating Climate Change, Annex II ¶ 6, AMCEN/SS/
III/6 (May 28, 2009), (recalling the special role of AMCEN in the AU climate
change framework), http://www.unep.org/roa/Amcen/Amcen_Events/3rd_ss/
162 See AMCEN, May 25-29 2009, Report of the Ministerial Segment of the
Special Session on Climate Change of the African Ministerial Conference on
the Environment, AMCEN/SS/III/6 (May 28, 2009), http://www.unep.org/roa/
Third Special Session, May 25-29, 2011, Nairobi Declaration on the African
Process for Combating Climate Change, AMCEN/SS/III/6 Annex I (May 28,
163 See AMCEN, Fourth Special Session on Climate Change, Sept. 15-16,
2011, Report of the Ministerial segment held on 15 and 16 September,
AMCEN/SS/IV/3 (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.unep.org/roa/amcen/Amcen_
164 See AMCEN, Thirteenth Session, June 21-25, 2010, Report of the ministerial
segment from 23 to 25 June 2010, UNEP/AMCEN/13/10 (June 25, 2010),
165 NEPAD, ACTION PLAN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT INITIATIVE (2003), http://www.
166 See id.
167 The AfDB, the region’s multilateral development bank, has proved instru-
mental in the region’s concerted efforts to ﬁght climate change. Currently, it is
exploring possibilities of establishing a regional climate ﬁnancing mechanism.
168 See NEPAD Planning & Coordinating Agency, Climate Change and Natural
Resource Management Thematic Area, http://www.nepad.org/climatechange-
andsustainabledevelopment (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
169 See First Africa Energy Week Highlights Importance of Clean Energy,
AFDB (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/
also, Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Energy, Maputo,
Mozambique, Nov. 1-5, 2010, Resolution on the “All Africa Energy Week,”
AU/MIN/Energy/Res. 2 (Nov. 5, 2010).
170 As the AU’s Secretariat, the AUC has played a pivotal role in generally
coordinating the various AU climate change initiatives. More importantly, it
recently established a Climate Change and Desertiﬁcation Control Unit to assist
in tackling climate change concerns. Mention must also be made of the growing
formidable partnerships with, among others, the AfDB, UNECA, UNEP, the
UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (“UNISDR”), NEPAD,
RECs, and development partners.
171 The ClimDev-Africa Programme is a joint initiative of the AUC, UNECA
and the AfDB, aims to enhance economic growth and sustainable progress
towards the MDGs. It primarily focuses on mitigating the vagaries of climate
change and climate-prooﬁng development gains already registered. In this
respect, it seeks to integrate Climate Risk Management (CRM) into regional
development policies, strategies and programmes.
172 The initiative, which initially involved the planting of a 15km-wide forest
belt (“green wall”) across the continent, was conceived by the 11 countries
located along the southern border of the Sahara, and their international partners.
It is aimed at limiting the desertiﬁcation of the Sahel zone, which is a transition
zone between the Sahara in the North and Africa savannas in the south, and
includes parts of Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan. The idea was ﬁrst proposed in
the 1980s, and eventually presented to the AU in 2005. In January 2007, the
AU Assembly adopted it, thereby committing the AU to ﬁghting desertiﬁcation
in the region. See, African Union, 8th Ordinary Session, Jan. 29-30, 2007,
Decision on the Implementation of the Green Wall for the Sahara Initiative, AU
Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.137(VIII); see also, Julio Godoy, Great Green Wall to
stop Sahel desertiﬁcation, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.guardian.
173 The program, funded by UK’s Department for International Development
(DfID) and the Ottawa-based International Development Research Centre
(IDRC), has seen investment in enhancing linkage between conventional
meteorological services and traditional weather forecast systems, especially in
Western Kenya. See Climate Change Adaptation in Africa, IDRC, http://www.
and_Adaptation_in_Africa/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
174 The Programme was launched in 2008 by the UNDP in partnership with
the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the UN Children’s
Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP), with ﬁnancial support
from the Government of Japan. It was established under the Japan-UNDP Joint
Framework for Building Partnership to Address Climate Change in Africa,
which was founded at the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African
Development (TICAD) in May 2008. Basically, it seeks to strengthen the
capacities of the target countries to deliver a development agenda that makes
steady progress towards the MDGs. See About Us, AFRICA ADAPTATION
PROGRAMME, http://www.undp-aap.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
175 See SOUTH AFRICAN DEV. CMTY., http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/52
(last updated Jan. 8, 2009).
176 See AMCEN, Twelfth Session, June 7-12, 2008, Subregional environmental
action plans and the NEPAD national action plans on the environment – an
introductory account, UNEP/AMCEN/12/INF/2 (May 12, 2008), http://www.
INF-2-SubregionalActionPlan.pdf; Abwao Kennedy, East Africa Establishes
Climate Monitoring Centre, SCIDEVNET (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.scidev.net/
Climate Initiative, http://programmes.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_conte
nt&view=article&id=80&Itemid=110 (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
177 See EAC SECRETRIAT, supra note 86.
178 See U. N. Dev. Programme, Local Responses to State Water Policy Changes
in Kenya and Madagascar (2006) (Richard R. Marcus), http://hdr.undp.org/en/
reports/global/hdr2006/papers/marcus%20richard.pdf; the Water Act, Act No. 8
(2002), http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken37553-a.pdf; the Forest Act, Act No.
7 (2005), http://www.fankenya.org/downloads/ForestsAct2005.pdf; the Energy
Act, Act No. 12 (2006), http://www.erc.go.ke/energy.pdf; KENYA MIN. OF ENV’T
& MINERAL RESOURCES (MEMR), NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSE STRATEGY
(EXECUTIVE BRIEF) (Apr. 2010), http://www.environment.go.ke/images/
complete%20nccrs%20executive%20brief.pdf (explaining the Integrated
Coastal Zone Management Policy); Min. of Env’t & Mineral Resources
(MEMR), Climate Change Finance and Development Effectiveness in Africa:
Kenya Climate Change Finance Experience, http://www.gcca.eu/usr/Min-of-
Env—Kenya-CC-Finance-Experience.pdf (explaining the National Climate
Change Response Strategy); Ministry of Env’t & Natural Resources,THE KENYA
NATIONAL BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN (2000), http://www.cbd.
int/doc/world/ke/ke-nr-04-en.pdf; Kenya Ministry of Finance, Draft National
Policy on Carbon Finance and Emission (2011); See CONSTITUTION arts. 69-72
(2010) (Kenya), http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/The%20Constitution%20
179 See The Environment Management and Co-ordination Act., No. 8 § 9(1)
(1999), http://www.nema.go.ke/images/documents/emca.pdf; See INST. FOR LAW
& ENVT’L GOVERNANCE (ILEG), CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION & MITIGATION:
WHAT ORGANIZATIONS IN KENYA ARE DOING 64-68 (Benson Owuor Ochieng &
Maurice Odhiambo Makoloo, undated), http://www.ilegkenya.org/pubs/docs/
180 The program focuses on research and capacity development to improve
the capacity of vulnerable communities in Kenya to adapt to climate change.
Naftali Mwaura, Kenya Develop Broad Action Plans to Combat Climate
Change, AFR. SCIENCE NEWS, http://www.africasciencenews.org/en/index.php/
combat-climate-change (last visited March 23, 2012).
181 Kenya is one of the twenty African countries participating in the program,
which aims to strengthen the country’s institutional and systemic capacity to
implement the NCCRS and to address the risks and opportunities presented by
climate change. Kenya, UNDP-ADP, http://www.undp-aap.org/countries/kenya
(last visited March 23, 2012).
182 KACCAL is a joint World Bank and UNDP programme that seeks to develop
and pilot a wide range of climate change coping mechanisms for reducing the
vulnerability of small holder farmers and pastoralists in the country. It was
approved in 2009. WORLD BANK, PROPOSED GRANT FROM THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
FACILITY SPECIAL CLIMATE CHANGE FUND TO THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA FOR KACCAL
183 This project seeks to remove market barriers to the adoption of sustainable
biomass energy practices and technologies in schools, hospitals and restaurants
by promoting adoption of highly energy-efﬁcient cook stoves and establishment
of woodlots. It was approved in 2009. VIOLET MATIRU & JASON SCHAFFLER,
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, MARKET TRANSFORMATION FOR HIGHLY
EFFICIENT BIOMASS STOVES FOR INSTITUTIONS AND MEDIUM-SCALE ENTERPRISES IN
KENYA 3 (2011).
184 See UNFCCC, Project 1404: “35 MW Bagasse Based Cogeneration
Project” by Mumias Sugar Company Limited (MSCL), http://cdm.unfccc.int/
Projects/DB/TUEV-SUED1193228673.11/view (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
185 See UNFCCC, Project 2975: Olkaria III Phase 2 Geothermal Expansion
Project in Kenya, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/RWTUV1252941041.99/
view (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
186 See UNFCCC, Project 3773: Olkaria II Geothermal Expansion Project,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1276170328.71/view (last visited
Feb. 11, 2012).
187 See UNFCCC, Project 4513: Lake Turkana 310 MW Wind Power Project,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/SGS-UKL1298369167.94/view (last visited
Feb. 11, 2012).
188 See UNFCCC, Project 3206: Aberdare Range/ Mt. Kenya Small Scale
Reforestation Initiative Kamae-Kipipiri Small Scale A/R Project, http://cdm.
unfccc.int/Projects/DB/JACO1260322827.04/view (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
189 The NAPAs are intended to assist the LDCs deﬁne their adaptation priority
activities in order to obtain climate ﬁnancing from the Global Environment
Facility (“GEF”) and other sources. National Adaptation Programmes of Action,
UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/national_reports/napa/items/2719.php (last visited
March 23, 2012).
