Appellate Decisions

Publication year2019
Pages60
Appellate Decisions
No. 88 J. Kan. Bar Assn 4, 60 (2019)
Kansas Bar Journal
April, 2019

Appellate Decisions

All opinion digests are available on the KBA website at www.ksbar.org/digests. We also send out a weekly newsletter informing KBA members of the latest decisions. If you do not have access to the KBA members-only site, or if your email address or other contact information has changed, please contact member and communication services at info@ksbar.org or at (785) 234-5696. For the full text of opinions, access the courts' website at www.kscourts.org

Kansas State Supreme Court

Attorney Discipline

ORDER OF INDEFINITE SUSPENSION IN RE LINDA S. DICKENS NO. 119,198—FEBRUARY 22, 2019

FACTS: A hearing panel determined that Dickens violated Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (competence); 1.3 (diligence); 1.4(a) (communication); 1.5(d) (fees); 1.8(e) (providing financial assistance to client); 1.16 (termination of representation); 3.2 (expediting litigation); 5.1 (responsibilities of partners, managers, and supervisory lawyers); 8.3(a) (reporting professional misconduct); 8.4(a) (misconduct); 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); and 8.4(g) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on lawyer's fitness to practice law). While representing a client, Dickens loaned the client $20,000 at 8.99% interest. After acknowledging that violation of the KRPC, Dickens entered the Kansas attorney diversion program. As part of that agreement, Dickens agreed to complete 16 hours of continuing legal education, including 6 hours of ethics. She failed to complete the required hours. The diversion was revoked in 2017 after Dickens had two new complaints filed against her. These complaints included allegations of entering a contingent fee arrangement without a written agreement and threatening clients when they did not give her money that was not earned. Dickens also had a pattern of missing deadlines.

HEARING PANEL: The hearing panel found that Dickens' violations were both knowing and negligent. In addition to several aggravating factors, the panel determined that there were mitigating factors, including Dickens' mental health. The disciplinary administrator recommended discipline ranging from a one-year suspension to disbarment, depending on which factual findings were made by the panel. Dickens asked that she be placed on probation and the panel agreed, finding that significant mitigating factors were compelling. The panel recommended a two-year suspension underlying a two-year term of probation.

HELD: Dickens did not contest the underlying factual allegations. Unlike the hearing panel, the Court was not persuaded that Dickens' underlying health conditions warranted probation in this case, where some of Dickens' actions involved dishonest conduct. Because Dickens showed bad faith and selfish motives when dealing with clients and the court, the Court determines that the appropriate discipline is an indefinite suspension with eligibility for reinstatement coming after three years.

ORDER OF PROBATION IN THE MATTER OF SAM S. KEPFIELD NOS. 112,897 AND 119,709—MARCH 15, 2019

FACTS: Kepfield has a previous history of discipline; he received a three-year suspension which was suspended while Kepfield was placed on supervised probation. A new disciplinary complaint was filed in 2018 alleging violations of KRPC 1.1 (competence); 1.3 (diligence); 1.4 (communication); 1.15(a) (safekeeping property); 1.16(d) (terminating representation); and 8.4(c) (misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). After hearing evidence, the panel concluded that Kepfield did not violate KRPC 1.1 or 1.4. Kepfield stipulated to the other violations and the panel found evidence in support. The violations arose after Kepfield failed to file a petition for review on behalf of a client. Issues also arose after it was discovered that not only did Kepfield did not have an attorney trust account, he lied to investigators about that fact when asked.

HEARING PANEL: The panel not only found that Kepfield committed new violations but also that he violated the terms of his probation. The hearing panel considered the violations, the aggravating factors (dishonest or selfish motive, multiple offenses, and bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process), and the mitigating factors (Kepfield's mental health, his cooperation in some aspects of the investigation, and his good character and reputation). The disciplinary administrator asked that Kepfield be disbarred. Kepfield asked that his probation be extended. The hearing panel recommended a three-year suspension with a probationary term entered after Kepfield serves 6 months of that suspension.

HELD: With no exceptions taken, the hearing panel's final report is deemed admitted. After hearing arguments, a majority of the court granted the motion to revoke probation and ordered the one-year suspension reinstated. After Kepfield serves this one-year suspension, the court recommended that Kepfield be suspended from practice for three years, with a three-year probation plan implemented after six months. A minority of the court agreed with the disciplinary administrator and would have imposed discipline of an indefinite suspension.

DISCHARGE FROM PROBATION IN THE MATTER OF STEPHENM. STARK NO. 114,583—MARCH 15, 2019

FACTS: In June 2016, the Kansas Supreme Court suspended Stark for two years, with the suspension stayed and Stark ordered to serve a two-year term of probation. Stark filed a motion for discharge from probation in February 2019.

DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATOR: 'The disciplinary administrator confirmed that Stark fully complied with the conditions of his probation. There was no objection to Stark's release from probation.

HELD: In the absence of any objection, the motion is granted. Stark is discharged from probation and this proceeding is closed.

CIVIL

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DAWSON V. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY WYANDOTTE DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED COURT OF APPEALS—REVERSED, NO. 112,925 - MARCH 15, 2019

FACTS: Dawson was diagnosed with arthritis in his back in 2004 and degenerative disc disease in 2008. Dawson was a train engineer, and after several rough rides, his pain intensified. While seeking treatment in 2010, a doctor mentioned that he treated several railroad employees. Dawson claimed this was the first time he realized that his work duties could have caused his back pain. After a spinal fusion surgery, Dawson was unable to continue to perform his job duties. In 2011 Dawson sued BNSF, his employer, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act alleging that negligence caused his back injuries. Although BNSF argued that Dawson's claims were time-barred, the case went before a jury, which found in Dawson's favor. BNSF appealed and the court of appeals ruled that the district court erred when it ruled that Dawson's claims were timely. Dawson's petition for review was granted.

ISSUES: (1) Disregard of Dawson's factual assertions; (2) timeliness of Dawson's cumulative injury

HELD: Although Dawson failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4) by providing pinpoint citations to the record on appeal, it was error to disregard the factual assertions supported by the record. Dawson properly requested all necessary materials but the Clerk of the District Court failed to compile an accurate record. Other pleadings that are in the record on appeal support Dawson's factual claims. Generally, a cause of action accrues when an injury occurs. With cumulative injuries, time begins to run when the injured person discovers or should have discovered the existence and cause of the injury. Dawson presented some evidence that he did not know about the cause of his injury until he was within three years before filing his claim. Because there was a factual dispute, the matter was properly sent to the jury. Dawson's cumulative injury claim was timely filed. The case must be remanded back to the court of appeals for consideration of Dawson's other claims.

STATUTES: 45 U.S.C. § 51, § 56 (2012); K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-250(a), -250(b), -259

EVIDENCE—SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT IN RE CONE CLAY DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED COURT OF APPEALS —AFFIRMED NO. 116,801—FEBRUARY 22, 2019

FACTS: In 2012, Cone was convicted of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. Prior to his...

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