Appellate Decisions
| Citation | Vol. 86 No. 3 Pg. 49 |
| Pages | 49 |
| Publication year | 2017 |
Supreme Court
Attorney Discpline
ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT
IN THE MATTER OF TROY D. RENKEMEYER REINSTATED
NO. 113,367—FRIDAY, JANUARY 20, 2017
FACTS: On Oct. 23, 2015, this court suspended the respondent, Troy D. Renkemeyer, from the practice of law in Kansas for a period of 1 year. See In re Renkemeyer, 302 Kan. 954, 359 P.3d 77 (2015).
On Oct. 31, 2016, respondent filed a petition for reinstatement. On Nov. 1, 2016, the Disciplinary Administrator filed a certification of compliance, under Supreme Court Rule 219 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 403).
HELD: The court, after carefully considering the record, granted the respondent's petition for reinstatement of his license to practice law in Kansas.
Civil
KANSAS CONSTITUTION—LEGISLATION
RIPENESS—STANDING
KNEA V. STATE OF KANSAS SHAWNEE DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 114,135—JANUARY 20, 2017
FACTS: 2014 Senate Substitute for House Bill No. 2506 was enacted in response to the court's decision declaring unconstitutional part of the state's public school finance law. HB 2506 covered a wide range of topics, including appropriations to various agencies and substantive and technical changes to the state's public school financing statutes. Also, at issue here, SB 2506 amended the Teacher Due Process Act to remove elementary and secondary public school teachers from statutory protections that had been afforded to them regarding termination or nonrenewal of their employment contracts. KNEA filed suit, claiming that HB 2506 was invalid under the Kansas constitutional provision limiting legislation to one subject. The district court found that the legislation was valid, and KNEA appealed.
ISSUES: (1) Does KNEA have standing to challenge the legislation's constitutionality; (2) Is this issue ripe for decision, since the revised due process procedure has not yet been used; and (3) Does HB 2506 violate the one-subject rule?
HELD: Judicial power is limited to actual cases and controversies. Because KNEA has no personal injury, standing exists only if KNEA is allowed to bring suit on behalf of a member who could have filed suit individually. HB 2506 excludes all primary and secondary public school teachers from the due process protections that are given in the TDPA. Because this due process is a valuable employment right, and because there are KNEA members who lost this access to due process when HB 2506 became effective, KNEA has standing to bring this action. And because the challenged legislation is now active law, KNEA's claim is ripe for decision. KNEA claims that HB 2506 contains both appropriations and general legislation. Under the constitutional one-subject provision, the "subject" can be as comprehensive as the legislature chooses. The one-subject rule does not expressly forbid comingling appropriations and general legislation into a single bill, and such combinations are allowable as long as the provisions address a single subject. In this case, the only subject covered by HB 2506 was education.
STATUTES: Kansas Constitution Article 2, § 16; K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-212(b)(1), 72-5436(a), -212(b)(6); K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 72-5436(a), -5438(a), -5439, -5443, -5445(a)(1)
Criminal
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—EVIDENCE—JURY INSTRUCTIONS
STATE V BELTZ SEDGWICK DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 111,785—JANUARY 27, 2017
FACTS: Beltz was convicted of attempted possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and first-degree felony murder of Betts during botched attempt to sell marijuana. On appeal Beltz claimed the district court erroneously: (1) allowed State to present evidence of Beltz growing marijuana in his basement, and of prior sales by Betts at or near Beltz's house; (2) denied Beltz's motion for acquittal in which Beltz argued there was no direct causal connection between the attempted sale of marijuana and Betts' death; and (3) denied Beltz's request for a self-defense instruction that relied on the retreat "safe harbor" exceptions in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5226(c); and (4) failed to give a unanimity instruction when State argued multiple acts supported the charge of aiding and abetting the attempted sale of marijuana.
ISSUES: (1) Trial evidence, (2) motion for acquittal, (3) self-defense instruction, (4) unanimity instruction
HELD: Beltz waived or abandoned his K.S.A. 60-455 challenges to the admission of evidence. He did not object to the admission of evidence of the marijuana grow, and abandoned his initial objection to evidence of prior marijuana sales at or near Beltz's house. Facts in case established a sufficient causal relationship between Betts' death and the attempted sale of marijuana. Betts' death occurred within the res gestae of the underlying crime, and criminal violence that erupts during a drug sale is not an extraordinary intervening event.
Beltz was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. There was no argument in this case that the attempted sale of marijuana was not a forcible felony for which a self-defense instruction was disallowed by K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5226(a). The "safe harbor" exceptions in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5226(c)(1) and (2) are only available pursuant to subsection (c). There were no exceptions applicable to subsections (a) and (b).
No unanimity instruction was required because there was no showing of multiple acts in this case. Beltz may have made multiple overt acts in support of the single attempted sale, but those facts could not have supported another conviction of the charged crime.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2015 SUPP. 21-5111(N), 5222(A), -5226, -5226(A), -5226(B), -5226(C), -5226(C)(1), -5226(C)(2), -5402(A)(2), -5402(C)(1)(N), 60-455; K.S.A. 60-404
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT—FIFTH AMENDMENT—RIGHT TO COUNSEL
STATE V BROWN
SALINE DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 111,166—JANUARY 20, 2017
FACTS: Brown was convicted of felony murder, two counts of child abuse, and interference with a law enforcement officer. On appeal he claimed: (1) his inculpatory statements to police should have been suppressed because officers failed to honor his request for counsel, his statements were not voluntary, and no Miranda warnings were given after each break in questioning; (2) district court failed to instruct jury on lesser included offenses of felony murder; (3) insufficient evidence supported his conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer; and (4) upward departure sentences were not justified by substantial and compelling reasons because age of victim was element of the child abuse offense.
ISSUES: (1) Statements to police, (2) jury instructions on lesser included offenses, (3) evidence supporting obstruction of law enforcement officer conviction, (4) evidence supporting departure sentences
HELD: Brown made unequivocal request for attorney, but after unsuccessful attempt to contact a lawyer he knowingly and intelligently waived his previously invoked right when he reinitiated interview with police. Under totality of the circumstances, Brown's statements were voluntary, and length of time between initial Miranda warnings and end of interview did not make renewed warnings necessary.
For reasons stated in State v. Love (decided this same date), district court properly refused to give lesser included offense instructions for the felony-murder charge.
Given standard of review and purpose underlying interference with law enforcement statute, sufficient evidence supports Brown's conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer where Brown failed to come out from hiding in...
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