Abstracts

• Published date: 01 September 1992
• Date: 01 September 1992
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591299204500302
• Subject Matter: Articles

ABSTRACTS

THE

STRATEGIC

CONFIGURATION,

PERSONAL

INFLUENCE,

AND

PRESIDENTIAL

POWER

IN

CONGRESS.

By

Calvin

Mouw

and

Michael

MacKuen.

This

paper

extends

the

long

line

of

research

on

presidential

persuasion

in

Congress

by

looking

at

three

major

considerations.

First,

we

show

that

per-

suasion

can

best

be

analyzed

through

the

development

of

a

baseline

model.

Beyond

this,

we

examine

two

major

theoretical

perspectives

regarding

presi-

dential

influence:

bargaining

politics,

characterized

by

the

commonplace

Bank

Account

Model

and

Neustadt’s

Political

Investment

Model;

and

plebiscitary

politics,

characterized

by

Neustadt’s

Presidential

Prestige

Model

and

Kernell’s

Going

Public

Model.

Empirical

analyses

of

the

Eisenhower

and

Reagan

presidencies

provide

sparse

support

for

these

propositions.

In

their

place,

we

suggest

that

presidential

persuasion

be

studied

within

the

context

of

the

Stra-

tegic

Configuration.

We

understand

that

legislative

outcomes

are

determined

by

the

ideological

composition

of

Congress

and

the

way

the

president

and

opposing

party

leadership

form

the

strategic

agenda.

CAMPAIGN

CONTRIBUTIONS

IN

AN

UNREGULATED

SETTING:

AN

ANALYSIS

OF

,

THE

1984

AND

1986

CALIFORNIA

ASSEMBLY

ELECTIONS.

By

Janet

M.

Box-Stefensmeter

and ,

Jay

K.

Dow.

The

study

of

campaign

finance

has

been

greatly

informed

by

the

use

of

economic

models

of

the

contributor-legislator

relationship.

Predominant

among

these

is

the

investment

theory

of

resource

allocation

which

predicts

that

inter-

est

groups

equate

the

marginal

value

of

the

last

dollar

provided

across

recip-

ients.

The

model,

however,

is

predicated

on

the

existence

of

an

unregulated

campaign

finance

environment.

This

is

clearly

antithetical

to

the

federal

elec-

tion

arena

in

which

most

studies

of

campaign

finance

have

been

conducted.

We

test

the

investment

model

in

the

unregulated

setting

of

the

1984

and

1986

California

Assembly

elections.

Our

results

indicate

the

acceptance

afforded

the

model

is

justified.

Further,

the

empirical

findings

in

this

paper

suggest

that

restrictions

on

campaign

contributions

benefit

incumbent

and

major

party

candidates

at

the

expense

of

challengers

and

members

of

minor

parties.

CLASS

AND

CULTURE:

AMERICAN

POLITICAL

CLEAVAGES

IN

THE

TWENTIETH

CENTURY.

By

Nicol

C.

Rae.

For

most

of

American

history

political

cleavages

have

been

based

on

cul-

tural

conflicts

rather

than

the

socioeconomic

class

conflicts

characteristic

of

the

New

Deal

era.

This

paper

argues

that

the

1932-52

period

was

an

aber-

ration

and

that

since

1952,

American

presidential

politics

has

once

again

reflected

cultural

as

opposed

to

class

divisions.

Cultural

conflicts

over

non-

material,

ethical

questions

are

more

difficult

to

resolve

than

socioeconomic

issues,

but

in

the

pre-New

Deal

period

powerful

party

organizations

partially

mediated

these

cleavages.

In

the

modern

era

the

erosion

of

the

parties

and

the

re-emergence

of

cultural

cleavages

may

lead

to

a

degree

of

social

polarization

that

might

threaten

the

stability

of

the

political

system

as

a

whole.