Labor Relations and Employment Law: Developments in Connecticut in 1994
| Pages | 313 |
| Publication year | 2021 |
69 CBJ 313. Labor Relations and Employment Law: Developments in Connecticut in 1994
The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CCHRO)dominated the labor and employment law agenda in 1994. Issues involving CCHRO and employment discrimination claims in general were the primary topics of discussion amongst the labor and employment bar, from the implementation of an initial administrative screening procedure (the "Merit Assessment Review" program) designed to eliminate "frivolous" or "meritless" claims to several significant court decisions affecting the rights of, and damages available to, those individuals who successfully proved that discrimination had occurred. This article will briefly examine these issues, as well as some of the other noteworthy 1994 labor and employment related decisions of this Connecticut Supreme Court, Appellate Court, Superior Court and the State Board of Labor Relations. The article will also address the Merit Assessment Review program and identify some of the other legislation enacted in 1994 affecting the labor and employment law arena.
The most important Supreme Court decisions were actually released in January of1995, but the subject matter and the possible outcome were such a hot topic last year that they merit inclusion in this annual survey The two companion decisions, Bridgeport Hospital v CCHRO, (fn1) and Fenn Manufacturing v CCHR0, (fn2) held that
the CCHRO is not authorized to award compensatory damages and attorney's fees for violations of the state law prohibiting employment discrimination, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(1). The decisions will have significant impact, because the CCHRO has been awarding compensatory damages and attorney's fees to successful complainants for years.
The CCHRO claimed authority to award such damages under C.G.S. §46a-86(a), which allows the agency to determine whether a discriminatory practice has occurred and to "take such affirmative action as ... will effectuate the purposes of this chapter" in response to findings of discrimination. The CCHRO argued that the "affirmative action" language in the statute was sufficiently broad to permit them to fashion any remedies necessary to combat discriminatory employment practices, including compensatory damages and attorney's fees. In a decision written by Justice Katz, the Supreme Court, relying on the language of the statute and intent of the legislature, found instead that the CCHRO was limited to other remedies, notably back pay awards, reinstatement and hiring.
The Court carefully examined the language of § 46a-86 to determine the legislative intent behind the remedy provision. Subsection (a) of § 46a-86 contains the "affirmative action language upon which the CCHRO based its position. Subsection (b) specifically refers to discriminatory employment practices, identifying precise remedies including hiring, reinstatement, and up to two years of back pay. Subsection (c) allows compensatory damages and attorney's fees in certain specified discrimination cases, notably excluding all statutes covering employment discrimination. Subsection (d) provides a damage remedy in discriminatory credit practice cases. The Court determined that § .46a-86 restricted the scope of damages depending upon the discriminatory practice at issue. If the "affirmative action" language of § 46a-86(a) were meant to include compensatory damages and attorney's fees, then express mention of them inspections (c) and (d) would be superfluous. Because basic rules of statutory construction prohibit such a result, the Court found that the "express exclusion of [employment discrimination] from §46a-86(c) and (d) evidences [the legislature's] intent not to authorize compensatory damages ...and attorney's fees . . . " in discriminatory employment cases under § 46a-60. (fn3) Thus, the Court clearly limited the scope of available damages in § 46a-60 employment discrimination cases brought before the CCHRO.
The Court, however, left open the question of whether employment discrimination might also violate Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-58, for which compensatory damages and attorney's fees are expressly available. Section 46a-58(a) states:
It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section for any person to subject, or cause to be subjected, any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States, on account of religion, national origin, alienage, color, race, sex, blindness or physical disability.
Section 46a-58 is specifically cited in § 46a-86(c), which permits compensatory damages and reasonable attorneys sees for certain types of discrimination. The CCHRO argued that it would be a violation of the equal protection clause of the State Constitution to disallow compensatory damages and attorney's fees to complainants alleging discrimination on the basis of mental disability, a class not covered by § 46a-58 and the claim at issue in Bridgeport Hospital. The Court failed to address the CCHRO's constitutional argument involving § 46a-58because the underlying issues were not adequately briefed. The Court found that the CCHRO's argument presumed that § 46a-58 even applied to employment cases. Interestingly, however, the Court seemed to leave the door open for the argument to be made that a violation of employment laws is also a violation of § 46a-58, for which compensatory damages and attorney's fees would be available.
If the Court were to decide that a violation of employment laws is also a violation of §46a-58, then, presumably, victims of employment discrimination could avoid the negative results of Bridgeport and Fenn by bringing such claims under § 46a-58 and obtaining compensatory damages and attorneys fees via § 46a-58s inclusion in § 46a-86(c). Alternatively, the Court might determine that the "omission of § 46a-60 from § 46a-86(c) reflects the legislature's intent that §46a-58 not pertain to employment claims," making compensatory damages and attorney's fees permanently unavailable in any CCHRO employment discrimination cases. (fn4) This argument will undoubtedly be raised in an employment discrimination case at the next available opportunity.
Another employment discrimination case decided by the Supreme Court last year was procedural in nature. Injoo v. Capitol Switch, Inc. (fn5) the Connecticut Supreme Court established that federal and state age discrimination laws do not impose an ad
ministrative exhaustion requirement when a plaintiff elects to pursue the federal age discrimination claim in state court.
The federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) requires an aggrieved party to first file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The party must wait sixty days after filing and obtain a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC before he or she is entitled to pursue an ADEA claim in federal court. In Connecticut, which has its own statute, C.G.S. § 46a-60(a)(1), prohibiting age discrimination in employment, the party is likewise required to file a statement with the state administrative agency, the CCHRO. However, the precise relationship between filing with the CCHRO and subsequent claims filed in state court had yet to be defined.
The plaintiff, Joseph Joo, had worked for the defendant employer Capitol Switch from1962 until his termination on May 16, 1988, when he was fifty-three years of age. In September of 1988, the plaintiff filed a timely age discrimination complaint with the CCHRO. In February of 1990, before the CCHRO had reached a decision on his claim, Joo filed a complaint in state court, alleging violations of the ADEA as well as breach of contract and common law claims. In February of 1991, the CCHRO determined that there was no reasonable cause to support Mr.Joo's claim of age discrimination, and denied his motion for reconsideration. The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim in state court, which was granted.
On appeal, the defendant employer conceded that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required before an ADEA complaint may be filed in federal court, but argued that once a person decides to pursue an ADEA claim on the state level, he or she is bound by the statute to complete the state administrative process. The Court, in an unanimous five Justice opinion, disagreed.
The Connecticut Supreme Court primarily based its decision on numerous federal cases which hold that Section 633(b) of the ADEA (the provision which grants concurrent administrative jurisdiction to state agencies) does not impose a state administrative exhaustion requirement on federal court actions. The Court found, rather, that Section 633(b) requires only that the action be filed with the state agency at least sixty (60). days prior to instituting a private action in federal court. The Court noted, in addition, that the U.S. Supreme Court had established that
federal courts are not bound by state administrative decisions regarding ADEA claims; otherwise a defendant employer would always be able to raise a collateral estoppel defense, thereby limiting federal jurisdiction whenever a state has a similar age discrimination statute. Thus, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that the purpose of 633(b) is to give a state administrative agency limited opportunity to resolve age discrimination complaints without infringing upon a complainant's right to pursue a private civil action. These decisions are consistent with analogous provisions of Title VIL and the Court determined that, in the absence of contrary precedent...
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