Appellate Decisions
| Publication year | 2018 |
| Pages | 71 |
| Citation | Vol. 87 No. 8 Pg. 71 |
Kansas State Supreme Court
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ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
ORDER OF DISCHARGE FROM PROBATION
IN THE MATTER OF JARED WARREN HOLSTE
NO. 113,970— JULY 12, 2018
FACTS: Holste was placed on a two-year suspension in October 2015. Holste was told that he could apply for reinstatement after six months, subject to terms and conditions. Holste requested and received an early reinstatement in 2016. He was allowed to return to practice subject to an 18-month term of probation. In June 2018, Holste requested that he be discharged from probation. The disciplinary administrator did not object to the request.
HELD: In the absence of an objection, Holste's motion was granted. He was discharged from probation.
CIVIL
REAL PROPERTY — STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
LCL V. FALEN
RICE DISTRICT COURT— COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED
DISTRICT COURT IS REVERSED — CASE REMANDED
NO. 115,434— JULY 27, 2018
FACTS: The Mary Louise Falen-Olsen Trust entered a contract to sell 200 acres of real property to Sammy Dean. The Trust owned all of the surface rights plus an undivided one-half mineral interest. It is undisputed that the Trust intended to sell the surface rights and retain the mineral interest. RCAT was the closing agent and title insurer. The deed prepared by RCAT did not include any reference to the mineral reservation. Neither of the co-trustees noticed this omission before they signed and filed the deed. LCL purchased the property in April 2014. At the time, LCL acknowledged that the mineral rights would not come with the property. RCAT again acted as the closing agent, and the deed again did not note the Trust's mineral rights reservation. After the sale closed, LCL inquired about the difference between the deed's language and its understanding of what it purchased. RCAT conducted a title search and discovered that none of the deeds included the reservation of the Trust's mineral interest. LCL refused to sign a corrected deed. The Trust first learned of this in August 2014, when royalty payments were suspended. LCL filed a petition to quiet title to the mineral interests. The Falens both filed an answer denying LCL's ownership and filed a third-party petition against RCAT for negligence and breach of contract. RCAT moved for summary judgment, claiming that the statute of limitations began to run in January 2008, when the original deed was prepared. The district court granted that motion, but that decision was reversed by the court of appeals, which found that the Falens did not sustain any damage until August 2014, when the royalty payments stopped. RCAT's petition for review was granted.
ISSUES: (1) Negligence cause of action; (2) breach of fiduciary duty cause of action
HELD: In the context of a statute of limitations, "substantial injury" means "actionable injury". There are two inquiries relevant to determining when the statute of limitations began to run — when did the Falens suffer actionable injury, and when did the existence of that injury become reasonably ascertainable? They were injured when the 2008 deed was filed because their mineral interest title became clouded. This injury was compounded in 2013, when their ability to reform the title became much more limited. But there remains a genuine issue of material fact about whether the Falens reviewed or understood the deed before signing and filing it. And factual questions remain about the Falens' continued receipt of royalty payments. Because of these factual disputes, summary judgment was inappropriate and the case must be remanded for further factfinding. The Falens' breach of fiduciary duty claims extended to the 2014 deed, meaning that the petition was filed well within the statute of limitations.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 58-2222, 60-511(5), -513(a)(4), -513(b)
NEGLIGENCE
MANLEY V. HALLBAUER
LABETTE DISTRICT COURT— COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED
DISTRICT COURT IS AFFIRMED
NO. 115,531— AUGUST 10, 2018
FACTS: Manley died in a car accident which occurred at the intersection of two gravel roads. Neither road had a traffic sign. A law enforcement investigation concluded that vegetation on one of the corners likely created a blind spot, making it impossible for either driver to see approaching traffic. The Hallbauers owned the property with the trees, which had been there since before they purchased the lot. Manley's estate's wrongful death suit included the Hallbauers as defendants. The Hallbauers moved for summary judgment, claiming they could not be held liable for failing to remove trees or other vegetation. The district court granted that motion and Manley's estate appealed. The Court of Appeals turned to the Restatement of Torts (Second) in concluding that the Hallbauers had no duty to clear vegetation from their lot. The estate's petition for review was granted.
ISSUE: (1) Existence of duty
HELD: Kansas law reflects a public policy not to impose tort liability on a landowner for natural obstructions on the landowner's property. Because it is not necessary to do so, the court takes no position at this time on whether the Restatement (Third) should be used in Kansas. There is no justification to depart from the established rule that a landowner owes no duty in a case such as this. It is especially true when, as was the case here, the landscape was rural.
STATUTES: No statutes cited
CAPITAL SENTENCES— CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE — JURIES — STATUTES
STATE V. LLOYD
SEDGWICK DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 115,834—AUGUST 10, 2018
FACTS: Lloyd was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and abuse of an infant victim. Hard 50 sentence imposed without a jury. Convictions affirmed on direct appeal, but remand ordered for resentencing in compliance with Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). State v. Lloyd, 299 Kan. 620 (2014). At resentencing, same evidence presented but in part through prior testimony of a key witness (Loudermilk) who was unavailable for the resentencing proceeding. Hard 50 sentence again imposed, based on jury's finding that Lloyd's 2007 guilty plea to aggravated assault for shooting Loudermilk in the foot was a prior felony resulting in great bodily harm, and that Lloyd committed the instant crime in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. Lloyd appealed, claiming district court erred by allowing Loudermilk's coerced pretrial statements and testimony from the first trial. Lloyd also claimed the State presented insufficient evidence that he had a prior felony conviction for a crime in which he inflicted great bodily harm because the crime of aggravated assault contains no such essential legal element.
ISSUES: (1) Coerced testimony, (2) sufficient evidence of prior conviction as aggravating factor
HELD: United States Supreme Court case has not addressed whether testimony of a coerced witness may be used against a defendant at trial, but Kansas Supreme Court has held that basing a conviction in whole or in part on the coerced statement of a witness may deprive a criminal defendant of due process. State v. Daniels, 278 Kan. 53 (2004). Assuming without deciding the admission of Loudermilk's transcribed testimony was erroneous, any such error was harmless under facts in this case.
Nothing in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6624(a) requires that bodily harm be an element...
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