190 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, National
Adaptation Programmes of Action: Index of NAPA Projects by Country, 6,
25-26, 31-32, 34 (2012), http://unfccc.int/ﬁles/cooperation_support/least_
191 See Law No 1/010 of 30, No 1/138 of 17, No 1/008 of 1 (detailing Burundi
has the Environment Code, the Forestry Code, the Mining and Petroleum Code,
and the Land Law, among others); Law No 04/2005 of 8 April 2005 Determining
the Modalities of Protection, Conservation and Promotion of Environment
in Rwanda, http://www.rema.gov.rw/rema_doc/Laws/Environment%20
Organic%20Law.pdf; Organic Law N° 08/2005 of 14 July 2005 Determining
the Use and Management of Land in Rwanda, http://www.rema.gov.rw/rema_
doc/Laws/Organic%20Land%20law.pdf; Republic of Rwanda, Min. of Lands,
Resettlement & Env’t, Environment Policy, http://www.rema.gov.rw/rema_doc/
Policies/Environment_policy_English_vesion_.pdf; Republic of Rwanda, Min.
of Lands, Env’t, Forests, Water & Mines, National Land Policy, Feb. 2004,
version_.pdf; RWANDA CONST. (2003), June 2, 2003, http://www.rwandahope.
com/constitution.pdf, art. 49; Environment Management Act (EMA), Act No.
20/2004, Act No. 14/2002, Act. No. 11/2009, Act No. 5/2009.
192 See Least Developed Countries Under the UNFCCC, UNFCCC Table 1
193 DROUGHT AND DESERTIFICATION, UNITED NATIONS ECON. AND SOC. COUNCIL
194 List of Parties, Convention on Bioloical Diversity, http://www.cbd.int/
convention/parties/list/ (last visited March 23, 2012).
195 Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratiﬁcation, UNFCCC (2006), http://unfccc.int/
196 Parties to the Protocol and signature and ratiﬁcation of the Supplementary
Protocol, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/par-
ties/ (last visited March 23, 2012).
197 See Law No 16/2006 of 3 April 2006 art. 3 (Determining the Organization,
Functioning and Responsibilities of Rwanda Environment Management
198 The Division was established in 1991 under the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Tourism. In 1995, it was transferred to the Vice President’s
Ofﬁce to give it the requisite priority and attention on promoting management
environmental agenda. It is responsible for the overall environmental policy and
regulation, formulation, coordination and monitoring of environment policy
implementation in the country. See Environment, TANZANIA.GO.TZ, http://www.
tanzania.go.tz/environment.html#Division%20of%20Environment: (last visited
March 23, 2012).
199 National Environment Act, supra note 54, § 6. (establishing the National
Environment Management Authority), http://www.nfa.org.ug (showing the
National Forestry Authority); see CCU, About CCU, http://www.ccu.go.ug/
about-ccu/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) Parliamentary Forum on Climate Change
(PFCC) – Uganda, http://www.parliament.go.ug/index.php?option=com_conte
nt&task=view&id=410&Itemid=138 (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
200 See UNFCCC, Project 1578: Uganda Nile Basin Reforestation Project No.
3, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/JACO1200649370.95/view (registered
Aug. 21, 2009); UNFCCC, Project 4466: Uganda Nile Basin Reforestation
Project No. 5, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/JACO1297129985.73/view
(registered June 20, 2011); UNFCCC, Project 4940: Uganda Nile Basin
Reforestation Project No. 2, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/
JACO1309233364.97/view (registered Aug. 23, 2011); UNFCCC, Project
4939: Uganda Nile Basin Reforestation Project No. 1, http://cdm.unfccc.int/
Projects/DB/JACO1309231132.71/view (registered Aug. 23, 2011); UNFCCC,
Project 4941: Uganda Nile Basin Reforestation Project No. 4, http://cdm.
unfccc.int/Projects/DB/JACO1309233467.05/view (registered Aug. 29, 2011).
62 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
201 See UNFCCC, Project 3404: Rwanda Electrogaz Compact Fluorescent
Lamp (CFL) distribution project (2010), http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/
AENOR1265819671.65/view; UNFCCC, Project 4613: Rwanda Natural
Energy Project: Water Treatment Systems for Rural Rwanda (Shyira and
Fawe) (registered Mar. 25, 2011), http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/
RWTUV1301046533.96/view; UNFCCC, Project 4799: Rwanda Natural
Energy Project: Water Treatment Systems for Rural Rwanda (Mugonero Esepan,
Rwesero, Nyagasambu) (registered May 16, 2011), http://cdm.unfccc.int/
202 See UNFCCC, Project 0908: Landﬁll gas recovery and electricity generation
at “Mtoni Dumpsite”, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania (registered June 2, 2007),
203 See UNFCCC, Project Cycle Search-Registered, http://cdm.unfccc.int/
204 See RWANDA ENV’T MG’T AUTH. (REMA), http://www.rema.gov.rw/ (last
visited Feb. 14, 2012).
205 See Stephen Otage, Uganda: Students to Start Sitting Climate Change
Examinations, ALLAFRICA.COM (Feb. 10, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/
206 In the latter front, the World Bank, UNEP, UNDP, the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (“FAO”), and the EU particularly stand out for
mention. In the bilateral realm, the US International Development Agency
“USAID”), DfID, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (“JICA”),
the Swedish International Development Agency (“SIDA”), the Canadian
International Development Agency (“CIDA”), the Austrian Development
Agency (“ADA”), the Belgian Development Agency (“BTC”), and the Danish
International Development Agency (“DANIDA”) lead the pack. See, e.g.,
Catherine Karongo, UNEP, Kenya in Sh270m Mau rehabilitation plan, CAPITAL
FM NEWS (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2011/11/unep-
208 See, e.g., Annemarie Roodbol, Foreign Players Show Interest in Green
Energy in Africa, KBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.
209 See, e.g., Ormat to Increase Capacity of Olkaria III Geothermal Plant, REN-
WABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld.
mal-plant?cmpid=rss; Ormat Secures US$310M Loan for Olkaria II Reﬁnance
and Expansion, THINK GEOENERGY (Sept. 14, 2011), http://thinkgeoenergy.com/
archives/8700; Olkaria III, EMERGING AFR. INFRASTRUCTURE FUND, http://www.
emergingafricafund.com/news/olkaria-iii.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
210 See, e.g., Patrick Thuita, Lake Turkana Wind Power Farm Gets Carbon
Credit Approval, CONSTRUCTION BUS. REV. (May 25, 2011), http://www.
credit-approval/; Victor Juma, Big Returns Spark Foreign Funds Rush
for Kenyan Firms, ALLAFRICA.COM (Jan. 24, 2012), http://allafrica.com/
stories/201201250335.html; Erik Ombok, Lake Turkana Wind Project in Kenya
to Break Ground in April, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.
211 See generally ILEG, supra note 180.
212 See, e.g., Nancy Kachingwe, African Civil Society Engagement with
COP 17: One Step Closer to an African Climate Change and Development
Agenda (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.boell.org.za/web/cop17-814.html;
Kevin Kinusu Kinyangi, KCCWG at the African Pavilion, Durban,
213 See, e.g., Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund: Renewable Energy and
Adaptation to Climate Technologies (REACT), CLIMATE FINANCE OPTIONS, http://
www.climateﬁnanceoptions.org/cfo/node/226 (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
216 Since 2006, UAP has been at the forefront in offering insurance products
targeting farming enterprises. The products cover both crop and livestock farmers
against natural perils like drought, ﬂoods, frost, ﬁre, winds and hail storms.
While the livestock covers insure mortality losses, the crop covers insure loses
due to failed harvests or destruction of crops or harvests. See ILEG, supra note
217 See, e.g., Xan Rice, Kenya herders to be offered livestock insurance against
drought, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/
2010/jan/22/kenya-drought-insurance; Jeff Haskins and Neil Palmer, Kenya:
Livestock Insurance – A Chance to Outsmart Drought?, TRINITY AFER (Jan. 9,
insurance-a-chance-to-outsmart-drought; see also Susan MacMillan, Herders
in drought-stricken northern Kenya get ﬁrst livestock insurance payouts, ILRI
NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.ilri.org/ilrinews/index.php/archives/7310;
Susan MacMillan, Livestock Director and Partners Launch First-ever Index-
based Livestock Insurance Payments in Africa, ILRI NEWS (Oct. 25, 2011),
218 Susan MacMillan, Livestock Director and Partners Launch First-ever
Index-based Livestock Insurance Payments in Africa, ILRI NEWS (Oct. 25,
219 See Southern Sudan, DRC lining up to join the EA Community, TRADEMARK
S. AFR. (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.trademarksa.org/node/3182.
222 See East African Community, 13th Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State,
Nov. 30, 2011, Communiqué of the 13th Ordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of
State ¶ 11 (2011).
223 See Christine Mungai, East Africa: Region’s Economy Expands Amid
Deepening Levels of Poverty, NORWEGIAN COUNCIL FOR AFRICA (Apr. 10, 2012),
224 See generally NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE
STERN REVIEW (2007); see also OTTMAR EDENHOFFER & LORD NICHOLAS STERN,
TOWARDS A GLOBAL GREEN RECOVERY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE G20
ACTION 43-47 (2009).
Endnotes: THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL: FIT FOR HYDROFLUROCARBONS
continued from page 25
10 UNEP Ozone Secretariat, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer 2007: A Success in the Making, 6 (Feb. 22, 2012), http://ozone.
