Appellate Decisions
| Publication year | 2012 |
| Pages | 30 |
| Citation | Vol. 81 No. 6 Pg. 30 |
Supreme Court
Civil
CONTRACTS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
AEROFLEX WICHITA INC. V. FILARDO ET AL.
SEDGWICK DISTRICT COURT — REVERSED AND REMANDED
NO. 103,672 — APRIL 27, 2012
FACTS: This lawsuit arose out of a multimillion-dollar contract awarded in 2009 to Tel-Instrument Electronics Corp. (TIC) by the U.S. Army. The contract related to a high-technology radar-transponder test system. Both TIC and Aeroflex participated in a competitive bid contest that led to the 2009 contract to upgrade the system that had been originally manufactured for the Army by Aeroflex. After six months of review and negotiation, the Army awarded the contract to TIC. Aeroflex filed a protest of the contract award, alleging in part that TIC had stolen its trade secrets. The protest led to an investigation and report by the Army to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) rejecting Aeroflex's claim and later this lawsuit. In asserting a basis for a Kansas court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants, the verified petition alleged Filardo, a TIC employee and prior employee of Aeroflex is, and at all times material to the lawsuit has been, a Kansas resident. Aeroflex acknowledged that Allen, another prior Aeroflex employee, had been an Arizona resident since 2003, but it alleged his many contacts with Kansas through his employment with Aeroflex were sufficient for the court to have personal jurisdiction over him. After being served with the petition, TIC specially appeared and challenged personal jurisdiction by filing under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(b)(2) the motion to dismiss that is the subject of this appeal. In granting the motion to dismiss, the district court drew the legal conclusion that Aeroflex failed to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over TIC. Although the district court granted TIC's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Filardo and Allen remain as defendants. Filardo, a Kansas resident, did not raise a challenge to personal jurisdiction. And although Allen, an Arizona resident, did challenge personal jurisdiction, the district court found personal jurisdiction existed because Allen was sued for actions arising under an employment contract entered into with a Kansas resident (Aeroflex) and at least partially performed in Kansas.
ISSUES: (1) Contracts and (2) personal jurisdiction
HELD: Court stated that even though there was discovery, when a defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is decided before trial on the basis of the pleadings, affidavits, and other written materials and without an evidentiary hearing, any factual disputes must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor and the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Court also stated that if TIC presented evidence refuting a point necessary to a finding of jurisdiction, Aeroflex had to respond with some evidence but needed to only make a prima facie showing. Court held that when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Aeroflex, Aeroflex presented a prima facie case of jurisdiction by providing evidence from which it can be inferred that TIC, through its alleged coconspirator Filardo, acted in Kansas to misappropriate Aeroflex's trade secrets. As a result, there was a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over TIC pursuant to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-308(b)(1)(B). The Court next addressed the due process concerns of extending personal jurisdiction based on minimum contacts. Court held that if Aeroflex's allegations are true, TIC sought out Aeroflex's employees to interfere with TIC's Kansas competition knowing one of them, Filardo, was a Kansas resident and remained a Kansas resident. It was foreseeable that this alleged purposeful contact by TIC with a Kansas resident and the alleged agreement to use Aeroflex's trade secrets would cause harm to Aeroflex in Kansas and give rise to TIC being forced to defend itself in a Kansas forum. Under these circumstances, TIC purposefully established minimum contacts with Kansas and invoked the benefits and protections of Kansas law. Court also held extending jurisdiction in this case did not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 20-3018; K.S.A. 53-601; and K.S.A. 60212, -230, -243, -308
EMINENT DOMAIN AND APPEAL
WOODS V. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF WYCO/KCK
WYANDOTTE DISTRICT COURT—APPEAL DISMISSED
NO. 104,435 — APRIL 27, 2012
FACTS: In 2009, Unified Government commenced a proceeding to condemn certain real estate, including a tract owned by Woods. On December 21, 2009, Unified Government paid the awards for all of the condemned real estate, and Woods acknowledges that on the following day, December 22, he received notice from Unified Government that his award had been paid into the district court. Woods did not file his notice of appeal of the appraisers' award on his condemned real estate until January 19, 2010. Unified Government responded with a motion to dismiss Woods' appeal as untimely. The district court dismissed Woods' appeal, finding that it was barred because it was filed 48 days after the filing of the appraisers' report. Woods contends that Unified Government failed to comply with the notice requirements applicable to eminent domain proceedings and, therefore, the district court should have extended the 30-day statutory deadline for appealing the appraisers' award.
