Academic fraud today: its social causes and institutional responses.

AuthorEpstein, Richard A.

INTRODUCTION

In this Article, I shall address a topic that we should all like to sweep under the rug if it were possible: academic integrity and its converse, academic fraud. As an initial observation, it is clear that academic fraud can occur outside the university setting at other institutions conducting research on matters of scientific importance. It is equally clear that the risk of academic fraud is not confined to the physical or biological sciences, but can also arise in research in the social sciences and the humanities. At this point, however, I shall not dwell on these differences; rather, I will concentrate on the fundamental risks to the integrity of the research mission of scholars and scientists, both inside and outside universities.

Defining this topic in this broad fashion gives ample clues as to why its mere mention is commonly the source of acute discomfort and anxiety. We do not develop institutional procedures and safeguards to celebrate scholarly integrity, which is surely the norm in research enterprises both within the academy and beyond it. We develop these systematic procedures to deal with the recurrent risk and troublesome cases of academic fraud wherever and however they appear. Our hope is that the presence of these procedures will act as a modest deterrent against the commission of these actions. But when that hope is dashed, we want to have standing procedures in place so that we do not have to improvise under pressure. Fortunately, these cases are rare, but the risks that they carry with them must never be minimized. Each documented incident of academic fraud--indeed each unproven allegation of academic fraud--saps the confidence of the public and the profession in the soundness of the research mission, which exposes every researcher whose work meets the highest standards of scientific integrity to undue scrutiny.

As I hope to show, only a comprehensive approach can meet the challenge that these cases present. The first task in dealing with academic fraud is to identify those activities that present a sufficient threat to the research mission that they should be singled out for special sanction. In other words, just how do we define academic or scientific fraud? The second, or remedial, task is every bit as important as the first. What procedures should be used to examine the cases that fall within this definition? And what additional procedures should be used to identify the extent of the fraud once its existence has been established?

This is a subject with which I have some hands-on experience. One of my most important administrative tasks at the University of Chicago was to chair the Committee on Academic Fraud in 1984, which, to the best of my knowledge, assembled the first set of systematic rules and procedures in the country for dealing with this problem. (1) Academic fraud is a relatively infrequent occurrence that has shattering implications when it occurs. In contrast, conflicts of interest are all-pervasive. I sometimes joke that the best definition of a conflict of interest is "two people" because any two people, almost by definition, always have divergent interests and goals.

  1. DEFINING ACADEMIC FRAUD

    In dealing with the wrongs of academic fraud, lawyers know what other academics tend to forget: that remedial issues loom just as important, and maybe more so, than the definition of the underlying wrongs which are logically prior to them. Starting with the former question, the definition of academic fraud cannot be dismissed as some arcane philosophical debate devoid of institutional consequences. In response to that question, the University of Chicago Report of Academic Fraud adopted a standard but narrow definition of the concept:

    Academic Fraud involves a deliberate effort to deceive and is distinguished from an honest mistake and honest differences in judgment or interpretation. Academic fraud is defined as plagiarism; fabrication or falsification of evidence, data, or results; the suppression of relevant evidence or data; the conscious misrepresentation of sources; the theft of ideas; or the intentional misappropriation of the research work or data of others. (2) A number of key points about this definition cry out for attention. The first is the observation that different forms of academic fraud have very different social consequences. When the deceit goes to the soundness of the data and the inferences drawn from it, the consequences reverberate at the core of the scientific mission. The rest of the scientific or research community is now asked to work with false information, which could easily result in endless efforts to replicate results that never occurred, or to start off on new ventures that would never been undertaken had the truth been known. The confusion goes to the supposed knowledge on which further advances depend.

    In contrast, incidents of plagiarism and misappropriation do not alter for the worse the nature of human understanding or the direction of scientific research since the truth of the underlying information is not in doubt. No one wants to steal work or ideas that are unsound. Instead what these actions do is undermine the system of incentives and awards in research by allowing one individual to take credit for the work that is done by another. The undeserving person receive recognition, promotion, and rewards that in truth should go to another.

    It could therefore be asked why these two kinds of wrongs should be grouped together, to which there are three answers. First, it appears in fact that the two kinds of academic fraud often go together. The people who fabricate data are the ones who are likely to misappropriate the work of others. Second, the conscious violation of the rights of others shows a form of moral dereliction that requires strong social sanction, which is best administered by a unified system that can look at both types of problems at the same time. Third, the types of expertise that are called upon to deal with both problems are sufficiently similar that there is no need to develop separate procedures to respond to each individually.

    The second point of debate addresses not the coverage in academic fraud cases, but the kinds of wrongful acts that fall within its scope. On this issue, it is important to note that the definition that I have used refers to academic fraud, not to some generalized notion of academic or scientific misconduct that could conceal a multitude of sins. In that definition, our report defined academic fraud in opposition to honest mistakes and honest differences in judgment, which are its obvious antithesis. The actual typology of wrongs is somewhat more complex because of all the intermediate states of mind that might, in principle, be relevant to the inquiry. In one sense, it is useful to examine this definitional question within the framework of the customary classification of wrongful mental states that is used, for example, to organize the law of tort. That inquiry starts off with intentional wrongs--the deliberate fabrication or omission of data. It then progresses to recklessness--the preparation of data without knowing or caring whether it is true or false. Both of these states of mind mesh well together because of the explicit mental attitude that individuals take toward truth or falsity.

    It is instructive to look at tort cases dealing with actions for deceit, in which this exact equivalence has been made. The standard definition of deceit requires that a plaintiff prove that the defendant knowingly made false statements of fact on which the plaintiff relied on to her detriment. One key problem in defining this wrong deals with the mental element of the cause of action. In the highly influential English case of Derry v. Peek, which involved an action for deceit for wrongful statements in a prospectus, the operative standard of liability was held to be fraud, which "is proved when it is shewn that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2), without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless of whether it is true or false." (3) The entire point of this exercise was to reject the notion that ordinary negligence was to be regarded as a variant on fraud. That restrictive definition carries over in modem law to two other significant contexts. The first of these is modern securities regulation, where the Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, took exactly this approach by refusing to equate negligence with fraud. (4) Although the precise status of recklessness was left open in Ernst & Ernst, lower courts have not hesitated to fill the gap by uniformly holding that fraud encompasses recklessness and not negligence. (5) The same line is drawn in defamation actions brought by public officials and public figures, where the malice standard embraces reckless disregard of the truth, but not any form of negligence. (6)

    Yet beyond this equivalence, most courts are not prepared to go. Thus, it is virtually impossible to find support for the view that gross negligence--which is a major deviation from standard research protocol without any intention or desire to get false results--should count as a species of academic fraud. Gross negligence may supply some evidence of reckless behavior, but, strictly speaking, it should never be confused with it. Rather, gross negligence bears a closer resemblance to negligence, or the want of ordinary care in carrying out research protocols. Unfortunately, there is always lots of negligence, and all of it has harmful consequences. But the personal taint is not there, and it diminishes the moral seriousness of fraud to lump negligence in with it under some amorphous standard of academic or scientific misconduct. And of course, results that are just erroneous are the ordinary stuff of science. We positively want to encourage speculation that could be wrong in order to get researchers to take the risks that could lead to major...

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