Acheson and the Diplomacy of World War II

• Author: Oscar William Perlmutter
• Date: 01 December 1961
• Published date: 01 December 1961
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296101400406
• Subject Matter: Articles

ACHESON AND THE DIPLOMACY OF WORLD WAR II
OSCAR WILLIAM PERLMUTTER
Institute of European Studies, Paris
MERICAN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS had already reached a critical juncture
when Acheson was appointed an assistant secretary of state early in
JL
1941. The new position proved to be a challenge as well as a source of
frustration. In a few public utterances prior to 1941 Acheson had formulated
principles of American politics which revealed an active concern for foreign
policy. Logically one would have expected the high position in the State De-
partment to provide him with ample opportunities to implement his ideas, but
this was not the case. The Department of State was a weak link in American
government and Acheson’s role within it tended to be limited to the execution
of policy rather than its formulation. Nevertheless, his term as assistant secre-
tary is significant to students of diplomacy for two principal reasons: it gives us
an insight into the basic problems confronting the Department of State in its
conduct of foreign policy and also a better understanding of the background of
one of the most influential personages in postwar diplomacy, Dean Acheson. His
presence in the New Deal hierarchy during this period was to become a central
issue during the Truman administration in controversies over his alleged steward-
ship of foreign policy during World War II, the Yalta settlements, the failure of
Far Eastern policy, and the alleged subversion of the State Department. In many
instances, adversaries of the Truman-Acheson foreign policy based a large part
of their case upon events and alleged failures that occurred during World War II
and attributed most, if not all the difficulties to Acheson. A stereotype of
Acheson was fostered and it became a fixed point of reference in the debates.
The three specific charges that were made most frequently against Acheson
in 1949, at the time of his nomination as secretary of state, date back to this
period: (1) that he was the leader of a pro-Russian clique within the Depart-
ment of State and influenced it and the government as a whole; (2) that he
protected Communists in the State Department, e.g., Alger Hiss; and (3) that
he was responsible for such major and controversial policies as those associated
with Yalta and China. Despite frequent denials, leading figures in Congress per-
sisted in reiterating such charges and accepted the multiplication of reiterations
as the equivalent of historical fact. For example, in 1951, at the hearings on the
relief of General McArthur, Senator Knowland opened his questioning of Ache-
son with a reference to Acheson’s appointment in 1941 and then proceeded to
link him with both Yalta and Alger Hiss.’ From the many assertions and
counterassertions made in reference to Acheson’s role during World War II, it
might seem that we are dealing with a moot question. But this is not the case.
From available documents it can be ascertained what Acheson did during World
War II and what were the limits of his responsibility.
1
Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East, Senate Committee on Armed Services and Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Part 3, 1892-93 (June 4, 1951).
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Both critics and supporters of Dean Acheson point to his experiences as an
assistant secretary and then proceed to draw contrary conclusions. His sup-
porters say that he was one of the best qualified secretaries of state because of his
earlier experience in the department, and hostile critics blame him for the errors
of World War II diplomacy. He thus became the symbol of the Democratic
party in foreign policy and the link between the New Deal of Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the Fair Deal of Harry Truman. The details of the first part of
his career in the State Department are still obscure and ought to be better known
since in many cases they served as the basis of subsequent attacks upon Acheson
personally as well as on American foreign policy. In several outstanding instances
Acheson bore the personal burden of responsibility (and guilt) for policies that
were never his.
FDR AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
In important matters of foreign policy, the distance between President
Roosevelt and the Department of State was incredibly great, and therefore, no
assistant secretary within the department was apt to have much influence at the
highest levels of deliberation in the government. If we are to reach a balanced
judgment of the conduct of American diplomacy during World War II, a much
clearer understanding of the role (or lack of role) of the Department of State
in the formulation of foreign policy is necessary. A careful examination reveals
the absurdity of allegations that identify Acheson with the over-all design of
postwar diplomatic planning. The eclipse of the Department of State in the
area of high policy during World War II is one of the most extraordinary features
in the evolution of foreign policy.2
Postwar critiques of both Acheson and the Department were seldom de-
tailed. Alleged deficiencies in policy were more frequently attributed to sub-
version or treason or both, within the department, rather than to errors and
omissions of Roosevelt and his immediate circle of trusted advisers, or to their
failure to consult the Department of State, or to act upon its recommendations
once it had been consulted
3
The dominant point of view controlling World War II diplomacy in the
intimate circle of Roosevelt’s advisers was military and resulted in a disjunction
2
Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New York: Harper, 1950); Daniel S. Cheever
and H. Field Haviland, Jr., American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers (Cam-
brige : Harvard University Press, 1952); Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National In-
terest (New York: Knopf, 1951); E. F. Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1953); and William Y. Elliott, Chairman, United States Foreign
Policy, Its Organization and Control, Report of a Study Group for the Woodrow Wilson
Foundation (New York, 1952).
3
"Unsupported charges that the Department ’has been shot through and through with Com-
munists,’ coupled with demands that the Department dismiss disloyal citizens outnumbered
all other comments about State in the Congressional Record." Blair Bolles, "Reorganization
of the State Department," Foreign Policy Reports, XXIII (August 15, 1947), 143. See also
Norman Palmer, "Disintegrating Alliance: U.S. Foreign Policy 1946-1950," Current His-
tory, XXI (November 1951), 280-86, and Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 98.

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between strictly military and diplomatic objectives.4
4
By contrast, the Soviet
Union and Great Britain, particularly as represented in the persons of Stalin and
Churchill, rejected such a disjunction in the conduct of their respective foreign
affairs. They held to this position despite the much weaker power situation of
their governments in world affairs as compared with the United States.5
5
In his
memoirs, Secretary of State Cordell Hull criticized this sharp separation between
diplomacy and military thinking and the resulting neglect of the Department of
State:
After Pearl Harbor I did not sit in on meetings concerned with military matters. This
was because the President did not invite me to such meetings. I raised the question with him
several times. It seemed manifest to me that, in numerous important instances, the Secretary
of State should sit in on the President’s war councils, particularly on those of a combined mili-
tary and diplomatic nature, for it was obvious that scarcely any largescale operations could be
undertaken that would not have diplomatic aspects.
I feel it is a serious mistake for a Secretary of State not to be present at important military
meetings. I often had occasion to point out to the President that some development of a mili-
tary character, which undoubtedly had been decided at one of these meetings, also had a
strong foreign affairs angle of which I should have been informed at the time.
The President did not take me with him to the Casablanca, Cairo, or Teheran conference,
which were predominantly military meetings, nor did I take part in his military discussions with
Prime Minister Churchill in Washington, some of which had widespread diplomatic repercus-
sions. I said to him: &dquo;I’m not looking for increased responsibilities, but I do believe the
Secretary of State should attend these meetings.&dquo; I referred to the British practice whereunder
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden participated in all war councils.’
4
"But in all these matters [World War II Policy] we must bear in mind both the overriding com-
pulsion of military necessity under which our statesmen were working...." George F.
Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951),
pp. 86-87. Kennan, however, goes on to dissociate himself from this point of view: "Many
of us who were familiar with Russian matters were impatient with this line of thought at the
time, because we knew how poor were the chances of success, and we saw no reason why
a Western world which kept its nerves, its good humor, and a due measure of military pre-
paredness should not continue indefinitely to live in the same world with the power of the
Kremlin without flying to either of the extremes of political intimacy or war." Ibid.
5
"Great Britain and the Soviet Union, fighting as they did for national advantage in terms of
power sought to strengthen their postwar...