11 The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UNEP OZONE
SECRETARIAT (Feb. 22, 2012, 5:19PM), http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/index.
12 CLIMATE CONTROL CO. ASS’N, supra note 2.
13 UNEP Ozone Secretariat, supra note 10.
14 Danielle Fest Grabiel, Crucial Crossroads, OUR PLANET MAGAZINE, Septem-
ber 2007, at 20.
15 Id.; INST. GOVERNANCE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT
REGULATING HYDROFLUOROCARBONS UNDER THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 9 (Jan. 22,
2012), http://www.igsd.org/documents/UpdatedHFCFAQsAugust.pdf; UNEP
Ozone Secretariat, supra note 10, at 10.
16 Grabiel, supra note 14.
17 UNEP Ozone Secretariat, supra note 10.
Endnotes: PREVENTING CORAL GRIEF: A COMPARISON OF AUSTRALIAN AND FRENCH CORAL REEF PROTECTION
STRATEGIES IN A CHANGING CLIMATE
continued from page 31
4 SPALDING ET AL., supra note 1, at 208–09, 385–91.
5 SPALDING ET AL., supra note 1, at 163, 207–08.
6 Andrew Chin et al., Status of the Coral Reefs in Australia and Papua
New Guinea, in STATUS OF THE CORAL REEFS OF THE WORLD: 2008 159, 161–64
(Clive Wilkinson ed., 2008).
7 GREAT BARRIER REEF MARINE PARK AUTH., GREAT BARRIER REEF OUTLOOK
REPORT 2009 ii (2009).
8 Claude Bouchon et al., Status of Coral Reefs of the Lesser Antilles: The
French West Indies, The Netherlands Antilles, Anguilla, Antigua, Grenada,
Trinidad and Tobago, in STATUS OF THE CORAL REEFS OF THE WORLD: 2008 265,
278 (Clive Wilkenson ed., 2008); GREAT BARRIER REEF MARINE PARK AUTH.,
supra note 7, at 98.
9 Caroline Vieux et al., Status of Coral Reefs in Polynesia Mana Node
Countries: Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Kiribati, Tonga, Tokelau and
Wallis and Futuna, in STATUS OF THE CORAL REEFS OF THE WORLD: 2008 189, 191
(Clive Wilkenson ed., 2008); Bouchon et al., supra note 8, at 273; Chin et al.,
supra note 6, at 159.
10 GREAT BARRIER REEF MARINE PARK AUTH., supra note 7, at 11.
11 See French Overseas Departments and Territories, http://www.francekeys.
com/english/regions/overseas.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
12 Laetitia Plaisance et al., The Diversity of Coral Reefs: What Are We
Missing?, PLOS ONE, Oct. 2011, at 1.
13 GREAT BARRIER REEF MARINE PARK AUTH., supra note 7, at 4.
14 Status of the Coral Reefs in the South West Paciﬁc: Fiji, New Caledonia,
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu (Cherie Morris & Kenneth
Mackay eds.), in STATUS OF THE CORAL REEFS OF THE WORLD: 2008 177, 184
(Clive Wilkenson ed., 2008).
15 E.g., J.E. Maragos et al., Coral Reefs and Biodiversity: A Critical and
Threatened Relationship, 9 OCEANOGRAPHY 83, 87–89, 93–94 (1996).
16 J.E. Maragos et al., Id. at 83, 87.
17 SUE WELLS, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME WORLD CONSERVATION
MONITORING CENTRE (UNEP-WCMC), IN THE FRONT LINE: SHORE PROTECTION AND
OTHER ECOSYSTEM SERVICES FROM MANGROVES AND CORAL REEFS 12–13 (2006).
18 OXFORD ECON., GREAT BARRIER REEF FOUND., VALUING THE EFFECTS OF GREAT
BARRIER REEF BLEACHING 2 (2009).
19 JOHN ROLFE & JILL WINDLE, ENVTL. ECON. RESEARCH HUB RESEARCH REPORTS,
REP. NO. 72, ASSESSING NATIONAL VALUES TO PROTECT THE HEALTH OF THE GREAT
BARRIER REEF 8 (2010).
20 Pierre Failler et al., Valeur économique Totale des Récifscoralliens,
Mangroves et Herbiers de la Martinique, ÉTUDES CARIBÉENNES (Apr. 2010),
21 Mahe Charles, Functions and Socio-Economic Importance of Coral Reefs
and Lagoons and Implications for Sustainable Management: Case study of
Moorea, French Polynesia 9 (July 2005) (MSc Thesis, Wageningen Univ.).
22 G. DAVID ET AL., CORAL REEF INITIATIVES FOR THE PACIFIC (CRISP),
APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VALUES OF PACIFIC CORAL
REEFS 43 (2007).
23 INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT OF CORAL REEFS: DECISION SUPPORT
MODELING 219–22 (Kent Gustavson et al. eds., 2000).
24 UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME (UNEP) ET AL., BLUE CARBON — THE
ROLE OF HEALTHY OCEANS IN BINDING CARBON 6–7 (Christian Nellemann et al.
25 UNEP ET AL., Id. at 7.
26 UNEP ET AL., Id. at 27.
27 JOAN A. KLEYPAS ET AL., IMPACTS OF OCEAN ACIDIFICATION ON CORAL REEFS
AND OTHER MARINE CALCIFIERS: A GUIDE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 24, 32, 36, 67 (2006).
28 Marine Parks, QUEENSLAND GOV’T, ENV’T & RESOURCE MGMT., http://www.
derm.qld.gov.au/parks_and_forests/marine_parks (last updated Dec. 1, 2011).
29 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 (Cth) pt I, s 2 (Austl.) (establishing
the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority); id. pt VAA, s 38AA (Austl.)
(providing the offences and penalties for mining or geological storage operations
in the Great Barrier Reef Region).
30 See generally Andrew Chin et al., supra note 6.
31 FRANCIS GORDON CLARKE, THE HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA 95 (2002).
32 AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 108.
33 Council of Australian Governments’ Communiqué 7 November 1997,
Environmental Reform, COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS (COAG),
cfm#environmental (last updated Oct. 24, 2008).
34 Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) s 4(2) (Austl.).
35 Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) pt 2, s 2 art 3, pt v, art (57) (Austl.).
36 See generally OFFSHORE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT: A MILESTONE IN
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM (1980).
37 OFFSHORE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT, Id.
38 OFFSHORE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT, Id. at 11.
39 Marine Protected Areas, Australia’s Marine Jurisdictions - State, Territory
and Commonwealth MPAs, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF ENV’T, http://www.
environment.gov.au/coasts/mpa/about/index.html (last updated Apr. 20, 2010).
40 Marine Protected Areas, Id.
41 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) pt I,
s 3 (Austl.).
42 See generally Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act
43 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, Id. pt 2, s 11.
44 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, Id. pt 1, s 3(2).
45 See generally Chris McGrath, Flying Foxes, Dams and Whales: Using
Federal Environmental Laws in the Public Interest, 25 EPLJ 324 (2008).
46 Marine Protected Areas, supra note 39.
47 IUCN, GUIDELINES FOR APPLYING PROTECTED AREA MANAGEMENT CATEGORIES
4 (Nigel Dudley ed., 2008).
48 IUCN, Id.; Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Regulations 2000 (Cth) reg 10.6 (Austl.).
49 NICK HARVEY & BRIAN CATON, COSTAL MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALIA 214–17
(Deidre Dragovitch & Alaric Maude eds., 2010).
50 HARVEY & CATON, Id. at 204.
51 HARVEY & CATON, Id. at 214–24.
52 HARVEY & CATON, Id. at 234.
53 National Representative System of Marine Protected Areas, AUSTRALIAN
GOV’T DEP’T OF ENV’T, http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/mpa/nrsmpa
(last updated Apr. 28, 2010).
54 MARINE PROTECTED AREAS WORKING GROUP, PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE
NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM OF MARINE PROTECTED AREAS (NRSMPA),
at 5 (2007).
55 GREAT BARRIER REEF MARINE PARK AUTH., supra note 7, at 169.
56 RYAN DONNELLY, CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT: QUEENSLAND
MARINE AQUARIUM SUPPLY INDUSTRY, 2010, at 93, 96 (2011).
57 The Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement 2009 (Cth) para 1
58 The Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement 2009, Id. sch C.
59 The Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement 2009, Id. para 18.
60 The Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement 2009, Id. para 1.
61 DONNELLY, supra note 56, at 43, 94.
62 A.M. AYLING & J.H. CHOAT, ABUNDANCE PATTERNS OF REEF SHARKS AND
PREDATORY FISHES ON DIFFERENTLY ZONED REEFS IN THE OFFSHORE TOWNSVILLE
REGION 22 (2008).
63 G.R. Almany et al., Connectivity, Biodiversity Conservation and the Design
of Marine Reserve Networks for Coral Reefs, 28 CORAL REEFS 339, 348 (2009).
64 What is Marine Bioregional Planning?, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF ENV’T,
http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/mbp/about/index.html (last updated Nov.
65 DONNELLY, supra note 56, at 98, 117.
66 GREAT BARRIER REEF MARINE PARK AUTH., supra note 7, at 120, 128–30.
67 GREAT BARRIER REEF MARINE PARK AUTH., supra note 7, at 178–80.
68 Claude E. Payri & Fabienne Bourdelin, The Status of Coral Reefs in French
Polynesia, at 48, http://nsgl.gso.uri.edu/hawau/hawauw97001/hawauw97001_
part3.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
69 AGENCE DES AIRES MARINES PROTEGEEES, FRENCH MARINE PROTECTED AREAS
AGENCY INFORMATIONAL GUIDE (MAR. 2008).
