Abuse of the Grand Jury Process

Pages287-312
287
CHAPTER 14
ABUSE OF THE GRAND JURY PROCESS
The grand jury, expressly referenced in the Fifth Amendment as a
protection against government persecution, is responsible for
investigating crime and determining whether there is probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed.1 Because the grand jury is
primarily inquisitional rather than adversarial, its investigative powers
are largely unfettered, and courts apply a presumption of regularity2 to its
proceedings, which are cloaked in secrecy.3 As this Chapter explains,
claims of grand jury abuse rarely succeed, given the general rule that an
indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, if
valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.4
1. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (grand jury’s
responsibilities include determination of whether there is probable cause
to believe a crime has been committed and protection of citizens against
unfounded criminal persecutions); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
686-87 (1972) (same).
2. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1943) (a grand jury
proceeding is accorded a presumption of regularity, which generally may
be dispelled only upon particularized proof of irregularities in grand jury
process); United States v. Alvarado, 840 F.3d 184, 189-90 (4th Cir. 2016)
(recognizing that district courts should refrain from intervening in grand
jury process absent compelling evidence of grand jury abuse).
3. See In re Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The
institutional independence and secrecy of the grand jury has been a
hallmark of criminal indictments for over three centuries.”); see also
Stern v. United States Dist. Ct. for D. Mass., 21 4 F.3d 4, 16 (1st Cir.
2000) (rejecting a local rule that required and set stringent standards for
subpoenas); In re Grand Jury Proc., 142 F.3d 1416, 1423 (11 th Cir. 1998)
(finding no effective relief for claim that attorney’s subpoenaed testimony
before grand jury influenced its decision to indict, due to secrecy of grand
jury proceedings and fact that grand jurors could not be questioned
regarding whether they relied on attorney’s testimony). The press is not
entitled, even under the First Amendment, to access grand jury
proceedings. See, e.g., In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496,
499 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
4. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (holding that a court
may not look behind an indictment to determine if evidence upon which
Antitrust Grand Jury Investigations Handbook
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As the Supreme Court has cautioned, any contrary rule “would saddle a
grand jury with mini-trials and preliminary showings [that] would
assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public’s interest in
the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws.”5 Courts
will dismiss an indictment only for the most flagrant prosecutorial
misconduct, such as willful presentation of perjured testimony.
A. Judicial Scrutiny of Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct Before
the Grand Jury
Because of the grand jury’s broad investigative powers to determine
the existence of probable cause, and its institutional separateness from
the courts, the Supreme Court has narrowly confined the district courts’
ability to invoke their supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment for
prosecutorial misconduct.6
prosecutors based it was incompetent, inadmissible, or insufficient); see
also Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 328 (2014) (finding an
indictment fair upon its face and returned by a properly constituted grand
jury conclusively determines existence of probable cause to believe
defendant perpetrated offence alleged); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 344-45
(affirming that an indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge
on the ground that the grand jury acted on basis of inadequate or
incompetent evidence); Fierro v. Smith, 741 F. App’x 558, 562-63 (10th
Cir. 2018 ) (finding that an indictment valid on its face is not subject to
challenge on ground that grand jury acted on basis of information
obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination).
5. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 ( 1973).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1992)
(expressing reluctance to invoke judicial supervisory power as a basis for
prescribing modes of grand jury procedure); see also United States v.
Perez, 246 F. App’x 140, 143-45 (3d Cir. 2007) (no abuse when grand
jury considered allegedly prejudicial rumors about target); United States
v. Gomez, 237 F.3d 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2000) (declining to exercise
supervisory powers to require government to advise a witness before a
grand jury of his right to remain silent and that his statements can be used
against him).

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