The Court Martial of Roger Enos
| Publication year | 2021 |
| Pages | 428 |
73 CBJ 428. THE COURT MARTIAL OF ROGER ENOS
Benedict Arnold's march through the wilderness of northern Maine to Quebec in 1775 has long fascinated Americans. Immortalized in Kenneth Roberts's Arundel, it remains one of our national epics. One of the disturbing incidents of that adventure took place just when the small army was about to plunge into the most arduous and most dangerous phase of its journey. One of Arnold's four unit commanders turned back with over a quarter of the entire force and a greater share of its supplies. This was a man in whom Arnold had placed special trust, for his was the rear unit, responsible for safeguarding supplies for the entire army. In Cambridge, Massachusetts, whence they had departed 44 days earlier, George Washington, on receiving the news, called it the "great defection" and began to consider the steps necessary to convene the court martial of Roger Enos.
I."... A TENDENCY TO PROMOTE THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THESE COLONIES."
The echos of musketry at Lexington and Concord in April of 1775 had hardly faded when American thoughts turned to an invasion of Canada. This remote, vast wilderness to the north had long been the safe haven for the marauding French and their Indian allies. It had passed to British hands by the Treaty of Paris in 1763, following General James Wolfe's dramatic capture of Quebec four years earlier.
Canada presented two faces to the Americans. One of these was that of grave threat, the other of enormous opportunity. The threat, of course, was military. Those with only a modest strategic sense could readily see that Canada was the potential staging area for an attack against the Colonies. The avenue of that attack was equally obvious. Waterways were the interstate highways of the eighteenth century. They were the routes of exploration, of commerce, of settlement and of armies on the move. Lake Champlain, "pointed like a long, vengeful sword at the heart of the renegade American colonies," (fn1) was a proven highway of war. Indeed, many men who would later become officers and soldiers under George Washington had first cut their military teeth campaigning in the Lake Champlain region during the French and Indian wars. Many felt that they might have to do so again.
The sense of opportunity was borne of political enthusiasm and not a little naivete. Perhaps also of faulty intelligence work. On the surface, American colonists and their counterparts in Canada seemed to share a common bond: they were both subject to the heavy hand of the British Crown. What was proving intolerable for the Americans surely must also be so for the Canadians. The British-Canadian mercantile class was subject to the same economic imperialism that stifled American enterprise. Moreover, French-Canadians, vastly superior in numbers in that country, had been forcibly conquered by the British only a few short years before, and they of all people should look forward to and seek to share in the success of the American cause.
Even before the organization of American military resistance, a broad range of informal contacts was extended to Canada to test opinion there and invite cooperative effort. It was easy enough to do. Merchants like Benedict Arnold of New Haven, Connecticut, regularly called at Quebec seeking - in his case - horses for the West Indian trade.(fn2) He became acquainted with many prominent merchants in that city and kept up a lively correspondence, seeking and receiving intelligence.(fn3) Many others did likewise. There were more formal efforts as well. In 1774, for instance, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress directed the Boston Committee of Safety, the patriot political arm in Boston, to send an envoy to Canada to gauge opinion. In return, Samuel Adams invited Canadians to send delegates to the Continental Congress. In the fall of 1774, Quebec merchants sent a relief shipment of 1,000 bushels of wheat to beleaguered Boston, and citizens of Montreal made a cash contribution. (fn4) These and other signs were taken - too readily - to signify that the Canadians were indeed receptive to the American purpose, and would, if properly approached, join in resistance to the British.
Thus on May 9, 1775, only 20 days after the opening engagements at Lexington and Concord, and more than a full year before the Declaration of Independence, Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain and its tiny garrison surrendered to Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold. Taken from the French, who called it Fort Carrillon, by General Jeffrey Amherst in 1759 the fort is strategically located at the upper (south) end of Lake Champlain.(fn5) It was sited by the French as protection against the British, and as a stop against hostile movement down the lake (north) towards Canada. However, it could be made to serve its purpose in either direction. In British hands, vis A vis the Americans, it provided a base and stronghold for an invading army 90 miles inside the heartland of the northeast colonies, a menace that could not be permitted. Besides, it was known to have had a substantial cache of artillery, badly needed by the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, General George Washington, for his forthcoming siege of Boston.
