Appellate Decisions
| Citation | Vol. 89 No. 6 Pg. 73 |
| Pages | 73 |
| Publication year | 2020 |
July, 2020
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Kansas State Supreme Court
CIVIL
TRUSTS IN RE ST CLAIR TRUST REFORMATION SEDGWICK DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 120,050—JUNE 5, 2020
FACTS: Jill St. Clair executed a trust agreement in September 2003. St. Clair's husband, William, was named a life beneficiary of the trust's income. Upon his death, the trust's income would be distributed to Jill and William's children and grandchildren, with the principal eventually being distributed to the grandchildren or their estates. William had previously created his own trust with an identical distribution scheme. Both trusts were funded with identical amounts, and both trusts were prepared by the same attorney. Mr. Davidson drafted the trusts to make sure that the trust assets were not included in either William or Jill's taxable estates. At the time the trust was executed, Jill believed it contained the necessary provisions for the trust assets to be excluded from both taxable estates. Unfortunately, the trust contained a drafting error which resulted in the trusts becoming reciprocal, with the assets of Jill's trust being included in William's estate upon his demise, and vice versa. The trust as written did not accurately express Jill's intent. In order to correct the drafting error, Jill and her trustee petitioned the district court for an order reforming Jill's trust to include provisions which would prevent the trusts from becoming reciprocal. The proposed amendment was served on all beneficiaries, with no objection. The district court ordered that the trust be reformed to correct the scrivener's error.
ISSUE: (1) Whether trust should have been reformed
HELD: The district court's decision was appealed in order to satisfy the requirements of Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, and the case was transferred from the Kansas Court of Appeals. The record on appeal shows that Jill and the trustee demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Jill's intent in creating and funding the trust was adversely affected by a drafting error, making it necessary to reform the trust. Reformation destroys the economic symmetry of the trusts, allowing the trust to be consistent with Jill's original intent. The reformation is affirmed.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 20-3017; K.S.A. 58a-415
PUBLIC DUTY—TORTS MONTGOMERY V. SALEH SHAWNEE DISTRICT COURT—COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED, DISTRICT COURT IS AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART
NO. 112,518—JUNE 26, 2020
FACTS: Trooper Saleh initiated a traffic stop when he was informed that a passenger in the vehicle had a knife and was acting erratically. The driver rapidly accelerated and drove recklessly, running stop signs and red lights while his speed reached near 100 miles per hour. Saleh decided to stop pursuit, but not before the driver ran a red light and hit a pickup truck, injuring Montgomery and another individual named Bennett. The plaintiffs filed separate petitions alleging that Saleh was negligent and that the State was liable for his actions. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that even if the plaintiffs could prove negligence there was no duty owed by Saleh under the public duty doctrine. The district court granted the motion, rejecting application of both the public duty doctrine and Kansas Tort Claims Act immunity. But the district court ruled the plaintiffs failed to proffer evidence sufficient to support a finding of causation in fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's findings on immunity and the public duty doctrine but remanded the case for further action on proof of causation. The Supreme Court granted Trooper Saleh and the State's petition for review.
ISSUES: (1) Application of the public duty doctrine; (2) breach; (3) causation; (4) immunity
HELD: The plain language of K.S.A. 8-1506 required emergency vehicle drivers to "drive with due regard for the safety of all persons." This language shows that the legislature did not intend to exempt emergency vehicle drivers from the consequences of reckless conduct. This statute imposes a specific duty on law enforcement and individuals may sue if they believe this duty has been breached. In order to prevail, the plaintiffs must prove that Saleh acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. The evidence presented to the district court showed there is a material issue of fact as to whether Saleh exhibited reckless disregard when continuing to pursue the fleeing driver. Law enforcement's conduct during a pursuit can be the legal cause of a third party's injuries. Given the evidence presented to the district court, a jury could have found that the driver knew he was being pursued by Saleh. Because there is a statutory duty created by K.S.A. 8-1506(d), the discretionary function exception does not apply to Saleh's pursuit of the fleeing driver.
