Connecticut Employment Law Decisions for 2008 - the Year in Review
| Publication year | 2021 |
| Pages | 197 |
83 CBJ 197. CONNECTICUT EMPLOYMENT LAW DECISIONS FOR 2008 - THE YEAR IN REVIEW
Volume 83, No. 2, Pg.
JUNE 2009
Blockbuster employment law cases are rare phenomena in Connecticut jurisprudence, but 2008 will be recorded as a rare year in Connecticut employment law, if for no other reason than the state Supreme Court's blockbuster decision in Curry v. A llan S. Goodman, Inc., a disability discrimination case.(fn1) Curry is probably the Court's most significant employment law decision since torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp.(fn2) in 1995.
While Curry is significant in many respects, it may ultimately be most significant for its first-time declaration that the state's anti-discrimination laws are not mirror images of their federal counterparts and that relying on those counterparts (such as the Americans with Disabilities Act)(fn3) to interpret these laws might well be inappropriate in certain circumstances. Strangely enough, however, Curry's more immediate significance is that it is the first Connecticut appellate decision to recognize that state disability discrimination law imposes on employers the very same duty the federal Americans with Disabilities Act imposes-the duty to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees when these accommodations are necessary to enable them to perform the essential functions of their jobs. What is particularly notworthy about this holding is that the pertinent state statute never uses the words "reasonable accommodation" or any even remotely similar language.
To understand Curry, one must understand its facts. The plaintiff there was a truck driver for a wine and liquor distributor before he sustained a work-related back injury and was unable to work for a while.(fn4) When he did return to work, his doctor restricted him to a four-hour day,(fn5) and imposed a 25-pound lifting restriction and a 30-minute sitting or standing restriction. Consequently, the employer placed him on "light duty," giving him a temporary position in the warehouse working the "split-line" on the night shift.(fn6) The placement was pursuant to a special agreement with the union. Ordinarily employees had to bid for these positions every six months, with awards being made on a seniority basis.
At that time the company placed the plaintiff on light duty, its policies stated:
Light duty status is intended to be a temporary, transitional situation^ Employees who have been on light duty status for sixty days must have their status reevaluated to determine when and if they will be able to return to full duty status.(fn7)
After the plaintiff had spent more than sixty days on light duty, the employer's workers' compensation carrier wrote to his doctor inquiring whether the plaintiff would be able to stand for an entire ten-hour shift or lift 45 pounds.(fn8) The doctor responded "NO" and provided no further information.(fn9)
Employees working the "split-line" stood by a conveyor belt and filled empty cartons passing on the belt with wine and liquor bottles from so-called flow racks.(fn10) On occasion, the racks would become depleted, in which case the employees were to restock the rack with a full case of product they would retrieve from some other location in the warehouse. The case could weigh more than 25 pounds.(fn11) When the employer assigned the plaintiff to light duty on the "split-line," the plaintiff worked a restricted, five-hour shift and was not required to restock the flow racks.(fn12) Other employees performed this task for him.(fn13)
Some months later, while the plaintiff was still on this light duty job, his doctor reported to the carrier that he could increase his shift to ten hours a day and would likely be able to reach "full duty work."(fn14) Shortly thereafter, however, the doctor told the employer that the plaintiff had not improved as expected and that, although he could work ten-hour shifts, the lifting restriction had to remain and was expected to be "permanent."(fn15)
At that point, the plaintiff decided to bid on the warehouse position.(fn16) Although the employee claimed he had sufficient seniority to obtain the position, his bid was not successful.(fn17 )The employer then terminated the plaintiff's employment, informing him that no suitable position existed for him.(fn18 )Shortly thereafter, the employee's attorney wrote to the employer requesting a concededly reasonable accommoda-tion.(fn19) The employer failed to respond, however.(fn20) The plaintiff then sued for disability discrimination under state law.(fn21) The employer moved for summary judgment, which was granted, and the plaintiff appealed.(fn22)
In deciding that state disability discrimination law imposed a duty to make reasonable accommodations, the Supreme Court first noted that the agency charged with enforcing the statute, the state Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CHRO"), had consistently interpreted the statute to provide for such a duty, despite the absence of explicit statutory language. Nevertheless, the Court held that, before it could defer to the agency's interpretation under traditional administrative law principles, it had to determine that the agency's interpretation was reasonable.(fn23)
The Court thus conducted its own analysis of the statute, beginning with the contract interpretation principles that apply when a statute is silent on the matter in question.
When... a statutory provision is silent with respect to [the issue at hand], our analysis is not limited by... § 1-2z, which provides that the meaning of statutes shall be ascertained from only their text and their relationship to other statutes if those sources reveal an unambiguous meaning that is not absurd or unworkable... In addition to the words of the statute itself, 'we look to... the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.(fn24)
After rejecting the notion that the bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense in the statute indicated that the legislature had disclaimed a duty of reasonable accom-modation,(fn25) the court looked at the "other sources" to determine the legislature's intent.(fn26) It looked specifically to the legislative history, where it found some discussion in 1973 suggesting that the statute was intended to provide broad protections to disabled people otherwise qualified for a job.(fn27) It also looked to other disability-related statutes the legislature had passed, concluding from this that the legislature's concern for protecting individuals with disabilities was strong.(fn28)
While the results of this resort to other sources was sufficient for the Court to conclude that the agency's interpretation was reasonable, the Court also noted that its conclusion was supported by the broad interpretation other states had given their similar anti-discrimination laws.(fn29) For all these reasons, the Court had no hesitancy in deferring to the CHRO's interpretation. thus placing its imprimatur on the duty reasonably to accommodate.(fn30)
The Court then turned to the question of whether the trial court properly entered summary judgment for the employer on the employee's reasonable accommodation claim. It began by describing how the familiar burden-shifting analysis in disability discrimination cases operates in the summary judgment context, saying that, to survive summary judgment in these cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
(1) he is disabled within the meaning of the [statute], (2) he was able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation, and (3) [the defendant], despite knowing of [the plaintiff's] disability, did not reasonably accommodate it.(fn31)
If the employee makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the employer to show that an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on its business.(fn32)
Importantly, the Court also held that under state law, as is the case under federal law, employers faced with a request for accommodations must
engage [with the employee] in an 'informal, interactive process^ [to] identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.' 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).(fn33)
As the Court put it, the employer must make a "good faith effort to participate in that discussion."(fn34)
Applying these various principles, the Court concluded that there was no dispute that the employee was disabled and that the employer was aware of his disability.(fn35) Indeed, the Court observed the employer had in fact accommodated the plaintiff's disability for many months.(fn36) The Court did not regard this as sufficient, however.
This temporary accommodation [did] not circumvents the requirement to make a good faith effort to engage in an...
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