Appellate Decisions
| Publication year | 2014 |
| Pages | 30 |
July, 2014
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SUPREME COURT
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
DISBARMENT IN RE LOWELL D. RAMSEY ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE NO. 14715 — MAY 29, 2014
FACTS: In a letter signed on May 22, 2014, addressed to the clerk of the appellate courts, respondent, Ramsey, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in the state of Kansas, voluntarily surrendered his license to practice law in Kansas, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 217 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 396). At the time the respondent surrendered his license, a complaint had been docketed by the disciplinary administrator's office for investigation, and a finding of probable cause had been made. The complaint alleged that respondent violated Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) (misconduct) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 655).
HELD: Court examined the files of the office of the disciplinary administrator and concluded the surrender of the respondent's license should be accepted and that the respondent should be disbarred. Ramsey is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in Kansas, and his license and privilege to practice law are hereby revoked.
ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION IN RE MIRIAM M. RITTMASTER ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE NOS. 109,836/111,126 — JUNE 6, 2014
FACTS: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the disciplinary administrator against the respondent, Rittmaster, of Overland Park, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1998. Two separate complaints were filed against the respondent; both complaints involved respondent's representation in divorce matters.
DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATOR: On January 4, 2013, in Case No. 109,836, the office of the disciplinary administrator filed a formal complaint against the respondent, alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). The respondent untimely filed an answer on March 7, 2013. The disciplinary administrator recommended a six-month suspension on that complaint. On November 5, 2013, the office of the disciplinary administrator filed a formal complaint against the respondent, alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). The respondent filed an answer on December 18, 2013. The disciplinary administrator recommended a one-year suspension for the second complaint retroactive to April 1, 2013, when her license was temporarily suspended.
HEARING PANEL: A hearing was held on complaint No. 109,836, before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on March 7, 2013, when the respondent was personally present and was represented by counsel. Respondent's oral motion to accept answer out of time was granted at the hearing. The hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 446) (competence); 1.3 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 464) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 484) (communication); 1.15(b) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 553) (safekeeping property); 8.1(b) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 646) (failure to respond to lawful demand for information from disciplinary authority); 8.4(c) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 655) (engaging in conduct involving misrepresentation); and Kansas Supreme Court Rule 207(b) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 336) (failure to cooperate in disciplinary investigation). The hearing panel recommended a six-month suspension on the first complaint. A hearing was held on complaint No. 11,126 before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on January 8, 2014, when the respondent was personally present and was represented by counsel. The hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.3 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 464) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 484) (communication); 1.16(a)(2) and (d) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 569) (termination of representation); and 8.4(d) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 655) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
HELD: Court held the evidence of respondent's misconduct before the hearing panel was established by clear and convincing evidence. Court held that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year, retroactive to April 1, 2013, and that she be subject to a Rule 219 reinstatement hearing before her suspension may be lifted. In respondent's motion for reinstatement, she is required to address whether an appropriate plan for supervision and support of her resumption of the practice of law is needed. At the reinstatement hearing, the respondent is required to present clear and convincing evidence that she has (1) made full restitution to her clients and/or the Client Protection Fund, and (2) received adequate mental health treatment to render her capable of engaging in the active practice of law.
CIVIL
CONTRACTS AND ELECTRIC COMPANIES PRAIRIE LAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC. V. KANSAS ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE ET AL. PHILLIPS DISTRICT COURT —AFFIRMED COURT OF APPEALS — REVERSED NO. 102,630 - MAY 16, 2014
FACTS: Prairie Land Electric Cooperative Inc. (Prairie Land) purchases wholesale electricity from multiple suppliers and distributes that electricity to retail consumers within a certified service area in northwest and north central Kansas. The Kansas Corporation Commission establishes the boundaries of Prairie Land's certified service area. Within its certified service area, Prairie Land's distribution system consists of all the "facilities, transmission lines, distribution lines and substation equipment as owned and operated by Prairie Land." The dispute in this case arises from Prairie Land's decision to enter into temporally overlapping, long-term all-requirements contracts with two different wholesale electricity suppliers, Kansas Electric Power Coop. (KEPCo), and Sunflower Electric Power Corp. and which supplier would provide the electricity for one of Prairie Land's new retail customers. Prairie Land filed a petition for declaratory judgment asking the court to construe and declare the rights, status and legal relations of the parties under both contracts. Trial court ruled that Sunflower has the contractual right and obligation to serve the new pumping station delivery point. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of KEPCo after concluding that KEPCo had the contractual right to supply electricity to Prairie Land for the new delivery point based on the unambiguous language of the KEPCo Contract.
ISSUES: (1) Contracts and (2) electric companies
HELD: After careful consideration of seemingly irreconcilable contract provisions, Court concluded the only way to reasonably interpret and give legal effect to both contracts is to interpret the KEPCo Contract in light of, and as limited by, Prairie Land's preexisting obligations under the Sunflower Contract. Thus, Court concluded that Prairie Land agreed in the KEPCo Contract to purchase its needs from KEPCo only if one of the two exceptions recognized in the Sunflower Contract applied—i.e., if Sunflower lacked capacity to meet all of Prairie Land's requirements; or (2) if Prairie Land had preexisting obligations to purchase some of its energy requirements from other suppliers at the time it entered into the Sunflower Contract. Court held the first exception did not apply because Sunflower had the capacity to meet Prairie Land's requirements for the new Jayhawk pumping station. Similarly, the second exception did not apply because Prairie Land did not have a preexisting obligation to purchase energy requirements for the new Jayhawk pumping station from a supplier other than Sunflower at the time it entered into the Sunflower Contract. Court interpreted the contracts at issue to require that Prairie Land purchase its energy needs for the Jayhawk pumping station from Sunflower rather than KEPCo.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 20-3018; and K.S.A. 60-1701, -1713, -2101
HABEAS CORPUS AND RES JUDICATA STATE V. KINGSLEY SEDGWICK DISTRICT COURT — AFFIRMED NO. 108,849 — JUNE 13, 2014
FACTS: In 1991, a jury convicted Kingsley of premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated arson, and forgery. The court imposed three consecutive life sentences. After his direct appeal, Kingsley also brought several unsuccessful collateral attacks on his convictions and sentences. In his current motion for relief of judgment, Kingsley challenged a jury instruction on premeditation and that it was also error to instruct the jury on both premeditated murder and felony murder. The district court held Kingsley's motion for relief was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
ISSUES: (1) Habeas corpus and (2) res judicata
HELD: Court stated that K.S.A. 60-1507 provides the exclusive statutory procedure for collaterally attacking a criminal conviction and sentence. Therefore, neither K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-260(b), nor K.S.A. 60-2606, can be used for that purpose. If a direct appeal has been taken from a criminal conviction or sentence, the doctrine of res judicata provides that the parties to the appeal are barred from relitigating any issue decided in the direct appeal. Further, those issues that could have been presented in the direct appeal, but were not, are deemed waived in a collateral proceeding. Court held that the claims raised by Kingsley in his pro se motion are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. As a result, contrary to Kingsley's argument, the district court did not err...
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