Accept Or Qualify the Guilty Plea and the Requirements Under the Due Process Clause and Md. Rule 4-242

• Jurisdiction: Maryland

V. Accept or qualify the guilty plea and the requirements under the Due Process Clause and Md. Rule 4-242

Due process requires a court, when accepting a guilty plea, to find, on the record, in open court, that (a) the guilty plea is voluntary under a totality of the circumstances; (b) the defendant is making a knowing and intelligent waiver of certain constitutional rights; and (c) there is prima facie case proffered by the State to support the defendant's guilt.

A guilty plea becomes final when the court "qualifies" the defendant on the record, in open court, and accepts the plea and the terms of the plea agreement. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969); Sutton v. State, 289 Md. 359, 364-65 (1981); State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 288 (1981); Custer v. State, 86 Md. App. 196, 203-04 (1991).; Wayne v. State, 4 Md. App. 424, 429-30 (1969); Md. Rules 4-242(c) and 4-243(d).

Due process may require the court to accept the plea if the defendant has already performed some or all of the terms of the agreement and has detrimentally relied, e.g., already testified for the State. The Maryland rules regarding acceptance of a guilty plea do not apply to pleas entered during a probation revocation hearing. Howlett v. State, 295 Md. 419, 427-28 (1983). In Miller v. State, 74 Md. App. 294 (1988), the Court of Special Appeals held: "[A]n admission to a probation violation is not the equivalent of a guilty plea, and, therefore, the procedures prescribed in Maryland Rule 2-242 are inapplicable." Id. at 298-99.

A. Voluntariness is required for a guilty plea

A valid guilty plea requires that the plea be voluntary under a totality of the circumstances. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); Lowe v. State, 111 Md. 1 (1909). The trial court must address the defendant personally to determine whether any other promises or any force or threats were used to obtain the guilty plea. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice standard 14-1.5 (3d ed.).

In Edwards v. State, 32 Md. App. 398 (1976), the Court of Special Appeals held that, when the court failed to question the defendant or his counsel as to whether the guilty plea was voluntary, the plea was unacceptable and involuntary. Id. at 402. A voluntary guilty plea requires that the defendant make a conscious choice among known alternatives. The presence of an attorney representing the defendant does not, in and of itself, automatically make a plea voluntary. Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 154 (1979). In Kisamore v. State, 286 Md. 654 (1980), the Court of Appeals held that if a guilty plea is involuntary, the court must permit the defendant to withdraw the plea. Id. at 664.

1. Pleas held to be voluntary

"But for" causation is not coercion that renders plea involuntary

In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the fact that the defendant was facing a possible death penalty may have "influenced" the decision to plead guilty, but that fact did not "coerce" the guilty plea. Id. at 749-50. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 767-68 (1970). In Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), the Supreme Court held: "[A]n otherwise valid plea is not involuntary because induced by the defendant's desire to limit the possible maximum penalty to less than that authorized if there is a jury trial." Id. at 795.

Threat to file greater charges if a plea is not accepted is permissible, and does not render plea involuntary, if the prosecution has probable cause for the greater charges

In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a threat to indict the defendant on greater charges if the defendant does not accept the terms of the plea offer does not make the guilty plea involuntary, provided that, when the State makes that threat, the State had probable cause for the threatened charges. Id. at 364-65. In Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226 (1983), the Court of Appeals held that the defendant was not denied due process when the defendant rejected a plea offer from the State, and the State then sought a mandatory sentence under a recidivist statute. "[T]he State was under no duty to inform [the defendant] as to what course of action it would take if he refused the bargain." Id. at 240.

In Hamm v. State 72 Md. App. 176 (1987), the Court of Special Appeals held that the State's intent to prosecute the defendant's relatives if the defendant refused to plead guilty did not rise to the level of coercion, inducement, or threat that would make the plea involuntary. Id. at 187-89. See Hamlet v. State, 68 Md. App. 553, 560 n.2 (1986) (prosecutors who use threat of prosecuting third parties to influence the plea offer must observe a high standard of good faith).

Statute authorizing a lesser sentence for pleading guilty does not render the plea involuntary

In Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a statute that authorizes a lesser sentence for Defendants who plead guilty does not violate due process. Id. at 224-26.

Facing deportation does not render a plea involuntary

In Rivera v. State, 409 Md. 176 (2009), the Court of Appeals held that the defendant's plea, which resulted in a PBJ, was voluntary, even though the defendant faced deportation, because the defendant was not guaranteed that he would not be deported, and the trial court complied with all requirements of Md. Rule 4-242(c). Id. at 194.

Plea voluntary even though the court failed to inform the defendant that it was not bound by the pre-sentence recommendation of probation

In State v. Brazle, 296 Md. 375 (1983), the Court of Appeals held that a defendant who had a...