Labor Relations and Employment Law: Developments in Connecticut in 1995
| Pages | 85 |
| Publication year | 2021 |
70 CBJ 85. Labor Relations and Employment Law: Developments in Connecticut in 1995
Last year represented a significant year in Connecticut labor and employment law, both judicially and legislatively. While the Connecticut Supreme Court continued the judicial erosion of the "at-A411" employment doctrine in Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., (fn1) a certain benefit to plaintiffs' counsel and their clients, the Court also limited the damages available to claimants in employment discrimination claims before the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in Bridgeport Hospital v. CCHR0 (fn2) and Fenn Manufacturing Co. v. CCHR0. (fn3)
The sweeping legislative changes to Connecticut's unemployment compensation statutes and the Second Injury Fund highlighted the 1995 General Assembly's participation in the labor and employment law areas. This article will briefly examine these issues as well as some of the other noteworthy 1995 labor and employment law decisions of the Connecticut Supreme Court, Appellate Court and the State Board of Labor Relations. Also discussed is an important decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Tomka v. Seiler Corp., (fn4) involving the individual liability of supervisors in employment discrimination cases.
One of the most important employment law decisions in the state last year was Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals Inc. (fn5). Connecticut courts have long recognized that
employee handbooks and manuals can establish the basis for an implied employment contract, thereby modifying the common law doctrine of employment at-will. In Torosyan, Connecticut's highest court strongly reaffirmed that principle by stating that all employment relationships involve some type of "implied contract" of employment. In addition, the Court made significant determinations regarding the use of intracorporate communications as a basis for defamation claims. Although the full significance of the high court's ruling on "at-,A411" employee relationships remains to be seen, the Torosyan decision provides plaintiffs' attorneys with a powerful weapon upon which to rely in establishing causes of action for employees and for averting summary judgment motions.
The plaintiff in Torosyan was a chemist from California. In 1982, the defendant employer invited the plaintiff to interview at its plant in Connecticut. In response to the plaintiffs concerns about job security and relocation during these interviews, defendant's executives told the plaintiff that the company would take care of him and that he should look to the employee manual to see if it provided the guarantees that he sought. Subsequently, after extending a verbal offer of employment, the defendant sent the plaintiff a written employment offer outlining his job benefits. The letter did not state that cause was required for termination. After accepting the job, the plaintiff was given the defendant's employee manual, which contained a just cause discharge provision. The manual further stated that the defendant had an open door policy which allowed employees to bring problems to senior management if the problems could not be resolved at lower levels.
Two years later, the defendant updated its employee manual. The new version stated that it was "distributed for general informational purposes only and, as such, is subject to change without notice." (fn6) In addition, the new manual eliminated the word "cause" relating to discharge. The open door policy was the same in the new manual as in the old manual.
The plaintiff worked for the defendant for several years and received favorable performance reviews. However, in 1984, the plaintiff began to object to the defendant's policies, including various safety procedures. In the spring of 1985, the parties had
a serious dispute over the manner in which the plaintiff handled his expense account from a business trip, ultimately resulting in his termination. The plaintiff was not permitted to meet with senior management prior to his termination.
The plaintiff thereafter brought a lawsuit alleging that the defendant had terminated his employment in violation of an express contract, an implied contract, and public policy, and also alleged a defamation claim. After a bench trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his defamation and breach of implied contract claims. The plaintiff was awarded almost $200,000 in damages, comprised of lost wages and compensatory damages for pain, suffering, humiliation and damage to reputation. The defendant appealed, challenging, among other matters, the court's findings that there was an implied contract and that the implied contract was breached. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.
The Supreme Court began by noting that the formation of an implied contract between an employer and an employee is governed by traditional legal principles:
At the outset, we note that all employer/employee relationships not governed by express contracts involve some type of implied contract of employment. There cannot be any serious dispute that there is a bargain of some kind; otherwise, the employee would not be working. (fn7)
The Court found that the employee manual in this case was part of the parties' implied contract, regardless of the fact that the plaintiff did not receive it until after he started. The Court also refused. to overturn as clearly erroneous the trial court's finding that the oral representations made by defendant's supervisors amounted to a contractually binding promise that the plaintiff could not be discharged without cause. Finally, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the revised manual controlled the parties' contractual relationship. The Court reasoned that for the revised manual to apply, the plaintiff must have accepted its new terms, specifically stating that the plaintiffs ongoing employment did not constitute such acceptance. While the Court acknowledged that a manual providing more generous benefits could be accepted by ongoing employment, the Court refused to apply this principle to a manual which abrogated existing rights of the employee.
The second issue addressed by the Supreme Court was the trial court's finding that the defendant had improperly accused the plaintiff of falsifying documents and, therefore, the discharge did not constitute just cause. The Supreme Court's opinion on this issue is noteworthy because the Court suggested a number of arguments that could have been advanced, but were not. In particular, the Court stated that it was not addressing the following issues which, if proposed, might constitute alternative defenses: (1) whether or not the defendant's good-faith belief that the plaintiff had committed a falsification of documents when they discharged him could have constituted just cause for dismissal; (2) whether or not, even if the plaintiff did not falsify documents, the plaintiffs innocent or negligent inaccuracies on those documents could have constituted cause for dismissal; and (3) whether or not the plaintiffs insistent badgering of his superiors could have constituted cause for dismissal. Finally, the Court expressly did not decide whether it was the employer's burden to prove that there was cause for dismissal or the employee's burden to prove the absence of cause for dismissal.
In addition to its rulings on the implied contract issues, the Court made two additional findings of import. First, with respect to damages, the Court stated that a plaintiff alleging wrongful termination or breach of contract may recover for future lost wages, or "front pay," even if such wages are for a period after the conclusion of the trial. By so ruling, the Supreme Court overruled statements to the contrary made by the Appellate Court in 1994. (fn8)
Second, with regard to the plaintiffs defamation claim, the Court held that intra-corporate communications clearly constitute publication of a defamatory statement such that false statements made about an employee solely within the company, and not published elsewhere, can form the basis for a successful defamation claim. While such communications may be covered by a qualified privilege which would protect the employer from a successful defamation charge, the Court stated that they are defamatory if made with malice or a reckless disregard of the truth.
In the labor law arena, the Supreme Court last year determined the status of stipulated arbitration awards under the com
pulsory binding arbitration provisions of the Municipal Employee Relations Act (MERA). (fn9) In International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 564 v. Borough of Jewett City, (fn10) the parties had reached impasse in negotiating a successor collective bargaining agreement and, as mandated by MERA, (fn11) proceeded to binding arbitration. After several days of hearing, the parties reached an agreement on all unresolved issues, waived the binding arbitration provisions of Section 7-473c, and stipulated to a collective bargaining agreement, which they presented to the arbitration panel. The panel issued the stipulated agreement as its award.
Thereafter the unions filed applications for confirmation of the stipulated arbitration awards. A receiver appointed for the Borough was permitted to intervene. The receiver sought to have the unions' applications for confirmation dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the stipulation of the parties created a collective bargaining agreement rather than an arbitration award; a motion to confirm would therefore be inappropriate. The trial court denied the...
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