Addressing the Competitive Harms of Opaque Online Surveillance and Recommendation Algorithms

Date01 March 2022
Published date01 March 2022
DOI10.1177/0003603X211066983
AuthorMarc Jarsulic
https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211066983
The Antitrust Bulletin
2022, Vol. 67(1) 100 –112
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211066983
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Article
Addressing the Competitive Harms
of Opaque Online Surveillance and
Recommendation Algorithms
Marc Jarsulic*
Abstract
Facebook and Alphabet operate free internet services that are widely used. They provide these services
for free because users are online ad targets. Together Facebook and Alphabet have a large share of the
market for online advertising in the U.S. Their dominance delivers monopolistic returns, reflected in
the persistently high valuations financial markets place on each company. Online ad sales depend on the
ability of these platforms to individually target ads and messages to huge numbers of people. Targeting
is made possible by surveillance which is large in scale, scope, and effectiveness. User engagement,
which helps determine target numbers, is stimulated and directed by “recommendation” algorithms
on Facebook and Alphabet’s YouTube platform. These algorithms can affect what users read and
view, and can influence their attitudes, emotions, and behavior. While surveillance has negative effects
on user privacy, and algorithms have had powerful effects on user attitudes and behavior, platform
users have limited knowledge about how these practices operate or their impacts. These information
asymmetries between platforms and users have important competitive effects. They divert users from
competing platforms that do not engage in these business practices, and inhibit entry and the innovation
it would stimulate, thereby helping sustain the monopoly power of dominant incumbents. Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and includes
rulemaking authority, may be the most effective way to address anticompetitive practices that are
technically complex, can evolve rapidly, and are difficult for industry outsiders to observe.
Keywords
Unfair competition, online surveillance, algorithms
I. Introduction
Both Facebook and Alphabet operate free internet services that are widely used. The Facebook social
media platform has nearly two billion daily active users worldwide, and hundreds of millions in the
United States. Alphabet provides a variety of free services including the dominant Google search and
YouTube video platforms.
Facebook and Alphabet provide these services for free because users are online ad targets. Together
Facebook and Alphabet have a large share of the market for online advertising—they sell over half of
*Senior Fellow and Chief Economist, Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, USA
Corresponding Author:
Marc Jarsulic, Center for American Progress, 1333 H Street N.W., Washington, DC, 20005, USA.
Email: mjarsulic@americanprogress.org
1066983ABXXXX10.1177/0003603X211066983The Antitrust Bulletin XX(X)Jarsulic
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