Appellate Decisions
| Jurisdiction | Kansas,United States,Federal |
| Citation | Vol. 81 No. 10 Pg. 38 |
| Pages | 38 |
| Publication year | 2012 |
November 2012
Supreme Court
Attorney Discipline
ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT
IN RE CHAUNCEY M. DEPEW
NO. 103,061 — AUGUST 27, 2012
FACTS: On August 6, 2010, this court suspended the respondent, Chauncey M. Depew, from the practice of law in Kansas for a period of one year. See In re Depew, 290 Kan. 1057, 237 P.3d 24 (2010). Before reinstatement, the respondent was required to pay the costs of the disciplinary action, comply with Supreme Court Rule 218 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot 379), and comply with Supreme Court Rule 219 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 380). On October 21, 2011, the respondent filed a petition with this court for reinstatement to the practice of law in Kansas.
DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATOR: On June 28, 2012, a hearing was held before a hearing panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys to consider the respondent's request for reinstatement. On August 16, 2012, the panel filed its report setting out the circumstances leading to respondent's suspension, a summary of the evidence presented, and its findings and recommendations. The panel unanimously recommended that respondent's petition for reinstatement to the practice of law in Kansas be granted.
HELD: Court, after carefully considering the record, accepted the findings and recommendations of the panel that the petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law in Kansas. Court ordered that the respondent be reinstated to the practice of law in the state of Kansas conditioned upon his compliance with the annual continuing legal education requirements and upon his payment of all fees required by the clerk of the appellate courts and the Kansas Continuing Legal Education Commission.
ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT
IN RE DANIEL HEATH LAMPSON
NO. 96,884 — AUGUST 27, 2012
FACTS: On December 8, 2006, this court suspended the respondent, Daniel Heath Lampson, from the practice of law in Kansas for an indefinite period of time. See In re Lampson, 282 Kan. 700, 147 P.3d 143 (2006). Before reinstatement, the respondent was required to pay the costs of the disciplinary action, comply with Supreme Court Rule 218 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 379), and comply with Supreme Court Rule 219 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 380). On February 1, 2012, the respondent filed a petition with this court for reinstatement to the practice of law in Kansas.
DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATOR: On July 12, 2012, a hearing was held before a hearing panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys to consider the respondent's request for reinstatement. On August 7, 2012, the panel filed its report setting out the circumstances leading to respondent's suspension, a summary of the evidence presented, and its findings and recommendations. The panel unanimously recommended that respondent's petition for reinstatement to the practice of law in Kansas be granted.
HELD: Court, after carefully considering the record, accepted the findings and recommendations of the panel that the respondent be reinstated to the practice of law in Kansas. Court ordered that the respondent be reinstated to the practice of law in the state of Kansas conditioned upon his compliance with the annual continuing legal education requirements and upon his payment of all fees required by the clerk of the appellate courts and the Kansas Continuing Legal Education Commission.
ORDER OF REINSTATMENT
IN RE JOSEPH M. LASKOWSKI
NO. 96,886 — OCTOBER 16, 2012
FACTS: On December 8, 2006, this court suspended the respondent, Joseph M. Laskowski, from the practice of law in Kansas for an indefinite period of time. See In re Laskowski, 282 Kan. 710, 147 P. 135 (2006). On August 9, 2011, the respondent filed a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law in Kansas.
DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATOR: The petition was referred to the disciplinary administrator for consideration by the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 219. The disciplinary administrator affirmed that the respondent met all requirements set forth by the court.
HELD: After carefully considering the record, Court accepted the findings and recommendations that the respondent be reinstated to the practice of law in Kansas. Court ordered that the respondent be reinstated to the practice of law in the state of Kansas conditioned upon his compliance with the annual continuing legal education requirements and upon his payment of all fees required by the clerk of the appellate courts and the Kansas Continuing Legal Education Commission.