70 See generally ROBERT ALDRICH & JOHN CONNELL, FRANCE’S OVERSEAS
FRONTIER: DEPARTMENTS ET TERRITOIRES D’OUTRE-MER (1992).
71 ALDRICH & CONNELL, Id. at 2.
72 ALDRICH & CONNELL, Id. at 5.
73 ALDRICH & CONNELL, Id. at 6.
74 ALDRICH & CONNELL, Id.
64 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
75 ALDRICH & CONNELL, Id.
76 New Caledonia Welcomes New Environmental Code, INT’L UNION
FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE (IUCN) (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.iucn.
77 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397 (1982).
78 ALDRICH & CONNELL, supra note 70, at 89.
79 WORLD COMM’N ON PROTECTED AREAS (WCPA), IUCN, SERIES NO. 3,
GUIDELINES FOR MARINE PROTECTED AREAS (Graeme Kelleher & Adrian Phillips
80 François Feral, L’extension récente de la taille des aires marines protégées:
une progression des surfaces inversment proportionnelle à leur normativité ?
Internal report GRAMP, 1-16 (2011).
81 Bernard Salvat, Bertrand Cazalet, & François Féral, La Représentation
Internationale des Aires Marines Protégées Francaises: Déﬁnition et Afﬁchage
des Surfaces Protégées. Réﬂexions sur les AMP Ultramarines, 239 COURRIER DE
LA NATURE 34, 41 (2008).
82 Catherine Gabrié C, Amandine Eynaudi & Adrien Cheminée, Les Recifs
Coralliens Proteges De L’Outre-Mer Francais. IFRECOR- WWF -MINISTÈRE DE
L’ÉCOLOGIE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE ET MINISTÈRE DE L’OUTRE-MER, 1,
1- 103 (2007); see also Salvat, Cazalet, & Feral, supra note 81, at 37–41.
83 See Conference Report, Bluebook Commitments of the Oceans Round
Table, Grenelle De La Mer, July 14–15, 2009, http://www.legrenelle-envi-
84 Single Country Proﬁle: France, EUROPEAN SUSTAINABLE DEV. NETWORK,
proﬁle&country=France (last visited Feb 20, 2012).
85 Conference Report, supra note 83, at 15.
86 See REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, PREMIÈRE MINISTRE, BLUE BOOK: A NATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR THE SEA AND OCEANS (Dec. 2009).
87 See Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Mauritius, http://
environment/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
88 Conference Report, supra note 83, at 15.
89 Conference Report, Id.
90 See Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Beneﬁts Arising From their Utilization to the Convention
on Biological Diversity, Oct. 29, 2010, http://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/
91 WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, TOWARDS GOOD ENVIRONMENTAL STATUS: A NETWORK
OF MARINE PROTECTED AREAS FOR THE NORTH SEA 51 (2009).
92 CENTRE D’ANALYSE STRATEGIQUE—SECRETARIAT GENERAL DE LA MER
(2006), UNE AMBITION MARITIME POUR LA FRANCE, RAPPORT DU GROUPE POSEIDON
POLITIQUE MARITIME DE LA FRANCE, Paris: CAS-SGM (2006).
93 CENTRE D’ANALYSE STRATEGIQUE, Id.
94 CENTRE D’ANALYSE STRATEGIQUE, Id.
95 See Laurence J. McCook et al., Marine Reserves Special Feature: Adaptive
Management of the Great Barrier Reef, PNAS (Oct. 2010), http://www.pnas.
96 Said Ahameda et al., Status of the Coral Reefs of the South-West Indian
Ocean Island States: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion, Seychelles, in
STATUS OF THE CORAL REEFS OF THE WORLD: 2008, at 265, 279 (Clive Wilkenson,
97 ALDRICH & CONNELL, supra note 70, at 6.
98 ALDRICH & CONNELL, supra note 70, at 6.
99 See generally AUST. STATE OF THE ENV’T COMM., INDEPENDENT REPORT TO
THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT MINISTER FOR SUSTAINABILITY, ENVIRONMENT,
WATER, POPULATION AND COMMUNITIES (2011), http://www.environment.gov.au/
keyﬁndings.pdf (last visited Feb 20, 2012).
100 AUST. STATE OF THE ENV’T COMM., Id.
101 AUST. STATE OF THE ENV’T COMM., Id.
102 Kurt Derbyshire et al., Can We Minimize the Impact of Vessel Moorings
on Coastal Habitats? An Interagency Management Approach in Queensland,
2nd Queensland Coastal Conference, Gold Coast, Australia (May 2009).
103 See Coral Reefs & Global Climate Change, CORAL REEF ALLIANCE,
http://www.coral.org/node/126 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
104 See 12th Int’l Coral Reef Symposium, ARC CENTER FOR CORAL REEF STUDIES,
http://www.coralcoe.org.au/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
105 Laboratoires d’ Excellence, Projet Corail, UNIVERSITE DE LA NOUVELLE-
t&view=article&id=103&lang=en, (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
106 Pedro Fidelman et al., Governing Large–Scale Marine Commons: Contextual
Challenges in the Coral Triangle, 36 MAR. POL. NO. 1 42 (2012).
107 See Background Note: the Philippines, CIA FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
108 Bernard Salvat & Clive Wilkinson, Uninhabited Islands Should be Focus
of Conservation Efforts, MPA NEWS, Nov. 2008, at 2.
109 See generally AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF ENV’T, FACT SHEET: CORAL REEF
CONSERVATION ZONE (2009).
110 See generally AUST. GOV’T DEP’T OF ENV’T, PROPOSED CORAL SEA
COMMONWEALTH MARINE RESERVE: DRAFT FOR COMMENT/PUBLIC CONSULTATION,
(last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
111 AUST. GOV’T DEP’T OF ENV’T, Id.
112 See EEZ Waters of France, SEA AROUND US PROJECT, http://www.
seaaroundus.org/eez/250.aspx (discussing the overall area of France’s exclusive
economic zone (“EEZ”) (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
113 Marine Protected Area Effectiveness and Marine Spatial Planning, SECOND
ANNUAL MARINE CONSERVATION CONGRESS (2011), http://birenheide.com/
scbmarine2011/program/singlesession.php3?sessid=C29 (indicating that
Bertrand Cazalet will present on Off-shore Extension of Marine Protected
Areas to Further Strengthen Coastal State’s Hold Over Sea Spaces).
114 INTERNATIONAL UNION OF CONSERVATION OF NATURE (IUCN), DURBAN ACTION
PLAN (rev’d 2004), http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/durbanactionen.pdf.
115 See generally ANDERS JÄGERSKOG ET AL, GETTING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER
RIGHT: THEORY AND PRACTICE FOR EFFECTIVE COOPERATION 7 (2009), http://www.
116 See Minutes of the 26th ICRI General Meeting La Réunion, 12-15 December
2011, INT’L CORAL REEF INITIATIVE, http://www.icriforum.org/sites/default/ﬁles/
ICRIGM26-minutes-ﬁnal.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
117 ICRI Secretariat, INT’L CORAL REEF INITIATIVE, http://www.icriforum.org/
icri-secretariat (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
Endnotes: RECOGNITION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CARBON CREDITS UNDER CALIFORNIA’S NEW GREENHOUSE
GAS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM
continued from page 32
1 Endnotes: RECOGNITION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CARBON CREDITS UNDER
CALIFORNIA’S NEW GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM
See Elisa Wood, Is Cap-and-Trade Kaput?, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.
COM (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/
article/2011/03/is-the-cap-kaput (discussing the U.S. federal government’s aver-
sion to adopting a nationwide cap-and-trade system); see also AMERICAN CLEAN
ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 1–553 (2009)
(proposing a robust cap-and-trade market for carbon dioxide). But see H.R.
2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2454 (last visited Feb. 2, 2012)
(listing the status of H.R. 2454 as having passed the Senate but failing
in the House).
2 See ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, BACK TO THE FUTURE: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY
CARBON MARKETS 2011 9 (2011) (ﬁnding that the voluntary carbon market in
the United States has grown thirty-four percent in 2010 after a downturn with
the recession in 2011).
4 See Memorandum of Understanding, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, (last
visited Mar. 8, 2012), http://rggi.org/design/history/mou (stating that seven states
ﬁrst announce their moratorium of understanding that outlines the framework
for the RGGI’s model rule on Dec. 20, 2005).
5 Although the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 authorized the creation
of the Acid Rain Program, a cap-and-trade program to reduce the amount of
sulfur and nitrous dioxide, the ﬁrst cap-and-trade program in the United States
was California’s Regional Clean Air Incentives Market that began in 1993.
Compare U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AN OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL CLEAN AIR
INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 1 (2006) (stating that RECLAIM was started
in 1993) with Acid Rain Program, EPA.GOV (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.epa.
gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/basic.html (stating that the Acid Rain Program
began in 1995). See also CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7651-51o (1990) (authorizing the use of a cap-and-trade scheme to limit
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide); Justin Gerdes, Cap and Trade Curbed
Acid Rain: 7 Reasons Why It Can Do The Same For Climate Change, FORBES
(Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/justingerdes/2012/02/13/cap-and-
(discussing the history of the Acid Rain Program).
6 See Cap and Trade Program, CALIFORNIA ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES.
BD., http://arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012)
(describing California’s cap-and-trade program which started on Jan. 1, 2012).