DISSENT: (Rosen, J., joined by Stegall, J., and Green, J., assigned) Justice Rosen would reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case that Saleh breached his duty of care under K.S.A. 8-1506.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 8-1506, -1506(d), 75-6101(b), -6103(a), -6104, -6104(e), -6104(n)
TORTS
HAMMOND V. SANLO LEYTE VFW POST #7515 CLOUD DISTRICT COURT—COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED,
DISTRICT COURT IS REVERSED, CASE REMANDED NO. 118,698—JULY 2, 2020FACTS: Jeffrey Hammond and his wife went to the San Lo Leyte VFW Post #7515. While at the VFW, Hammond encountered Travis Blackwood. The two men argued and Blackwood allegedly threatened to beat up Hammond in the bathroom. Hammond disengaged and returned to his table. Shortly thereafter, the manager of the VFW told Hammond that he needed to leave immediately and that he was banned from the club. The manager was backed up by Blackwood and his friends, who helped escort Hammond from the bar. As soon as the manager went back inside the bar, Blackwood and his friends physically assaulted Hammond. Hammond sued the VFW, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the VFW. The court of appeals reversed, finding that summary judgment was inappropriate. The VFW's petition for review was granted.
ISSUE: (1) Whether VFW owed a duty to Hammond
HELD: Kansas generally follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 regarding the scope of liability of owner/opera-tors of commercial enterprises when it comes to acts of third persons. In order to be liable, the owner need not directly witness a physical altercation. Instead, a totality of the circumstances test is used to look at factors in addition to a prior attack. By granting summary judgment, the district court cut off analysis of whether an attack such as the one Hammond suffered was foreseeable. The VFW owed Hammond a duty to protect him from the dangerous acts of other bar patrons.
Questions that must be answered on remand include whether Hammond's injury was foreseeable and whether the VFW breached its duty to Hammond.
STATUTES: No statutes cited.
CONTRACTS
RUSSELL V. TREANOR INVESTMENTS DOUGLAS DISTRICT COURT—COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED, DISTRICT COURT IS AFFIRMED
NO. 117,973—JUNE 26, 2020
FACTS: In 1997, the owner of two adjacent properties executed and recorded an Operation and Easement Agreement. The OEA restricted the building size and prohibited either property from being used as a regular grocery store. The OEA allowed for amendment if all of the current owners agreed in writing, and the OEA was amended to alter the original site plan. The amendment allowed for the creation of a multi-unit buildings with condominiums and retail space; Russell purchased a unit in the building in 2010. Treanor Investments purchased part of the property covered by the OEA in 2015, with hopes to amend the OEA and enlarge the property footprint to encompass a grocery store. Russell filed suit, claiming the OEA could not be amended without condominium owner consent. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment and the district court agreed with Treanor, finding that it had been designated as the responsible owner, who had authority to act on behalf of other owners. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the OEA and its amendments were clear and unambiguous in allowing the responsible owner to act on others' behalf. Russell's petition for review was granted.
ISSUES: (1) Authority to amend the OEA; (2) can amendment materially change the character of the real estate
HELD: The language of the OEA is plain and unambiguous, and it allows for the designation of a responsible owner to act on others' behalf. This language existed before Russell purchased his condominium. Nothing in the language prevents the responsible owner from further amending the OEA to alter size and use restrictions. Russell failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether the proposed changes to the property would cause a material change in circumstances.
STATUTES: No statutes cited.
CRIMINAL
ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—MOTIONS-SENTENCING
STATE V. ADAMS
SEDGWICK DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED NO. 120,475—JUNE 12, 2020
FACTS: District court allowed Adams to dismiss his appointed attorney and to proceed pro se at trial, resulting in plea agreement for guilty plea to criminal charges including premeditated first-degree murder. His request for...
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