The Unity of Interest Rule and Peremptory Challenges in Connecticut
| Pages | 353 |
| Publication year | 2021 |
69 CBJ 353. The Unity of Interest Rule and Peremptory Challenges in Connecticut
Civil litigation may involve multiple plaintiffs and defendants, often tangled in complex relationships. Although each party to litigation has historically enjoyed an individual right to exercise peremptory juror challenges under Connecticut law, the Connecticut legislature acted in 1993 to restrict that right under circumstances in which multiple parties are found to have a "unity of interest." This article examines the legislative action in light of both precedent and legislative history in order to address the significance and meaning of the "unity of interest" rule.
Black's Law Dictionary defines a peremptory challenge as "[t]he right to challenge a juror without assigning a reason for the challenge." (fn1) Connecticut's first codification of the common law privilege to challenge jurors likewise provided that the privilege be exercised "peremptorily, and without alleging or showing any cause therefore." (fn2) In recent years, the previously unrestricted nature of the peremptory challenge has been eroded by constitutional limitations. (fn3) Nevertheless, the peremptory challenge remains a useful tool in the quest to ensure a fair trial to a civil litigant.
For well over a hundred years, Connecticut statutes have provided peremptory challenges to each "party." (fn4) In Mourison v. Hanson, (fn5) the Connecticut Supreme Court was required to address the meaning of the peremptory challenge statute then in place, which provided that "[I]n the trial of any civil action, each party may challenge peremptorily four jurors. . .." (fn6) The single
plaintiff, who had sued two defendants, claimed error when she was allowed only four peremptory challenges and the two defendants were allowed four challenges each, for a total of eight. The Court, while recognizing the great weight of authority throughout the country interpreting similar statutes as providing challenges to each "side" rather than to each individual "party," nevertheless rejected the plaintiff's claim, reasoning that such a rule would not comport with the purpose for which peremptory challenges were provided.
[O]ne of the principal reasons of peremptory challenge is to prevent persons serving on the jury who, for reasons not amounting to cause, some party may feel are likely to be subjected to bias or influence. Where there is more than one party, it might very well be that persons acceptable to one would be wholly unacceptable to another. Moreover, where there are more than four plaintiffs or defendants, as not rarely happens, to restrict each side to four challenges might mean that one or more would have no right to challenge at all. To protect the rights of all, each should have an equal number of challenges. It follows that where there are several plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be, each is entitled to four peremptory challenges under this statute.(fn7)
The Court has continuously held to this rule, even where the rights of individual parties were intertwined. (fn8)
At the time the legislature passed Public Act 93-176, General Statutes § 51-241-provided that "[o]n the trial of any civil action to a jury, each party may challenge peremptorily three jurors. "The Act did not alter this language, but rather provided the following caveat:
Where the court determines a unity of interest exists, several plaintiffs or several defendants may be considered a single party for the purpose of making challenges, or the court may allow additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly. For the purpose of this section, a "unity of interest" means that the interests of the several plaintiffs or of the several defendants are substantially similar. (fn9)
The statute dealing with additional challenges when alternate jurors are selected was similarly amended. (fn10)
The legislative history suggests that the Act was intended to correct the problem of extremely lengthy jury selections and to address the unfairness that occurs when one party with a limited number of challenges is overwhelmed by multi le parties joining together in the exercise of peremptory challenges to allow only "favorable" jurors to be seated. The legislation is, at least in part, a belated response to Mourison v. Hansen's rejection of the majority rule providing peremptory challenges to each side "except where their interests are diverse or antagonistic."(fn11) Unfortunately, the legislative history does not address the conflicting reasoning of the Mourison decision.
The legislative history does attempt to address the interpretation of the new standard. That attempt is flawed, however,. by the legislature's stated understanding that its action was intended to "bring Connecticut into line with the practice in 49 other states and the federal government," (fn12) where there is, in fact, little consistency in the language or application of 'the various statutes dealing...
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