7 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95981 (West 2012) (listing the requirements
for offset credits); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95994 (listing the sector-based
8 See Rob Curran, Carbon Offsets: Q&A, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2001), http://
9 Voluntary markets do not have a single set of requirements, but use various
industry standards to assure the quality of the carbon credits. See Voluntary
Over-the-Counter (OTC) Offset Market, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, http://www.
market&page_name=otc_market (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
10 Compare REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MODEL RULE Subpart
XX-10 (Dec. 31, 2008) (listing the requirements for offsets in the RGGI) with
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 §§ 95981–94 (listing the requirements for offsets in
California’s cap-and-trade market).
11 See Compliance Offset Program, CALIFORNIA ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES.
BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm (last visited Mar.
9, 2012) (listing California’s offset programs).
12 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95802(a)(12) (West 2012) (deﬁning an offset
credit as a compliance instrument); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95820(c) (stating
that a compliance instrument “does not constitute property or a property right”).
13 See Markus W. Gehring & Charlotte Streck, Emissions Trading: Lessons
From SOx and NOx Emissions Allowance and Credit Systems Legal Nature,
Title, Transfer, and Taxation of Emission Allowances and Credits, 35 E.L.R.
10,221–22 (2005) (analyzing how the Fifth Amendment will require the
government to compensate regulated companies whose sulfur dioxide allow-
ances are revoked under the cap-and-trade Acid Rain Program); see also 136
CONG. REC. S16,980 (1990) (statement of Sen. Baucas) (“[T]he reason for char-
acterizing the legal or property status of allowances in this title is to make clear
that regulatory actions taken subsequent to the issuance of allowances are not
subject to the ‘takings clause’ of the U.S. Constitution.”). Compare CLEAN AIR
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f) (1990) (stating that a emissions
allowance used in the Acid Rain Program “does not constitute property right”)
with CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95820(c) (stating that a compliance instrument
“does not constitute property or a property right”).
14 C.f. Gehring, supra note 13, at 10,222 (arguing that if an emissions allow-
ance under the Acid Rain Program is revoked, then the owner could be entitled
to compensation under the Takings Clause).
15 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95801.
16 C.f. Gehring, supra note 13, at 10,222 (arguing that compensation for
revocation of emission allowances in the Acid Rain Program will impede the
government’s ability to achieve the goal of reducing emissions); Travis Allan
& Kathy Baylis, Who Owns Carbon? Property Rights Issues in a Market for
Greenhouse Gases, 7 CURRENT ARGIC., FOOD & RES. ISSUES 104, 106 (2006)
(stating that the Acid Rain Program does not recognize sulfur dioxide emissions
allowances as property because the United States is afraid of compensating
regulated companies when the allowances are revoked).
17 Roseland Plantation, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29334, 9–10 (W.D. La. 2006).
18 Roseland, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29334 at 9.
19 Roseland, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29334 at 8.
20 Roseland, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29334 at 9.
21 Roseland, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29334 at 7–8.
22 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95973.
23 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 §§ 95940–42.
24 California, Quebec To Link CO2 Markets This Year, THOMSON REUTERS
POINT CARBON (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.1716584.
26 C.f. Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F. 3d 799, 807 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that emissions allowances under the Acid Rain Program should be
treated like economic commodities and such treatment requires that their nature
and interest holders be treated the same throughout the entire market).
27 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall have power] [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”).
28 See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (stating that the
Commerce Clause limits state laws which interfere with interstate commerce).
Endnotes: THE ABCS OF GOVERNING THE HIMALAYAS IN RESPONSE TO GLACIAL MELT: ATMOSPHERIC BROWN CLOUDS,
BLACK CARBON, AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
continued from page 37
1 MATS ERIKSSON ET AL., THE CHANGING HIMALAYAS – IMPACT OF CLIMATE
CHANGE ON WATER RESOURCES AND LIVELIHOODS IN THE GREATER HIMALAYAS,
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR INTEGRATED MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT 1-3 (2009),
2 The terms “Greater Himalaya” and “Hindu Kush-Himalaya region” are
often used interchangeably but somewhat inconsistently in various studies.
The list of countries here includes all of those that fall within river basins
whose sources originate in the mountains referenced above. MADHAV KARKI
ET AL., REGIONAL ASSESSMENT FOR RIO+20: HINDU KUSH HIMALAYA AND SE
ASIA PACIFIC MOUNTAINS, DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION, FROM RIO 1992 TO 2012 AND
BEYOND: SUSTAINABLE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT, HINDU KUSH HIMALAYA (HKH)
REGION 9-10 (SEPT. 2011), www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/
3 AON BENFIELD, UCL HAZARD RESEARCH CENTRE, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
LONDON ET AL., THE WATERS OF THE THIRD POLE: SOURCES OF THREAT, SOURCES
OF SURVIVAL 5 (Nina Behrman ed., 2010), http://www.humanitarianfutures.org/
4 MINISTRY OF ENV’T AND FORESTS, GOV’T OF INDIA, GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINING
HIMALAYAN ECOSYSTEM: GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES 10 (undated), http://
gbpihed.gov.in/G-SHE_Book.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2012).
5 Shichang Kang et al., Review of Climate and Cryospheric Change in the
Tibetan Plateau, 5 015101 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 3 (2010), http://m.iopscience.
6 ERIKSSON, supra note 1, at 2-3.
7 BENFIELD, supra note 3, at 8.
8 Id. at 5-7, 10. See also Eriksson, supra note 1, at 3-4.
9 Id. at 7-10.
10 Id. at 10-13.
11 See, e.g., INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS,
APPLICATIONS, AND RESEARCH FRONTIERS, at xviii, xxi, 3-45 (Oran R. Young et
al. eds., 2008) (deﬁning “governance” as “[t]he process of steering or guiding
societies toward collective outcomes that are socially desirable and away from
those that are socially undesirable”).
12 R.V. Cruz et al., Asia in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 493 (M.L. Parry
et al., eds., 2007) http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch10.
html; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC STATEMENT ON THE
MELTING OF HIMALAYAN GLACIERS (2010), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/presentations/
13 Kang et al., supra note 5, at 3.
14 VEERABHADRAN RAMANATHAN ET AL., U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, ATMOSPHERIC
BROWN CLOUDS: REGIONAL ASSESSMENT REPORT WITH FOCUS ON ASIA 26-27
66 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
15 Gretchen Cook-Anderson, New Study Turns Up the Heat on Soot’s Role in
Himalayan Warming, NASA (2009), http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/
16 Kang et al., supra note 5, at 4, 6.
17 Veerabhadran Ramanathan et al., Warming Trends in Asia Ampliﬁed by
Brown Cloud Solar Absorption, 448 NATURE No. 7153 511, 575 (2007).
18 Kang et al., supra note 5, at 6.
19 Cook-Anderson, supra note 15.
20 Orjan Gustaffson et al., Brown Clouds Over South Asia: Biomass or Fossil
Fuel Combustion?, 323 SCI. No. 5913 495, 495-97 (2009).
21 Kang et al., supra note 5, at 1-3.
22 Id. at 3.
23 Lester Brown, Melting Mountain Glaciers Will Shrink Grain Harvests in
China and India, EARTH POLICY INST. (Mar. 20, 2008), www.earth-policy.org/
24 BENFIELD, supra note 3, at 8-10.
25 BENFIELD, supra note 3, at 8-10.
26 See, e.g., MINISTRY OF GOV’T AND FORESTS, supra note 4, at 10 (describing
the distinctive climate of the Himalayas, which inﬂuences much of Asia’s
climate). See also Kang, supra note 5, at 1-2 (characterizing the Tibetan Plateau
as a “huge inﬂuence on regional and global climate”).
27 Weather Extremes in a Changing Climate, WMO, www.wmo.int/pages/
mediacentre/news/extremeweathersequence_en.html (last updated Mar. 18, 2011).
28 Eriksson, supra note 1, at 15; BENFIELD, supra note 3, at 14-23.
29 See BENFIELD, supra note 3, at 10-13, 18-23.
30 See id. at 23 (describing the insufﬁciency of institutional mechanisms for
governing transboundary water resources).
31 Oran R. Young, Governance for Sustainable Development in a World of
Rising Interdependencies, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES
12-40 (Magali A. Delmas and Oran R. Young eds., 2009).
32 Young et al., supra note 11, at 4-5, 6-9; quote at 7.
33 ELINOR OSTROM, A DIAGNOSTIC APPROACH FOR GOING BEYOND PANACEAS,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES 104 (39): 15181, 15183
(B.L. Turner II ed., 2007), http://www.pnas.org/content/104/39/15181.abstract.
34 Robert O. Keohane, Peter M. Haas & Marc A. Levy, Effectiveness of
International Environmental Institutions, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH:
SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 8 (Haas,
Keohane, and Levy eds., 1993).
35 Id. at 3-4.
36 See, e.g., United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 (Jun. 16, 1972) [hereinafter
Stockholm] (setting forth the ideas of cooperation and duty to surrounding
states in Principles 6 (prevention), 21 (harm), and 24 (cooperation)); see also,
e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter
Rio] (supporting cooperation among neighbors in Principles 7 (responsibility)
and 15 (precaution)).
37 See, e.g., Rio, supra note 36 (providing for environmental impact assessment
in Principle 17).
38 See, e.g., Stockholm, supra note 36 (identifying international cooperation
as a goal in Principles 22 and 24).
39 See Stockholm, supra note 36. See also, Rio, supra note 36; United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June
3-14, 1992, The United Nations Program of Action from Rio, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., Agenda Item 21, Sec. II, Ch. 13, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26 (1992).
40 See, e.g., PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 128-205 (3d ed. 2009); DAVID HUNTER, JAMES
SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
469-537 (2d ed. 2007).
41 See generally Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992); United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, May 5, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18;
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf; Convention and Statute on
the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern, Apr. 20, 1921, 7
U.N.T.S. 36 (1921).
