8.13 - D. Hearing On Motion To Suppress Defendant's Statement

• Jurisdiction: New York

D. Hearing on Motion to Suppress
Defendant’s Statement¹⁵²⁸

The issue to be determined in a Huntley¹⁵²⁹ hearing is whether a statement made by the defendant can be utilized by the prosecutor on the People’s direct case and/or on cross-examination of the defendant at trial. Neither a record of the defendant’s statement¹⁵³⁰ nor testimony by one who heard it can be introduced against the defendant at trial if the statement was involuntarily made.¹⁵³¹

A statement is involuntarily made when it is the product of classical coercion (i.e., use or threatened use of physical force) or of any impairment of the defendant’s condition that undermines his ability to choose whether to make a statement.¹⁵³² A statement to law enforcement is involuntarily made when it is obtained by means that create a substantial risk of false self-incrimination or that violate the federal or state constitution.¹⁵³³ Relevant federal and state constitutional rights include the right to remain silent,¹⁵³⁴ the right to counsel¹⁵³⁵ and the right to have the statement suppressed if it is a fruit of the poisonous tree (e.g., the product of an illegal arrest).¹⁵³⁶ Additionally, statements taken from juvenile defendants may be suppressed for failure to comply with the requirements of the Family Court Act,¹⁵³⁷ unless failure to comply is due to the juvenile’s own false representation that he is an adult.¹⁵³⁸ Moreover, where a defendant makes statements to law enforcement officers about two different crimes that will be tried separately, it may well be necessary to conduct two Huntley hearings. Collateral estoppel would obviate the need for a second hearing only if all the suppression issues were identical.¹⁵³⁹

Special problems arise when a defendant gives more than one statement to law enforcement, and at least one of the statements is suppressible. Does the taint of one affect the admissibility of the other(s)? Different courts have answered this question differently. The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that when a defendant gives a non-Mirandized (and therefore suppressible) statement, followed by one made after Miranda warnings, the taint is dissipated, rendering the subsequent statement admissible at trial.¹⁵⁴⁰ However, the New York Court of Appeals determined that the New York State Constitution provides greater protection.¹⁵⁴¹ It adhered to a standard articulated in an earlier case, which held that when a non-Mirandized statement gives rise to a subsequent Mirandized statement in a “single continuous chain of events,” the warned statement also must be suppressed.¹⁵⁴² Conversely, if there is a sufficiently “definite, pronounced break in the interrogation” to attenuate the taint from the Miranda violation, the post-Mirandized statement is admissible.¹⁵⁴³ In 2005 the Court used this test in determining that although a defendant’s second (non-Mirandized) statement should have been suppressed, his third and fourth (Mirandized) statements were properly admitted into evidence.¹⁵⁴⁴ Whether there is a “sufficient, pronounced break” is not on its own dispositive, nor are Miranda warnings before or after a “pronounced break” unto themselves, or in combination with a “sufficient pronounced break,” dispositive. The law looks to reality, pre- or post-Miranda prophylactic formulas.¹⁵⁴⁵ Warnings that vitiate or neutralize the effect thereof, pre- or post-warnings, render them inadequate and ineffective.¹⁵⁴⁶

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Notes:

^[1528] . CPL § 710.20(3).

^[1529] . People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965).

^[1530] . A record of a statement includes written, videotaped and audiotaped statements.

^[1531] . CPL §§ 60.45(1), 710.20(3).

^[1532] . People v. Knapp, 124 A.D.3d 36, 995...