Appellate Decisions
| Publication year | 2017 |
| Pages | 73 |
| Citation | Vol. 86 No. 10 Pg. 73 |
November 2017
Supreme Court
Attorney Discipline
ORDER OF PROBATION
IN THE MATTER OF KURT L. JAMES
NO. 117,517––OCTOBER 20, 2017
FACTS: A hearing panel determined that James violated KRPC 1.3 (diligence), 1.4(a) (communication), 1.7(a)(2) (conflict of interest), 1.15(a) and (b) (safekeeping property), 1.16(a) (declining representation), 3.2 (expediting litigation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). The complaints arose after James took on several clients with the promise to file post-divorce modification motions but failed to do so.
HEARING PANEL: The hearing panel concluded that James' lack of communication and diligence harmed his clients. James had a prior disciplinary record, but there was no evidence of dishonest motive, and James made his clients whole through refunds. Because of that fact, the disciplinary administrator recommended that James be suspended for 1 year but that the suspension be stayed while James served a period of probation. The hearing panel agreed, with the caution that James should serve a 2-year suspension, with that order stayed during a 3-year probation term.
HELD: The court adopted the hearing panel's findings and conclusions. After reviewing the record, the court ordered that James be suspended for 1 year, with the imposition of the suspension stayed pending successful completion of a 3-year period of probation.
ORDER OF DISBARMENT
IN THE MATTER OF JEROME PATIENCE
NO. 22,022––NOVEMBER 1, 2017
FACTS: In a letter signed October 19, 2017, Jerome M. Patience, an attorney admitted to practice law in Kansas, voluntarily surrendered his law license. At the time of surrender, a disciplinary complaint was pending. The complaint was filed after Patience was charged with several felony offenses in Missouri.
HELD: The court found that the surrender of Patience's license should be accepted and Patience is disbarred.
ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT
IN THE MATTER OF JOHN M. STUDTMANN
NO. 17,370––SEPTEMBER 29, 2017
FACTS: Studtmann was disbarred in November 2003. He filed a petition for reinstatement in March 2016. A hearing panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys conducted a hearing and recommended that the petition be granted, with the condition that Studtmann continued to receive treatment.
HELD: The petition for reinstatement is granted, subject to conditions. Studtmann must continue to receive treatment from Dr. Parker until Dr. Parker believes that treatment is no longer necessary. Studtmann must also complete a bar review course that has been approved by the court and must pay all outstanding fees.
ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT
IN THE MATTER OF EDWARD F. WALSH, IV
NO. 99,410–– SEPTEMBER 29, 2017
FACTS: Walsh was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in May 2008. He filed a petition for reinstatement in December 2016. After conducting a hearing, a hearing panel recommended that the petition be granted.
HELD: After considering the record, the court grants Walsh's petition for reinstatement. The reinstatement is conditioned on Walsh's compliance with the annual continuing legal education requirements and upon payment of all fees.
Civil
JURISDICTION––REAL PROPERTY
JENKINS V. CHICAGO PACIFIC CORPORATION
JACKSON DISTRICT COURT––COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED, DISTRICT COURT IS AFFIRMED
NO. 113,104––OCTOBER 27, 2017
FACTS: The Chicago Pacific Railway Company operated on the disputed property beginning in 1886. In 1985, Chicago Pacific quitclaimed its interests in the property to Dirt & Gravel, Inc. Jenkins acquired her ownership interest via quitclaim deed from Dirt & Gravel. Jenkins later sued to quiet title, asking for a determination that she was a fee simple owner. Jenkins alternately claimed that she acquired fee title through the quitclaim deed or that she acquired title through adverse possession. Chicago Pacific moved for summary judgment, claiming that the 1886 deed only allowed a right of way that would revert to abutting landowners when the property was abandoned by the railroad. The district court granted the motion, finding that Jenkins could not have acquired any title through a quitclaim deed. The district court granted Jenkins' K.S.A. 60-254(b) motion in order to allow an immediate appeal on the question of ownership.
ISSUES: (1) Jurisdiction; (2) real property acquisition from a railroad; (3) the language of the 1886 deed HELD: Jenkins filed her notice of appeal before the district court made the proper K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-254(b) certification. But subsequent certification cured this defect, rendering her notice of appeal timely. When a railroad acquires land for a right of way it generally obtains only an easement. When that easement is abandoned, the estate reverts to the original land owners. In this case, the 1886 deed described the subject property in a manner consistent with a right of way.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-254(b), -2102, -2102(a), -2102(b), -2102(c)
Civil
SCHOOL FINANCE
GANNON V. STATE
SHAWNEE DISTRICT COURT––STATE FAILED TO SHOW THAT REMEDIAL LEGISLATION MEETS THE ADEQUACY AND EQUITY REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 6
NO. 113,267––OCTOBER 2, 2017
FACTS: Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution requires the legislature to "make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the state." These plaintiffs filed suit in 2010, alleging both inequitable and inadequate funding of K-12 public education. In 2013, a three-judge panel agreed, finding that the State's school finance formula failed both equity and adequacy tests. After the legislature's CLASS legislation was struck as constitutionally insufficient, the legislature was tasked with bringing the state's education finance system into compliance with Article 6. The legislature responded with Senate Bill 19. The centerpiece of that legislation is the new Kansas School Equity and Enhancement Act, which established a new education funding formula under which some funds come from the State via an amount arrived at by formula, and some funds come from local option budgets. The base aid per student for year 2018-18 is $4,006; that amount increases to $4,128 in 2018-19. School districts may add on local funding up to 33% of the district's total foundation aid. Less wealthy districts may also qualify for supplemental state aid, in recognition of varying property wealth among districts. This appeal follows from the plaintiffs' challenge to the KSEEA.
ISSUES: (1) Adequacy requirements; (2) equity requirements; (3) equal access to substantially similar educational opportunity through similar tax effort; (4) effect of change to LOB equalization calculation; (5) at-risk funding procedures; (6) remedies
HELD: The State did not meet its burden to show that the public education financing system established by SB 19 is constitutionally adequate. Overreliance on local option budget...
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