Losing Hearts & Minds: Aid and Ideology
Author | Travers B Child |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221074898 |
Published date | 01 February 2023 |
Date | 01 February 2023 |
Subject Matter | Article |
Article
Journal of Conflict Resolution
2023, Vol. 67(2-3) 457–493
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00220027221074898
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Losing Hearts & Minds:
Aid and Ideology
Travers B Child
1
Abstract
“Hearts and minds”theory contends development aid strengthens community
support for counterinsurgents by providing jobs and public goods. Based on field
interviews in Kabul, we develop an alternative theoretical framework emphasizing
instead the ideological preferences of civilians. In our model, some aid projects are
ideologically contentious while others are benign. Given a mix of foreign aid, each
civilian supports either the counterinsurgents or rebels, depending on his/her idi-
osyncratic preferences. In this setting, greater provisions of aid can actually erode
community support. Donors therefore calibrate the mix of foreign aid to appease
population groups with relatively strong ideological sensibilities. Individual-level
analysis based on unique Afghan data substantiates key features of our theory.
Benign projects lead to favorable opinions of development, while contentious aid has
the opposite effect. Moreover, favorable opinions of development are associated with
stronger support for government and counterinsurgents, and weaker support for
rebels.
Keywords
hearts and minds, foreign aid, public opinion, ideology, conflict
1
China Europe International Business School (CEIBS), Shanghai, China
Corresponding Author:
Travers Barclay Child, CEIBS, 699 Hongfeng Road, Shanghai, 201206, China.
Email: t.b.child@ceibs.edu
“We’re invariably going to get it wrong. Let’s be honest –it’s almost impossible to avoid
unintended consequences of our work here.”
(foreign donor, Kabul, 2013)
1. Introduction
For almost two decades, Western governments have been embroiled in protracted
missions to rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq. To this end, the US government alone has
spent over $200 billion on development aid in theater (SIGIR 2013;SIGAR 2018).
Despite considerable financial outlays, it remains unclear whether post-conflict aid has
been successful. A “hearts and minds”perspective was long espoused by American
military forces (US Army 2006), and later formalized by Berman et al. (2011). That
theory suggests development assistance builds popular support for counterinsurgents
by providing jobs and public goods otherwise absent under rebel control. In exchange
for aid, the community ostensibly shares intelligence with counterinsurgents regarding
the plans, identities, and whereabouts of rebel forces.
Despite the tremendous amount of resources dedicated to leveraging community
support for counterinsurgents, few empirical studies have validated the hearts and
minds theory. Berman et al. (2011) provide evidence that the US Commander’s
Emergency Response Program (CERP) mitigated violence in Iraq. But the combined
findings of Chou (2012),Child (2014), and Adams (2015) imply CERP projects in
Afghanistan were generally inconsequential. In a broader survey of the literature,
Zürcher (2017) shows aid in conflict settings is actually more likely to exacerbate than
alleviate violence.
Careful empirical studies have extended hearts and minds theory by identifying
conditions surrounding counterproductive aid. Many attribute aid’s deleterious effects
to strategic behavior by insurgents (e.g., Crost et al. 2014;Sexton 2016;Weintraub
2016;Khanna & Zimmerman 2017). Other studies acknowledge the important role of
community-based grievances. In Afghanistan, Karell and Schutte (2018) show conflict
increases in the wake of non-inclusive aid projects. Child (2019) suggests ideological
sensitivities could explain heightened conflict following military-led education proj-
ects. These recent empirical strides add nuance to the hearts and minds perspective, but
they remain unaccompanied by progress in formal theory.
Standard hearts and minds theory emphasizes practical and tangible interests of
communities. Under this characterization, civilians support counterinsurgents to secure
aid provisions and economic support. But in practice, we know local allegiances may
rest instead on political or ideological views. Local perspectives may even be shaped
through grievances induced by foreign intervention itself. In Afghanistan, for example,
qualitative research has connected grievances to aid in general (Fishstein & Wilder
2012;Jackson & Giustozzi 2012), and to education projects in particular (Giustozzi
2010;Giustozzi & Franco 2011).
458 Journal of Conflict Resolution 67(2-3)
This paper contributes a formal theory of aid and conflict in which community-based
grievances are pivotal. In our model, foreign aid generates an array of allegiances across
community members, based on their underlying ideological preferences. Certain aid
projects are controversial from the community’s perspective, and citizens are differ-
entiated by their sensitivity to those projects. Given a bundle of foreign aid, some
community members support the development effort, while others do not. Bas ed on
their assessments, each civilian casts their allegiance to either the counterinsurgents or
rebels. Both combatant groups rely on community support for their success. The
relative strength of (counter)insurgency therefore depends on how ideological pref-
erences in the community interact with foreign aid disbursements.
Our theoretical perspective is premised on anecdotal evidence from field interviews
conducted in Kabul, Afghanistan. In November 2013, the author carried out 21 un-
structured on-site interviews with development stakeholders. Interviewees included
foreign government donors (9), local and foreign NGOs (4), private companies (3),
research organizations and journalists (4), and a special forces operative (1). The views
expressed by our interlocutors are reflected in the core assumptions underpinning our
theoretical framework.
1
We test key features of our model using unique data on public opinion, foreign aid,
and conflict across Afghanistan. Public opinion data were secured by the author
through a pilot data-sharing agreement providing access to ISAF and Resolute Support
HQ’s Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) surveys.
These data cover approximately 40,000 individuals surveyed across Afghanistan
between September 2008 and September 2009. From ANQAR data, we obtain in-
formation on civilian attitudes toward aid efforts and combatant groups (including
government, international, and anti-government forces). Aid data were acquired
through a rare hardcopy of the now-defunct NATO C3 Agency’s Afghanistan Country
Stability Picture (ACSP). Those data permit us to track foreign aid projects by secto r at
afine level of spatiotemporal granularity. Conflict data are invoked from the U.S.
Defense Department’s Significant Activities (SIGACTS) dataset containing events
time-stamped and geolocated by ISAF units and local national security partners.
Two distinguishing features of our model are (i) both ideologically controversial and
ideologically benign foreign aid projects exist; and (ii) a community member’s as-
sessment of aid initiatives drives his/her allegiance in the conflict. Our analysis val-
idates the first feature by demonstrating the impact of foreign aid projects on individual
assessments of development initiatives. We operationalize education projects as
contentious, while remaining projects are deemed benign. These priors are based on
field interviews and qualitative research in section 3. Our findings suggest contentious
aid degrades opinions of development, while benign projects lead to more favorable
assessments. To validate the second feature, we then link individual assessments of aid
to proxies of support for combatants. Individuals with poor assessments of aid exhibit
weaker trust in their government and international forces, and stronger trust in anti-
government elements.
Child 459
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