Employer and Contractor Immunity from Tort Liability Under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act

Publication year2018
Pages30
Employer and Contractor Immunity from Tort Liability under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act
No. 87 J. Kan. Bar Assn 9, 30 (2018)
Kansas Bar Journal
October, 2018

Employer and Contractor Immunity from Tort Liability under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act

By Kyle Sollars

I. Introduction

Injuries that employees suffer in the scope of their employment have been the subject of unique treatment under the law. In virtually any other context, injured persons have recourse through appropriate common law theories of tort liability for their injuries. This is generally not the case for employees who are injured in the scope of their employment. Federal law provides statutory schemes for the compensation of employees injured in the scope of several employment contexts, including the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), providing a cause of action for injured railroad workers against their employers;[1] the Jones Act, extending FELA to injured seamen;[2] and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, providing a compensation scheme that is similar to state workers compensation statutes for certain maritime employees[3]

The most well-known of such statutory schemes are likely state workers compensation statutes. Contained within the workers compensation framework is "a classic social trade-off or, to use a Latin term, a quid pro quo"—injured employees receive prompt compensation for injuries suffered in the scope of their employment, without having to prove fault of any party—and in exchange, employers receive immunity from civil lawsuits for tort damages.[4] This article focuses on such employer immunity under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, including the extension of this immunity to certain principal contractors, so-called "statutory employers."

This article will also examine some of the limited exceptions to this immunity. One such exception is independent contractual obligations. The Workers Compensation Act does not displace freedom of contract—therefore parties are free to voluntarily incur obligations through contract that they otherwise would not have under that act. This article examines some of the contract issues that may arise in light of this exception, particularly as they impact general contractors j and subcontractors.

Another such exception is the so-called "dual capacity doctrine." Under that doctrine, an employer loses immunity from civil tort actions if the liability arises from the employer acting in some capacity other than that as an employer. This article analyzes that doctrine

and some of the considerations and pitfalls that may arise because of it.

II. Statutory Basis for Employer Immunity

Workers compensation immunity in Kansas is provided by statute. K.S.A. 44-504b(d) provides:

Except as provided in the workers compensation act, no employer, or other employee of such employer, shall be liable for any injury, whether by accident, repetitive trauma, or occupational disease, for which compensation is recoverable under the workers compensation act nor shall an employer be liable to any third party for any injury or death of an employee which was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability against a third party and for which workers compensation is payable by such employer.

Stated simply, where an injured employee can collect workers compensation, the employer is immune from any civil tort claims the employee may bring against the employer. The employer is also immune from any similar claims that a third party may bring against the employer if the injury occurred "under circumstances creating a legal liability against [such] third party."[5]

III. Statutory Employers

Generally, the ability to collect workers compensation requires an employer-employee relationship.[6] However, Kansas law has extended liability for workers compensation benefits to certain subcontracting relationships. Under Kansas law, whenever a "principal"—i.e. a general contractor—under-takes or contracts to perform work and thereafter contracts with a "contractor"—i.e. a subcontractor—to perform all or any part of such work, the principal will be liable to such contractor's employees for workers compensation benefits as if the principal were the direct employer of such employees.[7] In such a situation, the principal is called a "statutory employer" of the injured subcontractor employee.[8] However, if the subcontractor secures workers compensation benefits for its injured employee, the general contractor is not liable for such benefits.[9] If the subcontractor does not secure workers compensation benefits for its employees—or such compensation is otherwise unavailable—the general contractor shall be liable for such benefits.[10]

IV. Extension of Immunity to Statutory Employers

The question eventually arose whether workers compensation immunity extends to such statutory employers. In Robinett v. Haskell Company, the Kansas Supreme Court held that it does.[11]

In that case, Haskell Company was the general contractor in the construction of a building in Geary County, Kansas.[12] Haskell Company executed a subcontract with Stanley Jones to perform some of the work, including the installation of the heating and air conditioning systems.[13] Michael Robinett was one of Stanley Jones' employees.[14] The terms of Haskell's subcontract with Stanley Jones required Stanley Jones to supply workers compensation insurance for its employees.[15] Robinett was injured on the job when he stepped onto an uncovered floor drain, causing him serious injuries for which Stanley Jones paid workers compensation benefits.[16] Robinett filed suit against Haskell, claiming that the negligence of one of Haskell's employees caused Robinett's injuries.[17] Haskell moved for summary judgment, arguing that it qualified as a statutory employer under the Workers Compensation Act and was immune from suit under the "exclusive remedy rule" contained in K.S.A. 44-504b(d).[18] The trial court granted summary judgment to Haskell. On appeal, Robinett argued that K.S.A. 44-503(g) rendered Haskell liable because that statute expressly exempts principal contractors from providing workers compensation benefits when the subcontractor—i.e. direct employer—provides such benefits.[19]...

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