2017-2018 Developments in Connecticut Landlord-tenant Law
| Publication year | 2021 |
| Pages | 199 |
By Zachary J. Phillipps.[*]
In 2017 and 2018 the Connecticut Supreme and Appellate courts issued decisions in several landlord-tenant cases. As expected, the majority of those decisions dealt with issues which arose in the summary process context, but they also addressed issues with security deposits, equitable subrogation, and a personal guaranty of a commercial lease. This article summarizes all 2017 and 2018 appellate-level decisions in landlord-tenant cases, as well as the new legislation which took effect on October 1, 2017, which modified the process by which a landlord may regain possession of a rental unit after the death of the sole tenant.
I. Summary Process Issues
There were several appellate-level decisions in 2017 and 2018 addressing a wide range of summary process issues, including equitable nonforfeiture, mootness, subject matter jurisdiction issues arising from multiple notices to quit, the sufficiency of pretermination notices and notices to quit, the application of a payment to an arrearage rather than the current rental obligation, the willful violation of a stipulated judgment, counterclaims of constructive and resulting trust, and lapse of time. These decisions are addressed below.
A. Equitable Nonforfeiture, Support Dogs, and Reports of Treating Physicians
In Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips,[1] the Supreme Court of Connecticut addressed whether the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the "spirit" of regulations by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") in support of an equitable defense to the eviction of a tenant who kept an emotional support dog in violation of her lease for her federally subsidized apartment. The defendant lived with her mother and her four nieces and nephews in an apartment owned by the plaintiff.[2] The defendant's mother, the original leaseholder, kept a dog in the apartment.[3] After the mother died, the defendant obtained legal guardianship over her nieces and nephews, kept the dog, and signed a new lease with the plaintiff, which included a clause prohibiting dogs on the property.[4] Although the defendant was aware of the lease provision, she believed the plaintiff would not enforce it because her mother had kept the dog in the apartment.[5] However, the plaintiff later sent a pretermination notice advising the defendant that she had violated her lease by keeping the dog in the apartment.[6] The plaintiff then served a notice to quit and filed a summary process action.[7] The defendant appeared pro se and filed a special defense alleging that her mom kept the dog in the apartment for six years and that she and the four children had become attached to the dog.[8] At the first hearing the trial court continued the case to give the defendant time to find a new home for the dog or to certify the dog as a service animal.[9] At the second hearing, the defendant presented a letter from her niece's physician and social worker stating that the dog provided comfort to the niece, who was dealing with a personal loss.[10] At the third hearing, the trial court permitted additional evidence and arguments regarding the applicability of federal disability law.[11] The defendant testified that the dog did not accompany the children to school, that none of the children were disabled, and that the dog was providing comfort to the children.[12] The trial court determined that the defendant had established that the dog acted as a "therapy dog" and that the defendant had followed "the spirit" of the regulations of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development.[13] Therefore, the trial court invoked its equitable powers to rule in favor of the defendant after weighing the harm that would come from the dog's continued presence and the harm that would come from having the dog removed.[14]
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the ground that the trial court had improperly relied on the "spirit" of the federal regulations to support its equitable decision.[15] The Supreme Court acknowledged that, because the apartment was federally subsidized by HUD, the plaintiff was required to comply with federal housing and discrimination laws, including HUD's regulations concerning accommodations for handicapped persons.[16] After reviewing the applicable statutes and regulations, the Supreme Court stated that "to qualify for a reasonable housing accommodation, one must demonstrate a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities."[17] Because the defendant had presented
no evidence demonstrating that any one of the residents of the apartment ha[d] a physical or mental disability affecting a major life activity, the trial court could not have reasonably concluded that the defendant satisfied the "spirit" of the relevant federal regulations, which provide relief only for specifically defined physical or mental disabilities. . . . Put differently, the doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture does not provide a bypass of the proof necessary to establish qualification for a reasonable housing accommodation under federal disability laws.[18]
The Supreme Court then held that the trial court had abused its discretion in applying the doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture because "its balancing of the harm to the parties was overwhelmingly influenced by its improper consideration of the 'spirit' of the federal disability laws."[19] The Supreme Court explained that the trial court, despite knowing there was an equitable defense, focused only on whether the defendant qualified for a reasonable accommodation, rather than focusing on the equities.[20]
Lastly, the Supreme Court addressed whether the trial court had properly admitted into evidence the letter from the niece's physician pursuant to General Statutes § 52-174, which allows signed reports of treating physicians to be admitted in lieu of testimony of the physician.[21] The plaintiff argued that § 52-174 did not apply to summary process actions, but the Supreme Court disagreed because the statute refers not only to personal injury actions but also to "all other civil actions."[22] The Supreme Court concluded that summary process actions are "other civil actions" within the meaning of the statute because "[t]he statutory process by which eviction occurs in Connecticut is consistent with" the dictionary definition of a "civil action."[23]
B. Mootness of Summary Process Actions and Appeals
In addition to the issues discussed in Part LA. above, the Supreme Court in Phillips addressed whether an appeal of a summary process judgment in favor of the tenant was rendered moot when the landlord filed a second summary process action. The landlord sent the tenant a pretermination notice, served the notice to quit, and instituted a summary process action.[24] The trial court ruled in favor of the tenant on equitable grounds, and the landlord appealed.[25]While the appeal was pending, the landlord began a second summary process action against the tenant, which the trial court dismissed because the notice to quit was served in the wrong month and therefore invalid.[26] The tenant argued that the landlord's appeal in the first action was moot because the commencement of the second action reinstated her tenancy or, in the alternative, the dismissal of the second action reinstated her lease.[27] The landlord argued that, because an invalid notice to quit is void, the status of the first action was as if the second action had never occurred.[28]
The Supreme Court, agreeing with the landlord, held that the second notice to quit did not operate to terminate the lease and therefore did not render the appeal moot.[29] The Supreme Court stated that the "[s]ervice of a notice to quit possession is typically a landlord's unequivocal act notifying the tenant of the termination of the lease," but that "[a] legally invalid notice to quit is . . . considered 'equivocal' because of that legal defect and, therefore, does not operate to terminate a lease."[30] The Supreme Court then explained that the trial court's judgment in favor of the tenant in the first summary process action "reinstated the lease between the two parties," the filing of the appeal in the first action "did not affect the reinstatement of the lease," and "[t]he second notice to quit, which was deemed invalid, did not operate to terminate that lease, which continues in effect."[31] The Supreme Court summarized its decision as follows: "Put differently, the status quo between the parties was restored when the second notice to quit was held invalid in the second summary process action; it became as if the plaintiff never filed a second notice to quit and the lease remained reinstated."[32] Accordingly, the appeal was not moot.
In another case involving mootness, the Appellate Court addressed whether an appeal in a summary process action becomes moot when the landlord obtains possession of the premises during the pendency of the appeal.[33] The trial court had granted the tenant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the retaliatory eviction statute, General Statutes § 47a-20, prohibited the landlord from initiating a summary process action.[34] Following oral argument on the merits before the Appellate Court, the tenant vacated and relinquished possession to the landlord.[35] Because the sole remedy available to the landlord in the summary process action was possession of the premises, the Appellate Court sought supplemental briefs on the issue of mootness.[36]
The Appellate Court '"has consistently held that an appeal from a summary process judgment becomes moot where, at the time of the appeal, the defendant is no longer in possession of the premises.'"[37] Therefore, the Appellate Court held that the landlord's appeal was...
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