Losing Hearts & Minds: Aid and Ideology

• Author: Travers B Child
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221074898
• Published date: 01 February 2023
• Date: 01 February 2023
• Subject Matter: Article

Article

Journal of Conf‌lict Resolution

2023, Vol. 67(2-3) 457–493

© The Author(s) 2022

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/00220027221074898

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

Losing Hearts & Minds:

Aid and Ideology

Travers B Child

1



Abstract

“Hearts and minds”theory contends development aid strengthens community

support for counterinsurgents by providing jobs and public goods. Based on f‌ield

interviews in Kabul, we develop an alternative theoretical framework emphasizing

instead the ideological preferences of civilians. In our model, some aid projects are

ideologically contentious while others are benign. Given a mix of foreign aid, each

civilian supports either the counterinsurgents or rebels, depending on his/her idi-

osyncratic preferences. In this setting, greater provisions of aid can actually erode

community support. Donors therefore calibrate the mix of foreign aid to appease

population groups with relatively strong ideological sensibilities. Individual-level

analysis based on unique Afghan data substantiates key features of our theory.

Benign projects lead to favorable opinions of development, while contentious aid has

the opposite effect. Moreover, favorable opinions of development are associated with

stronger support for government and counterinsurgents, and weaker support for

rebels.

Keywords

hearts and minds, foreign aid, public opinion, ideology, conf‌lict

1

China Europe International Business School (CEIBS), Shanghai, China

Corresponding Author:

Travers Barclay Child, CEIBS, 699 Hongfeng Road, Shanghai, 201206, China.

Email: t.b.child@ceibs.edu

“We’re invariably going to get it wrong. Let’s be honest –it’s almost impossible to avoid

unintended consequences of our work here.”

(foreign donor, Kabul, 2013)

1. Introduction

For almost two decades, Western governments have been embroiled in protracted

missions to rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq. To this end, the US government alone has

spent over $200 billion on development aid in theater (SIGIR 2013;SIGAR 2018).

Despite considerable f‌inancial outlays, it remains unclear whether post-conf‌lict aid has

been successful. A “hearts and minds”perspective was long espoused by American

military forces (US Army 2006), and later formalized by Berman et al. (2011). That

theory suggests development assistance builds popular support for counterinsurgents

by providing jobs and public goods otherwise absent under rebel control. In exchange

for aid, the community ostensibly shares intelligence with counterinsurgents regarding

the plans, identities, and whereabouts of rebel forces.

Despite the tremendous amount of resources dedicated to leveraging community

support for counterinsurgents, few empirical studies have validated the hearts and

minds theory. Berman et al. (2011) provide evidence that the US Commander’s

Emergency Response Program (CERP) mitigated violence in Iraq. But the combined

f‌indings of Chou (2012),Child (2014), and Adams (2015) imply CERP projects in

Afghanistan were generally inconsequential. In a broader survey of the literature,

Zürcher (2017) shows aid in conf‌lict settings is actually more likely to exacerbate than

alleviate violence.

Careful empirical studies have extended hearts and minds theory by identifying

conditions surrounding counterproductive aid. Many attribute aid’s deleterious effects

to strategic behavior by insurgents (e.g., Crost et al. 2014;Sexton 2016;Weintraub

2016;Khanna & Zimmerman 2017). Other studies acknowledge the important role of

community-based grievances. In Afghanistan, Karell and Schutte (2018) show conf‌lict

increases in the wake of non-inclusive aid projects. Child (2019) suggests ideological

sensitivities could explain heightened conf‌lict following military-led education proj-

ects. These recent empirical strides add nuance to the hearts and minds perspective, but

they remain unaccompanied by progress in formal theory.

Standard hearts and minds theory emphasizes practical and tangible interests of

communities. Under this characterization, civilians support counterinsurgents to secure

aid provisions and economic support. But in practice, we know local allegiances may

rest instead on political or ideological views. Local perspectives may even be shaped

through grievances induced by foreign intervention itself. In Afghanistan, for example,

qualitative research has connected grievances to aid in general (Fishstein & Wilder

2012;Jackson & Giustozzi 2012), and to education projects in particular (Giustozzi

2010;Giustozzi & Franco 2011).

458 Journal of Conf‌lict Resolution 67(2-3)

This paper contributes a formal theory of aid and conf‌lict in which community-based

grievances are pivotal. In our model, foreign aid generates an array of allegiances across

community members, based on their underlying ideological preferences. Certain aid

projects are controversial from the community’s perspective, and citizens are differ-

entiated by their sensitivity to those projects. Given a bundle of foreign aid, some

community members support the development effort, while others do not. Bas ed on

their assessments, each civilian casts their allegiance to either the counterinsurgents or

rebels. Both combatant groups rely on community support for their success. The

relative strength of (counter)insurgency therefore depends on how ideological pref-

erences in the community interact with foreign aid disbursements.

Our theoretical perspective is premised on anecdotal evidence from f‌ield interviews

conducted in Kabul, Afghanistan. In November 2013, the author carried out 21 un-

structured on-site interviews with development stakeholders. Interviewees included

foreign government donors (9), local and foreign NGOs (4), private companies (3),

research organizations and journalists (4), and a special forces operative (1). The views

expressed by our interlocutors are ref‌lected in the core assumptions underpinning our

theoretical framework.

1

We test key features of our model using unique data on public opinion, foreign aid,

and conf‌lict across Afghanistan. Public opinion data were secured by the author

through a pilot data-sharing agreement providing access to ISAF and Resolute Support

HQ’s Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) surveys.

These data cover approximately 40,000 individuals surveyed across Afghanistan

between September 2008 and September 2009. From ANQAR data, we obtain in-

formation on civilian attitudes toward aid efforts and combatant groups (including

government, international, and anti-government forces). Aid data were acquired

through a rare hardcopy of the now-defunct NATO C3 Agency’s Afghanistan Country

Stability Picture (ACSP). Those data permit us to track foreign aid projects by secto r at

af‌ine level of spatiotemporal granularity. Conf‌lict data are invoked from the U.S.

Defense Department’s Signif‌icant Activities (SIGACTS) dataset containing events

time-stamped and geolocated by ISAF units and local national security partners.

Two distinguishing features of our model are (i) both ideologically controversial and

ideologically benign foreign aid projects exist; and (ii) a community member’s as-

sessment of aid initiatives drives his/her allegiance in the conf‌lict. Our analysis val-

idates the f‌irst feature by demonstrating the impact of foreign aid projects on individual

assessments of development initiatives. We operationalize education projects as

contentious, while remaining projects are deemed benign. These priors are based on

f‌ield interviews and qualitative research in section 3. Our f‌indings suggest contentious

aid degrades opinions of development, while benign projects lead to more favorable

assessments. To validate the second feature, we then link individual assessments of aid

to proxies of support for combatants. Individuals with poor assessments of aid exhibit

weaker trust in their government and international forces, and stronger trust in anti-

government elements.

Child 459