But taking Ticonderoga was only a step on the road to the heart of Canada. The entire country was known to be lightly garrisoned.(fn6) Holding the line at the southern end of Lake Champlain would be one way of containing the threat from the north. Taking the two major Canadian cities, Montreal and Quebec, tantamount to conquering the entire country, was quite another. If they could be held, it would eliminate the threat altogether, and if the Canadians really were willing to join the uprising, the dream of the fourteenth colony might be realized. Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen had both urged a full scale invasion down the lake (north) to Montreal and beyond, following the fall of Ticonderoga. Arnold estimated that 1,700 men in the assault force would be sufficient, with another 300 to secure the supply line. Not uncharacteristically, he proposed himself as commander.(fn7) Colonel Jonathan Brewer of the Massachusetts militia even volunteered to lead 500 men overland through Maine to attack Quebec, an idea that would quickly take root in Washington's mind.(fn8)
In June of 1775, the Continental Congress was ready to act. The authority given to Major General Phillip Schuyler, Commander of the Northern Army, was simply extraordinary, as the Congress resolved:
That if General Schuyler finds it practicable, and that it will not be disagreeable to the Canadians, he do immediately take possession of St. Johns, Montreal, and any other parts of the country, and pursue any other measures in Canada, which may have a tendency to promote the peace and security of these Colonies.(fn9)
Schuyler, a New York patrician, distrusted by New Englanders, was afflicted with asthma and was not physically up to campaigning. His skills, while formidable, lay in matters of administration and logistical support. He proceeded quickly with all the details necessary to gather, equip and provision an army in the early summer of 1775.(fn10) The field command devolved upon his second in command, a young relative by marriage, Brigadier General Richard Montgomery, late captain in His Majesty's 27th Regiment of Foot. By August 28, 1775, Montgomery lay off Ticonderoga with 1,200 troops, their weapons and supplies, bound for Montreal.(fn11)
By this time, Washington was deep in the planning of a second prong of the attack. His mind was fixed on an overland thrust through Maine to Quebec. It is possible that he had heard of Colonel Brewer's proposal. He clearly had access to Captain John Montresor's map and his journal.(fn12) Based on his travels in 1760 and 1761, Montresor - to become Chief Engineer of the British Army - had prepared a map showing detailed observations of, in what is now Maine, the Great Carrying Place from the Kennebec River to the Dead River, the height of land, and, on the Canadian side of the border, the Lake Megantic-Chaudire River watershed nor the to the St. Lawrence River. The map omitted the confusing nature of river mouths between the height of land and Lake Megantic, as well as certain important lakes in the precise area where it would turn out accuracy was most needed. His journal (kept while he was coming downstream in the summer, in a canoe) made the route seem relatively easy. Notwithstanding, his commanding officer thought the route unsuitable fortroops.(fn13) These discrepancies were either unknown to Washington, or overlooked, and far too much reliance was given Montresor's map and journal. On August 20, however, Washington's mind was made up. He wrote Schuyler of his plans:
The Design of this Express is to communicate to you a Plan of an Expedition which has engaged my thoughts for some Days. It is to penetrate into Canada by way of Kennebec River and so to Quebec. I can very well spare a Detachment for this Purpose of one Thousand or twelve Hundred men, and the Land Carriage of the rout proposed is too inconsiderable to make an objection.(fn14)
The last phrase above shows how little of the true nature of the terrain was understood. Inaccurate too was Washington's concept of the total distance involved: he put it as 210 miles "in a straight line."(fn15) That was close, but not wholly relevant: the actual route on the ground, following the various river courses, is over 300 miles.(fn16) Crucial decisions, those to strike out late in the season, and the estimates of necessary supplies, were thus flawed at the outset. There was nothing wrong with the strategy. The Provincial Governor, General Guy Carleton, had only two regiments of regulars in all of the province, about 600 men.(fn17) Most of these...
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