ISSUES: (1) Eminent domain and (2) appeal
HELD: Court held that given that an appeal to the district court from an appraisers' award in an eminent domain action is nevertheless an appellate proceeding, the district court, like the U.S. Supreme Court and Kansas Supreme Court, had no authority to create any equitable exception to the jurisdictional requirement that the notice of appeal be filed within 30 days of the appraisers' report. Court stated that in other words, the district court had no other choice but to dismiss the untimely-filed appeal. Likewise, Court held it had no choice but to dismiss this appeal because it was powerless to review an issue over which the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 26-501, -505, -508, -516; and K.S.A. 60206, -260
INJUNCTION, SMOKING BAN, AND EFFECTIVE DATE
DOWNTOWN BAR AND GRILL LLC V. STATE OF KANSAS
SHAWNEE DISTRICT COURT — REVERSED AND REMANDED
NO. 104,761 — APRIL 6, 2012
FACTS: Downtown Bar is a Class B club in Tonganoxie that acquired its Class B club license on May 4, 2009. Previously it operated as simply a drinking establishment, but as a Class B club it can serve food, drink, and entertainment. Approximately one year after Downtown Bar acquired its Class B license, the 2010 legislature enacted the Kansas Indoor Clean Air Act generally prohibiting smoking in public places and places of employment. But the Act exempts Class B clubs as long as the club (1) was so licensed as of January 1, 2009, and (2) notifies the secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment in writing, not later than 90 days after July 1, 2010, that it wishes to continue to allow smoking on its premises. Because Downtown Bar was licensed simply as a drinking establishment on January 1, 2009 — and not as a Class B club — it is ineligible for a smoking ban exemption under the Act. The 2010 session was not the legislature's first effort to pass House Bill 2221 for enacting a statewide smoking ban. One year earlier, the 2009 legislature failed to pass this legislation, which included the January 1, 2009, "cut-off" or grandfathering date. Downtown Bar brought a declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to declare that K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 21-4010(d)(8) and (9) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and § 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and to accordingly issue temporary and permanent injunctive relief. It argued the statute differentiates — without a "rational basis connected to its legislative purpose" — between Class B clubs organized before January 2, 2009, and Class B clubs like itself that organized after January 1, 2009. The trial court agreed, holding that the cut-off date was arbitrary, which therefore meant it could not be rational. It issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the state's enforcement of the statute.
ISSUES: (1) Injunction, (2) smoking ban, and (3) effective date
HELD: Court held that Class B clubs formed before and after the effective date of the statute were similarly situated. However, the Indoor Clean Act did not implicate a fundamental right and the proper test was a rational basis test. Court held the distinction of clubs before and after the effective date had a rational relationship to the statewide smoking ban. Court stated that if the 2009 legislature conceivably chose the January 1, 2009, date as a cut-off — which would eliminate any incentive to rush to Class B club status during the pendency of the 2009 legislation — then it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that the 2010 legislature could not conceivably have retained that same cut-off date for the same reason during its own session. Court held the trial court erred in holding that Downtown Bar established a substantial likelihood that it would eventually succeed on the merits of its equal protection claim.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 20-3018; K.S.A. 21-4009, -4010; and K.S.A. 41-2601, -2606
KANSAS UNDERGROUND UTILITY DAMAGE PREVENTION ACT, SEPARATION OF POWERS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND TAKINGS CLAUSE
KANSAS ONE-CALL SYSTEM INC. V. STATE OF KANSAS
SHAWNEE DISTRICT COURT – AFFIRMED
NO. 104,498 — APRIL 12, 2012
FACTS: One-Call began as a voluntary association of utility companies in 1983. Now, it is a nonprofit corporation that comprises the majority of utility companies in...
To continue reading
Request your trial