Appellate Decisions
| Publication year | 2014 |
| Pages | 27 |
| Citation | Vol. 83 No. 8 Pg. 27 |
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Supreme Court
Civil
ADOPTION IN RE N.A.C. SEDGWICK DISTRICT COURT COURT OF APPEALS — REVERSED AND APPEAL DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION NO. 109,208 — JULY 11, 2014
FACTS: Mother gave birth to N.A.C. on the sidewalk in front of a sandwich shop in Wichita. N.A.C. was born six weeks premature, weighed less than 5 pounds, and tested positive for cocaine. N.A.C. was placed into police protective custody that same day. H.G. and D.G. (Maternal Cousins from Idaho) appealed from the district court's order (1) finding that the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) failed to make reasonable efforts or progress toward finding an adoptive placement for N.A.C., (2) removing N.A.C. from the custody of SRS for adoptive placement, and (3) granting custody directly to S.D. and D.D. (Foster Parents) with court approval to adopt. Court of Appeals concluded the district court's finding regarding the lack of reasonable efforts by SRS toward finding an adoptive placement was not supported by substantial competent evidence, which in turn divested the court of its legal authority to remove N.A.C. from SRS custody for adoptive placement or grant legal custody directly to Foster Parents for adoption. Court of Appeals reversed the district court's finding regarding reasonable efforts, vacated the court's orders regarding custody, and remanded the cause while the Department for Children and Families proceeds with and finalizes adoption placement.
ISSUE: Adoption
HELD: Court held that the Maternal Cousins' claim that K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-2102 confers appellate jurisdiction and allows an appeal from any final order in a CINC proceeding under the Revised Code lacked merit. Court focused on whether the order was appealable under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2273(a), which specifically limits the types of orders that can be appealed in a child in need of care case under the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children. Under that statute, appealable orders are limited to "any order of temporary custody, adjudication, disposition, finding of unfitness or termination of parental rights." If an order in a child in need of care case does not fit within those five categories, it is not appealable. The terms "order of temporary custody," "adjudication," and "disposition" are terms of art within the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children with particular meanings assigned within its context. The Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children creates a legislatively designated framework of sequential steps of judicial proceedings with each step occurring in a specific order leading toward permanency in the child's placement. Applying that framework, the temporary custody hearing and order comprise the first step in the proceedings. The second step involves the adjudication. The third involves the disposition. An order terminating parental rights is the last appealable order under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2273(a). Court held that a post-termination permanency order issued under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2264(h) is not subject to appellate review. Court held that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the case.
DISSENT: Justice Johnson dissented and would hold that the Court had jurisdiction to consider the appeal under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2273 and the plain language of the statute, including the ._____ «____» term any.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 20-3018; K.S.A. 38-1201, -1591, -2201, -2202, -2231, -2232, -2241, -2242, -2243, -2251, -2253, -2255, -2256, -2264, -2266, -2267, -2269, -2270, -2273; K.S.A. 59-2111; and K.S.A. 60-2101, -2102
EMPLOYMENT CIVIL SERVICE, AND SHERIFF DENNING V. JOHNSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S CIVIL SERVICE BOARD ET AL. JOHNSON DISTRICT COURT — AFFIRMED COURT OF APPEALS — AFFIRMED NO. 104,318 — JULY 11, 2014
FACTS: Johnson County Sheriff's Department Master Deputy Maurer cracked a department vehicle's windshield with a binder while attempting to shoo a bothersome horsefly. Maurer initially reported the incident by writing "crack in windshield—rock" on a yellow sticky note and leaving the note for his commanding officer, Sgt. Greenwood. The next morning, Maurer briefly spoke with Greenwood and advised him the crack on the windshield had "spiderwebbed" as the result of a rock chip. But another deputy who witnessed the horsefly incident soon reported that Maurer caused the damage when he hit the windshield with the binder. Maurer eventually responded to questions regarding the incident in two separate written reports and disclosed additional facts regarding his role in damaging the windshield. After an internal investigation and hearing before an internal review board, Johnson County Sheriff Denning terminated Maurer's employment for violating the department's professional standard on truthfulness. In doing so, Denning adopted the position of the review board recommending termination based on Maurer's false statements in the sticky note and his verbal statement to his commanding officer indicating the windshield damage was caused by a rock rather than Maurer's own actions. Maurer appealed to the Johnson County Sheriff's Civil Service Board (CSB), and the CSB reversed Denning's decision and ordered Maurer's reinstatement. Denning appealed to the district court, and the district court reversed the CSB's decision and remanded the case to the CSB for further proceedings. Maurer appealed the district court's decision to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the district court's decision to remand the case to the CSB for further proceedings was not a final order. On remand, the CSB reversed itself, upholding Denning's decision to terminate Maurer. Maurer appealed to the district court, and the district court affirmed the CSB's second decision.
