Appellate Decisions
| Jurisdiction | Kansas,United States |
| Citation | Vol. 88 No. 5 Pg. 56 |
| Pages | 56 |
| Publication year | 2019 |
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KANSAS STATE SUPREME COURT
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
ORDER OF DISBARMENT
IN RE PATRICK GEORGE COPLEY
NO. 20,699—APRIL 9, 2019
FACTS: In a letter dated April 1, 2019, Patrick George Copley surrendered his license to practice law in Kansas. At the time of surrender, two disciplinary complaints were pending with the Disciplinary Administrator.
HELD: The Court accepts the surrender of Copley's license and orders that he be disbarred.
CIVIL
CONTRACTS—EMPLOYMENT
PETERS V. DESERET CATTLE FEEDERS, LLC
HASKELL DISTRICT COURT—
REVERSED AND REMANDED
COURT OF APPEALS—AFFIRMED
NO. 113,563—MARCH 29, 2019
FACTS: Peters supervised a cattle feedlot. He started the job in 2006, working for Hitch Enterprises as an employee-at-will. Hitch sold the business to Deseret Cattle Feeders in 2010. When the sale was announced, employees were told that there would be no layoffs and that employees would be retained by Deseret as long as they did their jobs. This message was reinforced by Deseret after it took control of the operation. Peters continued to work in his existing position. He signed several contracts with Deseret but none that specified that he was working as an employee-at-will. Peters was terminated in 2011 because of a reduction in Deseret's work-force—there was no evidence of misconduct or poor job performance. Peters filed suit claiming breach of an employment contract. The district court granted Deseret's motion for summary judgment, finding there was no evidence of an implied-in-fact employment contract. The court of appeals reversed, finding that disputed facts precluded summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted Deseret's petition for review.
ISSUES: (1) Existence of implied-in-fact employment contract; (2) promissory estoppel claim
HELD: Parties can become contractually obligated by conduct or words. An implied contract must be mutual and cannot be created solely by an employee's subjective understanding of employment terms. The parties' intent is a fact question for a jury. The comments made by Deseret when it purchased Hitch create a jury question about whether an implied-in-fact contract existed. For that reason, summary judgment was inappropriate and the court of appeals correctly reversed the district court. A question remains about whether Peters' employment with Deseret was at-will or through an implied-in-fact contract. Any estoppel issue must be addressed on remand.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 60-256
WORKERS COMPENSATION
ESTATE OF GRABER V. DILLON COMPANIES
WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD—
REVERSED AND REMANDED
COURT OF APPEALS—AFFIRMED
NO. 113,412—APRIL 12, 2019
FACTS: Graber was injured after he fell down some stairs while at work. Graber did not remember the accident, and there were no witnesses or any evidence to suggest how the accident happened. Graber applied for workers compensation benefits. An ALJ awarded him benefits, finding that the injury arose in and out of the course of his employment. Dillon appealed, claiming that because the cause of the accident was unknown, Graber's injuries arose from an idiopathic cause and were not compensable. The Board agreed with Dillon, holding that after 2011 amendments to the workers compensation statutes, idiopathic falls are not compensable. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "idiopathic" means something personal or innate to the claimant. The Supreme Court granted Dillon's petition for review.
ISSUE: (1) First impression question of the meaning of the term "idiopathic causes"
HELD: The legislative history does not address the "idiopathic causes" exclusion. "Idiopathic" means more than "spontaneous" or "unknown." Rather, it is connected with medical conditions and is not a synonym for all unknown causes. For that reason, the idiopathic exclusion is narrow. It applies only if there is proof that an injury or accident arose directly or indirectly from a medical condition or medical event of unknown origin which is peculiar to the claimant. The case must be remanded for further factfinding by the Board.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 44-501b(b), -508(f), -508(f) (3)(A)(iii), -508(f)(3)(A)(iv), 77-621(a), -621(c), -621(d)
HABEAS CORPUS—SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
IN RE CARE AND TREATMENT OF EASTERBERG
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING—REMANDED
TO THE DISTRICT COURT
NO. 117,933—MARCH 29, 2019
FACTS: Easterberg was charged with rape and aggravated criminal sodomy in 2007. But he pled guilty to other offenses, and the sex crime charges were dismissed under the plea agreement. The journal entry of sentencing did not reflect that Easterberg's crimes were sexually motivated. Prior to Easterberg's release from prison, the Department of Corrections provided notice that Easterberg might meet the criteria of a sexually violent predator under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. The attorney general filed a petition seeking to have Easterberg civilly committed. Easterberg challenged the motion, claiming he did not fit the statutory criteria for a sexually violent predator. The district court disagreed, and Easterberg filed this original action in habeas corpus with the Kansas Supreme Court.
ISSUES: (1) Original jurisdiction; (2) eligibility for civil commitment
HELD: The State's argument that the court lacks jurisdiction because it could not have heard the case in 1859—at the adoption of statehood—is rejected. The state constitution allows the court to hear original actions and Supreme Court Rule 9.01 provides details on how parties should proceed. If Easterberg is truly not subject to the KSVPA, any proceeding under that Act is illegal. Merely being charged with a sexually violent offense is insufficient to trigger involuntary commitment under the KSVPA. The district court found at sentencing that Easterberg's crime was not sexually motivated. But there is no evidence about whether that was truly the case, or whether there was little incentive to make such factual findings because of Easterberg's guilty plea. For this reason, the case must be remanded for a determination as to whether Easterberg's sexual motivation was litigated in the criminal case. If it was, the State is estopped from arguing to the contrary in this proceeding, and Easterberg is ineligible for civil commitment. If it was not, the KSVPA proceeding may continue.
CONCURRENCT AND DISSENT: (Johnson, J., joined by Luckert, J., and Malone, S.J.) The journal entry of sentencing is clear. There is no need to remand this case for more factfinding; the court should rely on the district court's prior finding that Easterberg's crime was not sexually motivated.
DISSENT: (Stegall, J.) Original actions in habeas corpus cannot take the place of appeals. Easterberg had remedies available in district court and should have used them. But since the court took jurisdiction, remand is the appropriate next step.
STATUTES: Kan. Const. art. 3, § 3; K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 59-29a02(a), -29a02(c), -29a02(d), -29a02(e), -29a02(e) (1), -29a02(e)(5), -29a02(e)(13), -29a03(a), -29a03(h), -29a04(a), -29a05(a), -29a06(a), -29a07(g), -29a20
DATE OF INJURY—WORKERS COMPENSATION
KNOLL V. OLATHE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 233
WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD OF APPEALS—
REVERSED AND REMANDED
COURT OF APPEALS—AFFIRMED
NO. 116,167—APRIL 19, 2019
FACTS: Knoll filed a claim for workers compensation coverage and requested a hearing. The claim did not proceed to final hearing within three years, so the school district moved for dismissal. The ALJ denied that request, holding that under K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 44-523(f) Knoll had five years to either proceed to final hearing or request an extension of time. The Board affirmed that holding but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-523(f)(1) controlled Knoll's claim and required either a final hearing or a motion within three years. Knoll's petition for review was granted.
ISSUE: (1) Which version of K.S.A. 44-523 controlled Knoll's claim
HELD: The only issue is which version of the statute...
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