42 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Johannesburg, S. Afr.,
Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002, Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, Ch. IV, ¶42
43 World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982).
44 U.N.E.P., Environmental Law Guidelines And Principles On Shared Natural
45 UNEP Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment, UNEP
Res. GC14/25, 14th Sess. (1987), endorsed by GA Res. 42/184, UN GAOR,
42nd Sess., UN Doc. A/Res/42/184 (1987).
46 See generally Int’l Law Ass’n, Berlin Conference on Water Resources Law,
Fourth Report (2004), http://www.unece.org/ﬁleadmin/DAM/env/water/
Rules_on_Water_Resources_ILA.pdf (explaining which aspects of the
Convention are obligatory and relevant rules of customary international law).
47 Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, July 3, 1978, Bol.-Braz.-Colom.-
Ecuador-Guy.-Peru-Surin.-Venez., 17 I.L.M. 1045 (entered into force Aug. 3,
48 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35
49 Regional Seas Programme, UNEP (last visited May 1, 2012), http://www.
50 Wolfram Krewitt et al., Assessment of Environmental and Health Beneﬁts
from the Implementation of the UN-ECE Protocols on Long Range Transbound-
ary Air Pollution, 61 JOURNAL OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, Aug. 1998, at 239-47
(estimating that the measures taken as a result of the convention saved an
average of 1% of annual GDP for 15 European countries and preserved 90,000
years of life expectancy each year).
51 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundry Watercourses and
International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 ILM 1312 (1992).
52 See, e.g. Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound
Management of the Common Zambezi River System, May 28, 1987, 27 I.L.M.
1109; Agreement Between the Republic of Zambia and the Republic of
Zimbabwe Concerning the Utilization of the Zambezi River, Zambia-Zimb.,
July 28, 1987, http://www.fao.org/docrep/W7414B/w7414b17.htm.
53 Katak B. Malla, Hydro-climate Legal Management of the Hindu-Kush
Himalayas, 12(1) ASIA PAC. J.ENVTL. L. 51-83, 83 (2009).
54 Convention on the Protection of the Alps (Alpine Convention), art. 2, ¶ 1,
Nov. 7, 1991, 1917 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Mar. 6, 1995), http://
55 Id. art. 2, ¶ 2.
56 Id. arts. 3, 4, and 5.
57 See, e.g., Young, supra note 11, at 267 (showing the importance of
creating a framework for discussing problems of governance). See also Alpine
Convention, supra note 54 (calling for general obligations of all parties to the
Convention (art. 2)).
58 INT’L CTR FOR INTEGRATED MOUNTAIN DEV. [ICIMOD], STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK 4 (Jan. 2008), www.icimod.org/resource.php?id=21.
59 Id. at 8.
60 Id. at 4.
61 Id. at 8.
62 ICIMOD ANNUAL REPORT 2009 48-50 (2009), http://books.icimod.org/
63 See Strategic Framework, supra note 58, at 20.
64 David Cyranoski, Glacial Melt Thaws South Asian Rivalry, NATURE NEWS, April
16, 2008, at 793, http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080416/full/452793a.html.
65 See generally ICIMOD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58.
66 SOUTH ASIAN ASS’N FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION [SAARC], www.saarc-
sec.org (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
67 See generally SAARC Charter, SAARC, http://www.saarc-sec.org/
SAARC-Charter/5/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
68 M.K. Bhadrakumar, China Breaks the Himalayan Barrier, ASIA TIMES
(May 1, 2010), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LE01Df03.html.
69 See Area of Cooperation, SAARC (2009), http://www.saarc-sec.org/#
(last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
70 See generally SAARC, Area of Cooperation: Science and Technology,
www.saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/cat-detail.php?cat_id=46 (last visited
Apr. 24, 2012).
71 See generally U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, SAARC, & DEV. ALTERNATIVES,
SOUTH ASIAN ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK (2009), http://www.saarc-sec.org/userﬁles/
72 Douglas McGuire, The Mountain Partnership and Regional Cooperation,
INT’L MOUNTAIN P’SHIP (Special Event in Bolzano), 16-18 (2006),
73 See generally P’SHIP FOR CLEAN INDOOR AIR, http://www.pciaonline.org/
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012); GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN COOKSTOVES, http://
cleancookstoves.org/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2012); CLEAN AIR INITIATIVE FOR
ASIAN CITIES, http://cleanairinitiative.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
74 See Malla, supra note 53, at 67.
75 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the
Mekong River Basin, art. 1, Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. 3, www.mrcmekong.
76 Id. at 1.
77 See id. See also Malla, supra note 53, at 73.
78 Press Release, China Ready to Share Data on Mekong Water Levels Ahead
of Regional River Summit, MEKONG RIVER COMM’N (Mar. 26, 2010), http://ns1.
79 See Saira Kurup, Water Wars: India, China and the Great Thirst, THE TIMES
OF INDIA (July 25, 2010), http://articles.timesoﬁndia.indiatimes.com/2010-
(describing the need for a bilateral agreement that goes beyond sharing
80 GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF WATER RES., India- China Co-operation,
visited Feb. 20, 2012). See also, Mirza Zulﬁqur Rahman, Quiet Flows the
Brahmaputra? INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES (Oct. 2, 2008), www.
81 See Kurup, supra note 79.
82 GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF WATER RES., Bilateral International Cooperation,
http://wrmin.nic.in/index2.asp?slid=368&sublinkid=365&langid=1 (last visited
Feb. 20, 2012).
83 See Malla, supra note 53, at 51, 80-83.
84 See Jessica Seddon Wallack & Veerabhadran Ramanathan, The Other
Climate Changers: Why Black Carbon and Ozone Also Matter, 8(5) FOREIGN
AFF. MAG., Sept./Oct. 2009, at 105-113.
85 See, e.g., id. at 108-09. See also Cook-Anderson, supra note 15.
86 See generally Gyami Shrestha, Samuel Traina, & Christopher Swanston,
Black Carbon’s Properties and Role in the Environment: A Comprehensive
Review, 2 SUSTAINABILITY, 1, 294-320 (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/
87 Jeremy Carl, Rising From the Ashes: India’s Black Carbon Opportunity,
INDIA IN TRANSITION BLOG (Jul. 19, 2009), http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/iit/carl.
88 Consultation Meeting Explores Measures to Reduce Emissions of Short-lived
Atmospheric Pollutants, ICIMOD (MAR. 25, 2011), www.icimod.org/?q=3147.
90 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Brieﬁng on Global Climate Change
and Clean Air Initiative (Feb. 16, 2012), www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/
91 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Climate and Clean Air Coalition
to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (Feb. 16, 2012), www.state.gov/r/pa/
92 See Id.
93 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Brieﬁng on Global Climate Change
and Clean Air Initiative (Feb. 16, 2012), www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/
94 Young, supra note 31, at 21-23; see also, Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric
Approach for Coping with Climate Change, 32-39 (World Dev. Rep. Policy
Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
95 Heike Schroeder, Leslie A. King, & Simon Tay, Contributing to the
Science-Policy Interface in INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PRINCIPAL
FINDINGS, APPLICATIONS, AND RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN YOUNG, supra note 11, at
96 See BENFIELD, supra note 3, at 27-31, 147-86.
97 See generally ICIMOD, About Us, http://www.icimod.org/?q=122
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
98 See generally ICIMOD, MIDTERM REVIEW 2007 OF THE ICIMOD STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK AND MEDIUM TERM ACTION PLAN 2008-2012 (Sept. 30, 2010).
99 See Malla, supra note 53, at 83.
100 See Malla, supra note 53, at 83.
101 See generally ICIMOD, Hindu-Kush Himalayan Region, http://www.
icimod.org/?q=1137 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
102 See, e.g., SAARC, 17th SAARC Summit, Addu, Maldives, Nov. 11, 2011,
Addu Declaration of 11 Nov. 2011, SAARC/SUMMIT.17/13 (2011), www.
103 SAARC Charter, supra note 66, art. 4.
104 Ashfaque H Khan, China and SAARC, THE INT’L NEWS (Dec. 20, 2011),
105 Naser Mermon, Shared Waters and Glacial Melt, DAWN (Jan. 1, 2012),
http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/01/shared-waters-glacial-melt.html. See also
Second International Workshop Himalayan Sub-regional Cooperation on Water
Security, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Jan. 15-16, 2010, Dhaka Declaration on Water
Security (2010), http://www.strategicforesight.com/Dhaka%20Declaration.
pdf. The multi-donor Abu Dhabi Dialogue, led by the World Bank, has brought
together high-level representatives of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
China, India, Nepal, and Pakistan; see Geneive Connors, The South Asia
Water Initiative, Presentation from the 2011 World Water Week in Stockholm,
106 Simon Montlake, Climate Change: Southeast Asia’s Preparation Falls
Short, CHRISTIAN SCI, MONITOR (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/
107 See Kurup, supra note 79.
Endnotes: OFFSETTING PROGRAMS: STRUGGLING TO FIND AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION INTERNATIONALLY
continued from page 39
28 See Ostrom, supra note 14, at 8 (communicating the difﬁculty of social
dilemmas where beneﬁts of a solution are diffuse).
29 See, e.g., David Crossland, The Durban Climate Agreement ‘Is Almost
Useless,’ SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/
international/world/0,1518,803158,00.html (describing the new Durban
agreements as too vague and reﬂecting slow progress in extending the Kyoto
Protocol for ﬁve years, creating a delay in deciding on a wider pact); see also
Disastrous outcome from international climate talks in Durban, News Releases,
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.foe.org/news/news-releases/
concern that Durban failed to set clear, binding goals to reduce emissions).