ORDER OF DISBARMENT
IN RE THOMAS L. THURSTON
NO. 10,980 — SEPTEMBER 28, 2012
FACTS: In a letter received by the clerk of the appellate courts dated September 19, 2012, Thomas L. Thurston, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in the state of Kansas, voluntarily surrendered his license to practice law in Kansas, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 217 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 371). At the time Thurston surrendered his license, a panel hearing was pending in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 211 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 334). The complaint alleged that respondent violated Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(b) (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 618) and Supreme Court Rule 203(c)(1) (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 280) after he was convicted of one count of sexual exploitation of a child and failed to report his arrest and conviction to the disciplinary administrator.
HELD: Court examined the files of the office of the disciplinary administrator and found the surrender of Thurston's license should be accepted and that he should be disbarred. Thurston is disbarred from the practice of law in Kansas, and his license and privilege to practice law are hereby revoked.
Civil
ABNORNALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY, ABSOLUTE LIABILITY, STRICT LIABILITY, AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
EASTMAN ET AL. V. COFFEYVILLE RESOURCES REFINING & MARKETING LLC
CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NO. 105,805 — SEPTEMBER 7, 2012
FACTS: In 2007, Coffeyville Resources Refining and Marketing LLC (Coffeyville Resources) accidentally released about 90,000 gallons of crude oil into floodwaters of the Verdigris River in Coffeyville. In 2010, Benjamin and Marcita Eastman, as trustees of the Eastman Family 1999 Revocable Trust (the Eastmans), filed an action in federal court alleging the oil spill damaged their pecan grove. Eastman v. Coffeyville Res. Ref. &Mktg. LLC, No. 6:10-CV-01216-MLB (D. Kan. petition filed June 30, 2010). The Eastmans initially asserted a continuing nuisance claim but later asserted a statutory right to recover damages under K.S.A. 65-6203 which requires "any person responsible for an accidental release or discharge of materials detrimental to the quality of the waters or soil of the state" to "[c] ompensate the owner of the property where the release or discharge occurred for actual damages incurred as the result of the release or discharge." In the federal action, Coffeyville Resources admitted potential liability under K.S.A. 65-6203 but argued the Eastmans' claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). But the Eastmans contended they timely filed their action under the three-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-512(2) which applies to "[a]n action upon a liability created by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture." Specifically, the Eastmans argued K.S.A. 65-6203 creates an "absolute" liability different in kind from the strict liability doctrine applied under Kansas common law and therefore the three-year limitation period applies. The Hon. Monti L. Belot, U.S. District Court judge, District of Kansas, certified six questions to the Court under the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, K.S.A. 60-3201 et seq. Four of those questions related to the Eastmans' continuing nuisance claim, but the Eastmans have abandoned that claim and now are pursuing only a claim under K.S.A. 65-6203.
ISSUES: Whether K.S.A. 65-6203 creates absolute liability? Which statute of limitations, if any, applies to K.S.A. 65-6203?
HELD: First, Court held K.S.A. 65-6203 imposes liability for an accidental release or discharge of materials detrimental to the quality of the waters or soil of the state that differs from our Kansas common-law strict liability standard. While both the common-law standard and the statute provide for liability absent any showing of intent, negligence, or misconduct on the part of the responsible party, only the statute provides for liability absent any showing that the responsible party was engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity. Second, regarding the statute of limitations, Court held that because the elements necessary to establish liability imposed under K.S.A. 65-6203 are not identical to the elements necessary to impose liability under the common-law doctrine of strict liability, it concluded that K.S.A. 65-6203(a) imposes a new, substantive right not recognized at common law. Thus, the three-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-512(2) applies to actions brought under K.S.A. 65-6203.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 60-512, -513, -3201; and K.S.A. 65-6203
CLASS ACTION, STRICT LIABILITY, OIL AND GAS, AND ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES
CITY OF NEODESHA V. BP CORPORATION NORTH AMERICA INC. ET AL.
WILSON DISTRICT COURT — REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
NO. 101,183 — AUGUST 31, 2012
FACTS: All persons and entities owning real property in and around the city of Neodesha brought a class action against BP Corporation of North America and other owners of a former oil refinery, alleging groundwater and subsurface soil contamination caused by the now dismantled facility. A jury found in the defendants' favor after a 17-week trial. But in post-trial proceedings, the district court decided it had made a mistake in...
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