Maurer appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the panel majority affirmed both district court decisions, ultimately upholding Maurer's termination. Judge Leben dissented and would have affirmed the CSB's first decision upholding Maurer's reinstatement.
ISSUES: (1) Employment, (2) civil service, and (3) sheriff
HELD: Court agreed with Maurer that in this case the plain language of K.S.A. 19-4327(b) and (d) authorizes the CSB to receive and consider evidence for and against a dismissal in determining the reasonableness of the sheriff's personnel decision, to approve or disapprove of the sheriff's decision, and to make appropriate orders based on its findings and conclusions. Court rejected Denning's argument that the CSB either had no authority, or had only limited authority, to review his personnel decision. However, Court held the CSB exceeded its scope of authority in this case because it failed to understand or apply the reasonableness standard, and its failure to understand that standard is demonstrated by the lack of evidentiary support for its own decision.
DISSENT: Justice Johnson agreed with Judge Leben's dissent in the Court of Appeals decision that "The civil-service board concluded that firing Maurer wasn't reasonable, and we are not allowed to substitute our judgment for that of the administrative agency charged by statute with making such a decision." Justice Johnson agreed and found that no matter how the majority tried to spin what it was doing, the bottom line is simply a reversal of a decision that the majority does not like—"That is not our function, and I would not do it."
STATUTES: K.S.A. 19-805(a), -4303, -4304, -4311, -4327; K.S.A. 20-3018; K.S.A. 60-2101, -2102; and K.S.A. 77-601
PRISONER MEDICAL EXPENSES UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS HOSPITAL AUTHORITY V THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF WABAUNSEE, KANSAS WABAUNSEE DISTRICT COURT — AFFIRMED COURT OF APPEALS – REVERSED NO. 104,236 — JUNE 27, 2014
FACTS: The University of Kansas Hospital Authority (Hospital Authority) sued the Board of Wabaunsee County Commissioners (County) for reimbursement of the medical expenses incurred in the treatment of a man (Contreras) who jumped through the fourth story window of an unlocked interrogation room in the Wabaunsee County jail where he had been placed by sheriff officials during an investigation. Prior Kansas appellate decisions require a sheriff to provide medical care to a prisoner in the sheriff's custody and a county to pay for the care if the prisoner is indigent and has no other means of payment. The district court granted summary judgment to the County finding that Contreras was not under arrest, a prisoner committed to the county jail or held within the county. The Court of Appeals held that the district court's definition of custody was too limited and significant restraints had been placed on Contreras' freedom requiring the sheriff to assume responsibility for all costs associated with Contreras' medical care.
ISSUE: Prisoner medical expenses
HELD: Court held the County is not obligated to pay the expenses because Contreras, although temporarily detained, was not a prisoner committed to or held in the county jail at the time he was injured and hospitalized. Court held that under K.S.A. 19-1910, the County would only be obligated to pay for Contreras' medical care if he had no resources to pay for his own care and if he was a prisoner committed to or held in the county jail, meaning he had been sentenced to jail; had been arrested and was being detained in jail while awaiting trial; had been apprehended and arrested and was to be detained...
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