30 See Kate Horner, The Durban Deal – An initial analysis of the outcomes,
Blog, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.foe.org/news/
the establishment of a process for developing new market mechanisms and
potential of carbon offsets through REDD as part of the Durban Platform).
31 See Mohamed Adow, Durban Climate Talks: Mind the Gap, Time for Cli-
mate Justice, CHRISTIAN AID (Nov. 2011), http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/
time-for-climate-justice-durban.pdf (recognizing that the Kyoto Protocol’s
Article 3 principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” allows for
a heavier burden on developed countries).
32 See id. (outlining the accounting loopholes present in CDM, to demonstrate
how credits loosen the degree to which developed countries must comply inter-
nally with Kyoto Protocol commitments).
33 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Draft
Dec. –/CP-17, Conference of the Parties, Green Climate Fund-Report of the
Transitional Committee, 17th Sess., Nov. 28-Dec. 9, 2011, U.N. Doc. FCCC/
CP/2011/L.9 (Dec. 10, 2011), http://unfccc.int/ﬁles/meetings/durban_
nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_gcf.pdf (establishing the Green
Climate Fund to channel ﬁnancial resources to developing countries in support
of their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
68 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
Endnotes: COUPLING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE WITH CARBON TRADING
continued from page 44
10 Alice Kaswan, CPR Perspective: Environmental Justice and Climate
Change, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2009), http://www.progressivereform.
org/perspEJandCC.cfm; see also Basics of Cap and Trade, U.S. ENV’L PROT.
AGENCY [U.S. EPA], http://www.epa.gov/captrade/basic-info.html (last updated
Apr. 9, 2009) (stating that “[a] well-designed cap and trade program delivers . . .
[f]ewer administrative costs to government . . . .”).
14 See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Climate Change Policy, 38
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10287, 10298 (2008).
15 Id. at 10299.
16 Id. at 10302.
17 Alice Kaswan, Reconciling Justice and Efﬁciency: Integrating Environmental
Justice Into Domestic Cap-And-Trade Programs for Controlling Greenhouse
Gases, in ETHICS IN GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 240 (Dennis G. Arnold ed., 2011).
18 See Envtl. Justice Advisory Comm., Proposed Screening Method for Low-
Income Communities Highly Impacted by Air Pollution for AB 32 Assessments,
1-4, (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32publichealth/
communitymethod.pdf (spelling out a “screening method” that attempts to
identify communities that have been “highly impacted by air pollution”)
[hereinafter EJAC]; MRKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD.,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP AND TRADE SYSTEM
FOR CALIFORNIA 9 (2007), http://www.energy.ca.gov./2007publications/ARB-
1000-2007-007/ARB-1000-2007-007.PDF [hereinafter MKT. ADVISORY COMM].
19 See generally U.S. EPA, IMPROVING AIR QUALITY WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVE
PROGRAMS (Jan. 2001), http://www.epa.gov/ttncaaa1/t1/memoranda/eipﬁn.pdf.
21 EMILY WELSCH, UNIV. MICH. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DEFINITIONS 1 (1997)
22 MRKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 18, at 9.
23 See Alice Kaswan, Reconciling Justice and Efﬁciency: Integrating
Environmental Justice Into Domestic Cap-And-Trade Programs for Controlling
Greenhouse Gases, in ETHICS IN GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 252-53 (Dennis G.
Arnold ed., 2011).
24 EJAC, supra note 18, at 1.
27 Id. at 2.
30 Id. at 2-3.
31 Id. at 2 (stating that “EJAC recommends that a broader suite of indicators
should be available to tailor to the reality of each of the State’s regions.”).
32 See U.S. EPA, supra note 19, at 77-94.
33 See Bryan Walsh, What is a Green-Collar Job, Exactly?, TIME (May 26,
34 See e.g. ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MAKING GREEN WORK: BEST
PRACTICES IN GREEN-COLLAR JOB TRAINING (2009), http://www.ellabakercenter.
org/downloads/gcjc/making-green-work.pdf; RAQUEL PINDERHUGHES, GREEN
COLLAR JOBS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAPACITY OF GREEN BUSINESSES TO PROVIDE
HIGH QUALITY JOBS FOR MEN AND WOMEN WITH BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT (2007),
ROSE COMPANIES LLC & WALLACE ROBERTS & TODD, SMART GROWTH: GUIDELINES
FOR SUSTAINABLE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT (2009), http://www.epa.gov/dced/
pdf/sg_guidelines.pdf; U.S. EPA, BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: A REPORT
ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S BROWNFIELDS SUSTAINABILITY
PILOTS (2009), http://www.epa.gov/brownﬁelds/sustain_plts/reports/sustain_
report_web_ﬁnal.pdf; see CLINTON-GORE ADMIN., BUILDING LIVABLE COMMUNITIES:
SUSTAINING PROSPERITY, IMPROVING QUALITY OF LIFE, BUILDING A SENSE OF
COMMUNITY (2000), http://www.smartgrowth.org/pdf/report2knew.pdf; see
ROBERT POLLIN, JEANNETTE WICKS-LIM & HEIDI GARRETT-PELTIER, GREEN
PROSPERITY: HOW CLEAN ENERGY POLICIES CAN FIGHT POVERTY AND RAISE
LIVING STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES (June 2009), http://docs.nrdc.org/
globalWarming/ﬁles/glo_09062504a.pdf; see CAL. JOBS AND ECON. DEV.
PANEL, THE GOVERNOR’S CONFERENCE ON LOCAL RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES:
CALIFORNIA’S PATH TO LOCAL RENEWABLES (2009), http://gov.ca.gov/docs/ec/
Jobs_and_Economic_Development.pdf; see generally VAN JONES HARPERON,
THE GREEN COLLAR ECONOMY: HOW ONE SOLUTION CAN FIX OUR TWO BIGGEST
PROBLEMS 1, 79 (2008).
35 POLLIN, WICKS-LIM & GARRETT-PELTIER, supra note 34, at 2.
36 POLLIN, WICKS-LIM & GARRETT-PELTIER, supra note 34, at 9 (stating that “[s]
pending money in any area of the U.S. economy will create jobs, since people
are needed to produce any good or service that the economy supplies. This is
true regardless of whether the spending is done by private businesses, households,
or a government entity.”).
37 HARPERON, supra note 34, at 14.
38 Id. at 10.
39 DANIEL M. KAMMEN ET AL., PUTTING RENEWABLES TO WORK: HOW MANY
JOBS CAN THE CLEAN ENERGY INDUSTRY GENERATE? 2 (Apr. 13, 2004), http://rael.
40 POLLIN, WICKS-LIM & GARRETT-PELTIER, supra note 34, at 9-10.
41 See id.
42 Id. at 9.
46 ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 7.
47 See POLLIN, WICKS-LIM & GARRETT-PELTIER, supra note 34, at 10, 12.
48 POLLIN, WICKS-LIM & GARRETT-PELTIER, supra note 34, at 12.
50 Id. at 10.
52 Id. at 9.
53 Id. at 12.
56 PINDERHUGHES, supra note 34, at 21.
57 See generally POLLIN, WICKS-LIM & GARRETT-PELTIER, supra note 34.
58 CLINTON-GORE ADMIN., supra note 34, at 62; see also POLLIN, WICKS-LIM
& GARRETT-PELTIER, supra note 34, at 22.
59 MKT. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 18, at 57.
61 Id. at 4.
62 See id. at 56.
63 Id. at 58.
64 Id. at 58-59.
65 Id. at 59; see How Treasury Auctions Work, TREASURY DIRECT, http://www.
treasurydirect.gov/instit/auctfund/work/work.htm (last visited March 6, 2012).
66 See Alice Kaswan, Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? State Controls within a
Federal Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 346
68 MKT. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 18, at 15.
69 Kaswan, supra note 14, at 10307.
70 See id. (suggesting that “a sufﬁciently stringent cap will be key to a trading
71 See generally Kaswan, Reconciling Justice and Efﬁciency, supra note 17.
73 MKT. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 18, at 80.
Endnotes: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH FOR ADDRESSING CO2-DRIVEN OCEAN ACIDIFICATION
continued from page 45
1 See Scott C. Doney et al., Ocean Acidiﬁcation: The Other CO2 Problem,
1 ANNU. REV. MARINE SCI. 170, 172 (2009).
2 See U.N. Entl. Programme [UNEP], Emerging Issues: Environmental
Consequences of Ocean Acidiﬁcation: A Threat to Food Security, 2 (2010),
Acidiﬁcation.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
3 Victoria J. Fabry, Impacts of Ocean Acidiﬁcation on Marine Fauna and
Ecosystem Processes, 65 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 414 (2008).
4 Id. at 415.
5 See generally K. R. N. Anthony et al., Ocean Acidiﬁcation Causes Bleaching
and Productivity Loss in Coral Reef Builders, 105 PNAS 17442–17446 (2008),
http://www.pnas.org/content/105/45/17442.full.pdf+html (detailing the impacts
of ocean acidiﬁcation in coral reefs); Coral bleaching refers to “the loss of
color from reef-building corals because of a breakdown of the symbiosis with
the dinoﬂagellate Symbiodinium.” Simon D. Donner et al., Model-based
Assessment of the Role of Human-induced Climate Change in the 2005
Caribbean Coral Bleaching Event, 104 PNAS 5483 (2007), http://www.pnas.
6 See Philip L. Munday et al., Replenishment of Fish Populations is
Threatened by Ocean Acidiﬁcation, 107 PNAS 12930 (2010), http://www.pnas.
