Attorneys Fees in Civil Rights Cases
| Jurisdiction | United States,Federal |
| Citation | Vol. 74 No. 10 Pg. 42-53 |
| Pages | 42-53 |
| Publication year | 2005 |
74 J. Kan. Bar Assn. 10, 42-53 (2005). Attorneys Fees in Civil Rights Cases
74 J. Kan. Bar Assn. 10, 42-53 (2005)
Introduction
Attorneys fees provisions are among the most potent means of enforcing the civil rights statutes.(fn1) Congress passed an amendment(fn2) in 1976 to authorize federal and state courts to award attorneys fees to "prevailing parties" in civil rights cases. The amendment, which came in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the Alyeska(fn3) pipeline case, was intended "to encourage the private enforcement of civil rights laws in order to fully vindicate the federal rights involved." Defendants must now shoulder both their own attorneys fees as well as the plaintiff's attorneys fees if the plaintiff prevails.
In the ensuing three decades since the amendment of § 1988, the Court and lower federal courts have addressed and clarified numerous issues surrounding attorneys fees. This article explains the major doctrinal pronouncements governing attorney fee awards. The first part of the article covers entitlement issues, which address the standards for deciding who is a prevailing party, and a variety of related topics. The second part addresses computation issues, which deal with the determination of a fee award after an entitlement has been found.
Entitlement Issues
Prevailing party status
Whether a plaintiff or a defendant, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authorizes an award of attorneys fees to a "prevailing party."(fn4) However, different standards cover prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants. A plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees if he prevails on any significant issue in litigation that achieves some of the benefit the party sought in bringing suit.(fn5) A prevailing defendant, on the other hand, cannot seek attorneys fees unless a court finds that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.(fn6)
The Supreme Court has identified three reasons for distinguishing between defendants and plaintiffs. First, the differing treatment reflects the need to facilitate the enforcement of the civil rights laws through "private attorneys general." Second, the differing treatment avoids the risk of creating a disincentive for plaintiffs to bring civil rights suits if prevailing defendants could obtain their attorneys fees as a matter of course. Third, the Court observed that "when a district court awards counsel fees to a prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against a violator of federal law."(fn7) That situation is not present when fees are awarded to a prevailing defendant.(fn8)
A series of U.S. Supreme Court cases delineate the parameters of prevailing party status. In Hewitt v. Helms,(fn9) a prison inmate challenged, on substantive due process grounds, a prison disciplinary proceeding that resulted in his confinement for six months. The plaintiff was released from prison prior to the Court's ruling, thus rendering his claims for prospective relief moot. As for the claims for damages, the district court determined that although the plaintiff's due process rights were violated, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the constitutional right in question was not "clearly established." The plaintiff then sought attorneys fees.
The Court held the plaintiff did not fit within the definition of prevailing party.(fn10) The Court reasoned:
Respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail. Helms obtained no relief. Because of the defendant's official immunity he received no damages award. No injunction or declaratory judgment was entered in his favor. Nor did Helms obtain relief without benefit of a formal judgment - for example, through a consent decree or settlement. The most that he obtained was an interlocutory ruling that his complaint should have been dismissed for failure to state a constitutional claim. That is not the stuff of which legal victories are made.(fn11)
The Court emphasized that a plaintiff must prove "the settling of some dispute, which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff."(fn12) "A favorable judicial statement of law in the course of litigation that results in judgment against the plaintiff does not suffice to render him a prevailing party."(fn13)
The mere entry of a judgment does not, standing alone, confer prevailing party status on a plaintiff. In Rhodes v. Stewart,(fn14) two prisoners sought and obtained a declaratory judgment that prison officials violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing them permission to subscribe to a magazine. Prior to entry of the declaratory judgment, one of the plaintiffs died and the other was paroled. After entry of the judgment, the district court ordered the defendants to pay plaintiffs' attorney fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the fee award.(fn15) The Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Relying on its prior holding in Hewitt, the Court noted that even though plaintiffs had obtained a declaratory judgment, that judgment did not and could not affect the behavior of the defendants toward the plaintiffs.(fn16) The lawsuit was not a class action and could not benefit either plaintiff, one of whom was dead and the other released before the district court's order. The plaintiff was therefore not entitled to attorneys fees.(fn17) Rhodes, thus, teaches that a plaintiff must obtain a judgment that actually benefits him to claim prevailing party status.
In Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland School District,(fn18) the Court addressed whether the significance of the issue upon which the plaintiff prevails determines prevailing party status. In Texas State Teachers Association, the plaintiff challenged administrative regulations that prohibited (1) visits to campuses by outside representatives of teacher organizations during regular school hours; (2) the use by such organizations of schools' internal communications systems; (3) private conversations between teachers regarding such organizations; and (4) teacher use of a school's internal mail system and bulletin boards for this subject.
The Fifth Circuit ultimately upheld the first two regulations, but declared invalid the latter two.(fn19) The court then found the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties.(fn20) While recognizing that the plaintiff had achieved "partial success," the court reasoned that the main thrust of the plaintiffs' lawsuit was to gain access to school campuses during school hours by union representatives.(fn21) Because the plaintiffs did not prevail on this "central issue," they were precluded from recovering attorneys fees. The Court, noting a serious split in the federal appellate courts on this issue, granted certiorari and reversed the Fifth Circuit.
The Court squarely rejected the "central issue" test applied by the Fifth Circuit.(fn22) First, the Court found Congress clearly contemplated that interim fee awards would be available "where a party has prevailed on an important matter in the course of litigation, even when he ultimately does not prevail on all issues."(fn23) The Court noted the incongruence of the "central issue" test in light of the clear congressional intent that interim fee awards be available to partially prevailing civil rights plaintiffs.(fn24)
Second, the Court found the "central issue" test was virtually impossible to administer judicially.(fn25) The Court expressed doubts about courts deciding the primary relief sought in a lawsuit. Such a question was, in the Court's view, wholly irrelevant to the purposes behind the fee-shifting provisions and likely to mire district courts in "excruciating" fee disputes. In summary, the Court emphasized "the touchstone of the prevailing party's inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties ... Where such a change has occurred, the degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the reasonableness of the award under Hensley, not to the availability of a fee award."(fn26)
The demise of the catalyst theory
Prior to 2001 numerous circuits(fn27) had adopted the catalyst theory, whereby a plaintiff was deemed a "prevailing party" if the lawsuit in fact brought about a benefit, which had some basis in law. The Court sounded a death knell for the catalyst theory in Buckhannon v. West Virginia D.H.H.R.(fn28) After Buckhannon, a plaintiff is only a prevailing party if he or she obtains an enforceable judgment or a court ordered consent decree.
Buckhannon involved a group of nursing homes that failed inspections by the state fire marshal because some of the residents were incapable of "self preservation," as defined by West Virginia law.(fn29) After receiving orders requiring the closure of their facilities, the plaintiffs filed suit in federal court in October 1997 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the "self- preservation" requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988(fn30) (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).(fn31) The defendants agreed to stay enforcement of the closure orders pending resolution of the case.
In 1998 the West Virginia Legislature enacted two bills eliminating the "self preservation" requirement.(fn32) The state then moved to dismiss the case as moot. The district court granted the motion, finding that the 1998 legislation eliminated the allegedly offensive provision. The plaintiff then sought attorneys fees under the catalyst theory. Relying on Fourth Circuit precedent,(fn33) the district court denied the motion. Recognizing the conflict among the circuits on this issue, the Court granted certiorari and affirmed the denial of fees.(fn34)
The Court emphasized that its...
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