Increasing the accountability of state actors in prison systems - a necessary enterprise in guaranteeing the Eighth Amendment rights of prison inmates.

• Author: Chin, Alison
• Position: Case Note

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)

1. INTRODUCTION

   In 1996, Larry Hope, an Alabama prison inmate, was handcuffed to the restraining bar known as a "hitching post" in Alabama's prison system. (1) Not only was Hope left shirtless in the hot sun for seven hours, but guards denied him water and toilet breaks for most of the day, ridiculing his complaints of thirst. (2) Hope suffered pain to his wrists and arms, muscle aches, dehydration and sunburn. (3) The Supreme Court in Hope v. Pelzer held that: (1) Hope was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) officials can be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances; and (3) the Alabama prison guards in this case were not entitled to qualified immunity because they had "fair notice" from: (a) binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, (b) the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC") regulation on hitching posts, and (c) a Department of Justice ("DOJ") report informing the ADOC that its particular use of the hitching post was unconstitutional. (4)

   This Note argues that Hope encourages judicial intervention through its monitoring of state prison management, which may, in some cases, be necessary to protect inmate rights. Part II will discuss prior Supreme Court rulings regarding inmates' claims of Eighth Amendment violations in relation to the Court's analysis of both the Eighth Amendment issues and 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983. Subpart A will focus on the Eighth Amendment and will be split into two sections: the first will explain the evolution and application of the deliberate indifference standard; and the second will explain the evolution and application of the malice standard--a standard to detect an actor's malicious intent to cause harm. Subpart B will briefly explain [section] 1983, which can be used either by plaintiffs to impose individual liability on officers or by defendants to claim qualified immunity. Part III addresses the factual and procedural history of Hope v. Pelzer and includes an explanation of Austin v. Hopper (5) which heavily influenced the Supreme Court's decision. Part IV outlines the Majority and Dissenting opinions. Part V argues that the Court's application of the deliberate indifference standard narrowed the malice standard by more critically scrutinizing the point at which an emergency situation ends and an inquiry into a lower threshold of deliberate indifference begins. For example, by expanding the sources of "fair notice" to include federal warnings to the prison administration of unconstitutional punishments, Hope makes individual officers accountable for constitutional violations. This section also explores whether the Supreme Court intruded on the authority of the state's executive and legislative purview.

2. BACKGROUND

   1. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

      The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution declares that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." (6) The Supreme Court has historically defined cruel and unusual punishment in broad terms. In Trop v. Dulles, (7) the Supreme Court first based its interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment on the vague principle that the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man." (8) Most notably, however, the Court argued that its interpretation on the scope of the Eighth Amendment would draw its meaning from the "evolving standards of decency that marks the progress of a maturing society," a guideline that continually resurfaced in Eighth Amendment cases, particularly when addressing prison concerns. (9) Later, in Gregg v. Georgia, (10) the Court built on Trop's constitutional interpretation by defining cruel and unusual punishment as any punishment "grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime," (11) any pain inflicted without penological justification, or as any "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." (12)

      Over the last fifty years, several landmark cases have been brought by prison inmates claiming Eighth Amendment violations by state prison administrations or individual officers. (13) Through these cases, the Supreme Court not only refined its objective definition of "cruel and unusual punishment," but also developed separate subjective standards for determining Eighth Amendment violations. For example, when the Court determined that the alleged mistreatment of the inmate or inmates occurred because of prison conditions, the Court applied a "deliberate indifference" standard. (14) In contrast, when the Court dealt with incidents where pain was inflicted on an inmate because of an alleged need to maintain prison order or safety, or where excessive force was used, the Court applied a "malice" standard. (15) Meanwhile, various justices, including Justice Stevens, argued that cruel and unusual punishment existed objectively regardless of the actor's mental state. (16)

      1. Subjective Standards of Eighth Amendment Analysis

      It is important to address the two subjective standards used by the Supreme Court to analyze Eighth Amendment claims because they reflect the justices' disparate views regarding judicial intervention in prison systems. First, this sub-section will provide background on the Court's past scrutiny of prison conditions, including its application of the deliberate indifference standard. Second, it will explain the Court's use of the malice standard to determine Eighth Amendment violations in emergency situations where force may be required to maintain prison order and in other situations where force has been used.

      1. Eighth Amendment Application on Prison Conditions

         Justice Marshall first spoke of the Court's institution of the "deliberate indifference" standard in Estelle v. Gamble, (17) where a plaintiff inmate claimed prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide him with adequate medical care. (18) The Court held that deliberate indifference by prison personnel to the serious medical needs of prisoners was "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," and thus cruel and unusual punishment, because it caused pain serving no penological purpose. (19) Moreover, Justice Marshall stated that basic Eighth Amendment principles established the government's duty to provide medical care to its inmates, since inmates depended on the administration to preserve their basic health. (20) However, the Court emphasized that the mere denial of adequate medical care without intent did not necessarily violate the Eighth Amendment. (21) In truth, this distinction may have been the Court's attempt to exempt prison staff from accountability for poor inmate treatment in case institutional failure was to blame. (22) Consequently, because the inmate could not prove the doctor's intent to deny him care, the Estelle Court ruled against the inmate's claim that the physician's failure to pursue all medical avenues violated his constitutional rights. (23)

         In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the Court's consideration of the defendant's subjective motivations as a criterion for whether cruel and unusual punishment was inflicted. (24) To Stevens, the violation was objective. It existed in the character of the punishment, not the actor's intent. (25) At the same time, the state of prison conditions was universally poor across the nation. (26) Thus, a purely objective standard may have created too great an opportunity for inmates to find prison staff individually accountable for conditions caused by institutional failures of the state. Because the state legislature, not the judiciary, was traditionally seen as responsible for prison management, Estelle's deliberate indifference standard restrained the federal courts' capacity to intervene in state administrative matters.

         In 1981, Rhodes v. Chapman (27) reaffirmed that the judiciary was not to intervene in general matters of state prison management simply because the court subjectively believed the prison conditions were unreasonable. (28) The Court had no need to address the appropriateness of a deliberate indifference standard in Rhodes since it ruled that the conditions in question, the "double-celling" of inmates, were objectively inoffensive to Eighth Amendment principles. (29) Rhodes held that as long as prison conditions did not violate basic human needs, (30) such as essential food, medical care or sanitation, they did not violate the Eighth Amendment. (31) Beyond these requirements, decisions by a prison administration regarding its management of inmates were more "properly ... weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather than a court." (32) Justice Powell, who delivered the majority opinion, emphasized that courts were ill-equipped to handle the urgent problems of prison reform (33) and that they should not assume that the legislative and executive branches were "insensitive" to constitutional parameters. (34) This statement drew heavy criticism from Justice Marshall, who stated in the dissent, that such "unfortunate dicta" could be interpreted by federal courts as a warning against judicial intervention in state prison operations. (35) Moreover, he complained that legislators and prison officials often disregarded Eighth Amendment principles, and thus federal intervention was necessary to protect inmate rights. (36) Similarly, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Stevens in a concurrence, highlighted that past judicial intervention was an essential force in reforming inhumane prison conditions and encouraged litigation against entire prison systems for constitutional violations. (37) However, the Rhodes majority opinion seemed to signal a precedent for ensuring federalism when courts scrutinized state prison administration.

         A decade after Rhodes, Justice Scalia wrote in the majority opinion for Wilson v. Seiter (38) that, despite an inmate's complaint of overcrowding, inadequate heating and cooling...