7 See id. See also Philip L. Munday, Ocean Acidiﬁcation Impairs Olfactory
Discrimination and Homing Ability of a Marine Fish, 106 PNAS 6, 1848–1852
(2009) (detailing low pH impact on clownﬁsh ability to ﬁnd suitable habitat).
8 Doney, supra note 1, at 185; See also UNEP, supra note 2, at 6.
9 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 5, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC].
10 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
11 See e.g. John M. Broder, At Meeting on Climate Change, Urgent Issues but
Low Expectations, The NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
change.html (Last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
12 UNCLOS, supra note 10, arts. 2-16.
13 See id, arts. 192-237; see, e.g., Heidi R. Lamirande, From Sea to Carbon
Cesspool: Preventing the World’s Marine Ecosystems from Falling Victim to
Ocean Acidiﬁcation, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 183, 192 (2011) (discussing
protection of the marine environment under UNCLOS); Rachel Baird, et al.,
Ocean Acidiﬁcation: A Litmus Test for International Law, CARBON & CLIMATE
L. REV., 459, 464-65 (2009) (discussing international instruments that relate to
ocean acidiﬁcation, including UNCLOS).
14 UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 192; Although UNCLOS does not deﬁne the
term ‘marine environment’, it is generally understood to mean “the ocean space
taken as a whole (i.e., the surface of the sea, the water column, the subsoil, the
seabed and the atmosphere above them) and everything comprised in that space,
both physical and chemical components, including marine life.” VERONICA
FRANK, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL OBLIGATIONS AT THE
REGIONAL LEVEL 10 (2008).
15 For the purposes of UNCLOS, pollution of the marine environment refers
to the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into
the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards
to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including ﬁshing and other
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and
reduction of amenities. See UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 1(4).
16 UNCLOS, id., art. 194(1).
17 See id., art. 212(1).
18 See id., art. 207(1).
19 See William C.G. Burns, Potential Causes Of Action For Climate Change
Impacts Under The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, 7 SUST. DEV. L. &
POL’Y No. 3, 36 (WINTER 2007) (arguing that CO2 is pollutant under the meaning
20 UNCLOS has been ratiﬁed or acceded to by 162 countries. It should be
noted that of the largest emitters of CO2, to date only the United States of
America has not ratiﬁed UNCLOS. See United Nations Division for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Status of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, of the Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of
the Convention and of the Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of
the Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling ﬁsh
stocks and highly migratory ﬁsh stocks, (as of September 2011), http://www.
un.org/depts/los/reference_ﬁles/status2010.pdf (Last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
21 See generally Barry Buzan, Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in
Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of The Sea, 75 A.J.I.L.
22 See UNCLOS, supra note 10, arts. 279-299.
23 See Jonathan L. Hafetz, Fostering Protection of the Marine Environmental
and Economic Development: Article 131(3) of the Third Law of the Sea
Convention, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 583, 596 (2000).
24 See Frank, supra note 14, at 10.
25 UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 207 (“internationally agreed rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures”).
26 Lakshman Guruswamy, The Promise of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS): Justice in Trade and Environment Disputes, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 189, 208 (1998).
27 ROBIN WARNER, PROTECTING THE OCEANS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION:
STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 49 (2009).
28 See UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 212.
29 See Frank, supra note 14, at 10.
30 See Burns, supra note 19.
Endnotes: CAN GOVERNMENTS ENSURE ADHERENCE TO THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE IN THE LONG-TERM CCS LIABIL-
continued from page 51
40 See 10 C.F.R. § 40.28.
41 Environmental Protection: Storage of CO2 (Termination of Licenses),
2011, S.I. 2221/8, § 7(2) (U.K.); Environmental Protection: Storage of CO2
(Termination of Licenses), 2011, S.I. 2221/8 Schedule I, 4(1) (U.K.).
42 Id. § 15(3)(b).
43 Id. § 14–15.
44 See, e.g., Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of CO2 and amending
Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives
2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation
(EC) No 1013/2006, art. 20, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0114:01:EN:HTML; B.O.E. 2010, 317, Art. 23(5); C.
Env. Art. L 519-1 (Fr.).
45 Environmental Protection: Storage of CO2 (Termination of Licenses), 2011,
S.I. 2221/8, § 10(1) (U.K.); Environmental Protection: Storage of CO2 (Ter mination
of Licenses), 2011, S.I. 2221/8 Schedule I, 4(1) (U.K.).
46 Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
April 2009 on the geological storage of CO2 and amending Council Directive
85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC,
2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No
1013/2006, art. 20, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:
48 B.O.E. 2010, 317, art. 23(5); C. Env. Art.L 519-1 (Fr.).
50 B.O.E. 2010, 317, art. 23(5).
51 B.O.E. 2010, 317, art. 24(6).
52 C. Env. Art.L 519-1 (Fr.).
53 C. Env. Art.L. 229-47-II (Fr.).
54 10 C.F.R. § 40.28.
55 See Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 7901
70 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
56 See General license for custody and long-term care of uranium or thorium
byproduct materials disposal sites, 10 C.F.R. § 40.28(a) (1990).
57 Id. § 40.28(b).
58 See Financial Criteria, 10 C.F.R. § 40 Appendix A, Criterion 10 (2011).
59 Id. § 40 Appendix A, Criterion 11.
60 See Regulatory Framework, DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF LEGACY MGMT.,
http://www.lm.doe.gov/pro_doc/references/framework.htm#umtrca (last visited
Feb. 22, 2012) (Colorado, New Mexico, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming).
61 Ownership And Custody Of Certain Byproduct Material And Disposable
Sites, 42 U.S.C. § 2113(b)(6).
62 10 C.F.R. § 40 Appendix A, Criterion 12.
63 See generally Jacobs et al., Proposed Roadmap for Overcoming Legal and
Financial Obstacles to Carbon Capture and Sequestration, Discussion Article
2009-04, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy
School (2009), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ﬁles/2009-04_ETIP_Jacobs_
64 Id. at 19.
65 Id. at 14.
66 Discussion Article, DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES- VICTORIA, A REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR THE LONG-TERM UNDERGROUND GEOLOGICAL STORAGE OF CARBON
DIOXIDE IN VICTORIA (Jan. 2008), http://www.dpi.vic.gov.au/energy/about/
67 The Department of Energy Carbon Capture and Sequestration Program
Amendments Act of 2011, S. 699, 112th Cong. (2011).
68 UCL CARBON CAPTURE LEGAL PROGRAMME, LIABILITY: AUSTRALIA, http://
www.ucl.ac.uk/cclp/ccsliable-AUS.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (summarizing
the Austl. Cap. Terr. Laws Act No. 14 (2006)).
79 Id. (“The OPGGS Act also provides for a transfer of long-term liability if
the licensee ceases to exist (whether or not the license is in force). Provided the
above conditions are otherwise met, liability will be considered to be a liability
of the [Australian Government].”).
80 See 31 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2012).
81 The Department of Energy Carbon Capture and Sequestration Program
Amendments Act of 2011, supra note 67.
84 Id. § 963A(g).
85 Id. § 963A(g).
86 Id. § 963A(g)(4).
89 See, e.g., Olga Elogolova, Insiders: Energy Legislation Unlikely in 2012,
NAT’L J. (Jan. 31, 2012), http://mobile.nationaljournal.com/energy/insiders-
90 See UCL CARBON CAPTURE LEGAL PROGRAMME, LIABILITY: AUSTRALIA, supra
note 68; see also The Department of Energy Carbon Capture and Sequestration
Program Amendments Act of 2011, supra note 67.
91 See DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES- VICTORIA supra note 66.
92 See Ingelson et al. supra note 34, at 468; see The Carbon Capture and
Sequestration Deployment Act of 2010, S. 3589, 111th Cong. (2010) [CCS
93 Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC)
Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 237
Fed. Reg. 77,230, 77,272 (Dec. 10, 2010).
98 See, e.g., Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, R.S.A. 2000,
s. 215 (providing that in Alberta, Canada, along with government liability
schemes, tort liability is not prohibited as a remedy); see also, Alexandra B.
Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change And Carbon Sequestration:
Assessing A Liability Regime For Long-Term Storage Of Carbon Dioxide, 58
EMORY L.J. 103, 124 (2008) (highlighting that allowing for tort remedies along
with liability schemes is crucial to regulating CCS).
99 Ingelson et al. supra note 34, at 468 (highlighting the risk of owners/
operators going bankrupt).
101 CCS Deployment Act, supra note 92.
102 Id. § 406.
103 CCS Deployment Act, supra note 92.
104 CCS Deployment Act, supra note 92.
105 Id. §§ 406, 407(d).
106 40 C.F.R. § 146.93(b) (2011) (noting that the government may approve an
alternate timeframe if requested by the operator); Post-Injection Site Care and
Closure, 40 C.F.R. § 146.93(c) (2011).
107 CCS Deployment Act, supra note 92, § 406.
108 Id. § 406.
109 Id. § 405(b).
110 Id. § 405(c)(1).
111 Id. § 409.
112 Id. § 405(c)(1).
114 See Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund, 30 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006)
authorized by Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1201 et seq.; The Nuclear Waste Fund, 42 U.S.C. § 10222 (2011) authorized
by Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq.
115 Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Bulletin: Financial Management Service,
Jan. 2011, at 142, http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/b2011_1.pdf.
118 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, UPDATE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISKS
AND CLAIMS PROCESSING, GAO-11-397R (2011), http://www.gao.gov/products/
119 See e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 40.28(a), supra note 56; The Department of Energy
Carbon Capture and Sequestration Program Amendments Act of 2011, supra
note 67; CCS Deployment Act, supra note 92.