Labor Relations and Employment Law: Developments in Connecticut in 1993
| Pages | 193 |
| Publication year | 2021 |
68 CBJ 193. Labor Relations and Employment Law: Developments in Connecticut In 1993
Comprehensive reform of Connecticut's workers' compensation system represented the most significant labor and employment law development in 1993. While the legislature was busy revamping the workers' compensation system, and to a lesser extent, Connecticut's unemployment compensation laws, the courts continued to grapple with existing statutory and judicially created causes of action stemming from the employeremployee relationship. This article will briefly examine some of the more noteworthy 1993 labor and employment law related decisions of the Connecticut Supreme Court, Appellate Court, Superior Court and the State Board of Labor Relations. The article will also identify some of the other legislation, in addition to the workers'compensation and unemployment compensation revisions, impacting on labor and employment law issues.
The most significant labor and employment law decision of the Supreme Court in 1993 was Genovese v. GaUo Wine Merchants, Inc. (fn1) In a 4-1 decision, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an employee's statutory cause of action for retaliatory discharge, pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 31-290a, is -precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, because of the employee's prior unsuccessful submission of a related'claim to arbitration. The decision is also a case of first impression involving an appellate courfs interpretation of Connecticut General Statutes § 31-51bb. The result of the Court's decision is that discharged employees subject to arbitration will be guaranteed "two bites of the apple" where they can also allege an independent statutory cause of action. Although the case involved a § 31-290a lawsuit, the Court's rationale also applies to other causes of action. (fn2)
The plaintiff in Genovese claimed that when he attempted to return to work he was terminated allegedly because he had been receiving workers' compensation benefits. The employer believed that the employee had voluntarily quit based upon his request for payment of accrued vacation and personal time, and therefore disputed the claimed termination. The union filed a it grievance on behalf of the employee and the grievance was submitted to final and binding arbitration in accordance with the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The issue at arbitration was whether the employee voluntarily quit or was unjustly terminated. (fn3) The arbitrator ultimately denied the grievance,finding that the employee voluntarily quit his job. Neither the employer nor the employee sought to confirm, modify, or vacate the award. (fn4)
Subsequent to receiving the final arbitration decision, the employee filed a separate action in Superior Court maintaining that he had been unlawfully discharged in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 31-290a, which prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an employee because the employee has filed a claim for or is receiving workers' compensation benefits. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the arbitrator had previously determined that the plaintiff had voluntarily quit his job, the plaintiff should be precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating the issue of a wrongful discharge under § 31-290a. The trial court granted the employer's motion.
On appeal, the Supreme Court first reviewed its prior decision in Kolenberg v. Board of Education, (fn5) and how that decision was subsequently affected by the legislature's passage of Connecticut General Statutes § 31-51bb, which states as follows:
No employee shall be denied the ri lit to pursue,. in a court of competent jurisdiction, a cause oXIction arising under the state or federal constitution or under a state statute solely because the employee is covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. Nothing in this section shall be construed to give an employee the right to pursue a cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction for breach of any provision of a collective bargaining agreement or other claims dependent upon the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.
Section 31-51bb was specifically enacted in 1988 by the General Assembly in response to the Supreme Court's Kolenberg decision. In Kolenberg the court held that "an employee's failure to exhaust grievance and arbitration procedures available under a collective bargaining agreement deprived the court of jurisdiction over a cause of action arising from an employment relationship." (fn6)
After reviewing the specific language of § 31-51bb and the legislative history behind its enactment, the Court held that "an employee who does not exhaust the grievance procedures established in a collective bargaining agreement may pursue a cause of action in the [S]uperior [C]ourt if the cause of action is premised on an independent statutory claim." (fn7) A contrary conclusion would effectively "deny such an employee the right to pursue a statutory cause of action because of the existence of a collective bargaining agreement." (fn8) In this case, of course, the employee did not fail to exhaust the grievance procedures before filing his § 31-290a claim but rather he did, albeit unsuccessfully, invoke these procedures. Therefore, the defendant argued that § 31-51bb was not even applicable to this case. Instead, the defendant maintained that the applicable issue was whether or not the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the plaintiffs cause of action because in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the plaintiff had already "litigated the issue of whether he was unjustly discharged or voluntarily quit. (fn9)
The Court rejected the defendant's argument, concluding that the adverse determination in the plaintiff's arbitration proceeding was not entitled to preclusive effect with regard to his statutory § 31-290a claim. First, the Court found that the legislative history of § 31-51bb supported the conclusion that its enactment was not designed to preclude employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement from pursuing a statutory cause of action despite an adverse determination in a grievance
or arbitration proceeding. (fn10) Although arbitrators may have the competence or expertise to decide legal issues, the scope of the issue submitted to the arbitrator may limit the arbitrator's ability to consider certain factual and legal questions.
A second reason why the Court held that preclusion was not warranted in this case involves the remedial nature of § 31-290a and the broad remedies available in a superior court action under that statute. The availability of such remedies reflected a "legislative preference for a full judicial determination of an employee's section 31-290a claim." (fn11) As a third reason for its holding, the Court noted that an arbitration proceeding may not always prove to be the most beneficial forum for the employee, since the union's interest and objective in an arbitration proceeding may not always be the same as the employee's.
The fourth and final reason provided by the Court involved the distinction between arbitration proceedings and judicial proceedings. Essentially, the Court reasoned that the legislature's enactment of § 31-51bb constituted a determination that the less formal fact-finding procedures of arbitration constitute a "less effective forum for the final resolution of statutory claims." (fn12)
Although the Court acknowledged that its "conclusion in this case may seem inconsistent with our traditional respect for the integrity of grievance and arbitration proceedings," (fn13) it determined that its decision may actually encourage the use of arbitration because the employee will know that he or she may not be losing the opportunity to go to court by first choosing arbitration. (fn14) Finally, the Court indicated that if its decision results in an unfair burden on employers, the legislature could revisit the issue and amend § 31-51bb accordingly.
Justice Berdon dissented from the majority view that section 31-51bb permits employees who voluntarily and actively participate in an arbitration proceeding to subsequently pursue an independent judicial remedy on the same subject matter. He noted that nothing in the plain language of § 31-51bb permits an employee "to elect to pursue a collective bargaining remedy such as arbitration in the present action, and then ignore the
outcome." (fn15) Further, justice Berdon noted that while the legislature enacted § 31-51bb to overrule the Court's Kolenberg decision, there is no evidence that it intended to overturn established principles of collateral estoppel, yet this is precisely what the majority opinion accomplishes. Finally, he expressed concern regarding the constitutionality of § 31-51bb given its interpretation by the majority and the impact that this decision could have upon the "delicate procedural balance for resolving grievances between organized labor and management."
Whether or not the majority's decision does in fact alter this delicate balance is something that practitioners will have to consider in the future. For the moment, however, employers will have to be aware that obtaining a successful arbitration decision does not necessarily resolve all of the issues surrounding a termination or other adverse employment decision.
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to address a number of issues regarding the hotly debated topic of "mental" injuries under the Connecticut's Workers' Compensation Act in Crochiere v. Board of Education of the Toum of Enfield. (fn16) The plaintiff...
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