The Supreme Court Reverses Itself on Automobile Searches
| Publication year | 1992 |
| Pages | 21 |
61 J. Kan. Bar Assn. February, 21 (1992). THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES ITSELF ON AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
Vol. 61, February, 1992
Copyright (c) 1992 by the Kansas Bar Association; Mike Jilka
I. Introduction
In a decision reflecting the U.S. Supreme Court's shifting stance on criminal procedure, the Court set forth a new rule this past term to govern searches of containers found in automobiles. [FN1] Under the previous rule, if a police officer had probable cause to search an entire automobile, the officer could open and search containers found in the course of the search without obtaining a search warrant. [FN2] However, if that same police officer had probable cause to search a particular container within the automobile, the officer had to obtain a search warrant before searching it. [FN3] California v. Acevedo eliminates this dichotomy, holding that police may make a warrantless search of an automobile and the containers within it if they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is located within the automobile. [FN4] This article explores the doctrinal foundations of the automobile search cases and analyzes the Court's decision in Acevedo.
A. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [FN5] The Fourth Amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and made fully applicable against the states in 1961. [FN6] Kansas interprets its equivalent of the Fourth Amendment [FN7] as having the identical scope as the Fourth Amendment. [FN8]
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require searches to be conducted pursuant to warrants issued by judicial officers, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. [FN9] This interpretation recognizes the danger of placing unchecked authority in the hands of executive officers and the importance of the separation of powers:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. [FN10] B. The Automobile Exception
One of the specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement is the "automobile exception," first recognized in Carroll v. United States. [FN11] In Carroll, government agents conducted a warrantless search of an automobile and seized contraband liquor. The Court held the automobile could be searched without a warrant. [FN12] In the Court's view:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrrant is sought. [FN13] The Court held the standard required to sustain the legality*22 of a warrantless automobile search is probable cause. [FN14]
In subsequent opinions, the Court explained why automobiles are treated differently from other private property. First, the inherent mobility of an automobile makes it impractical for law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant. Second, the reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile is diminished due to its configuration, use, and regulation. [FN15]
In United States v. Chadwick, [FN16] the Court addressed the question of whether federal agents needed a search warrant to open a locked footlocker they had lawfully seized as it was being loaded into the trunk of an automobile. In Chadwick, Amtrak railroad officials in San Diego noticed the defendants load a brown footlocker onto a train bound for Boston. The officials were suspicious because the footlocker appeared to be unusually heavy and was leaking a powder often used to mask the odor of illegal narcotics. The officials notified federal agents, who informed their counterparts in Boston of their suspicions. When the defendants arrived in Boston, federal agents were present and used a trained police dog to detect marijuana in the footlocker. As the defendants left the train station and were loading the footlocker into the trunk of one of the defendant's automobile, federal agents arrested them. The footlocker was taken to the Federal Building in Boston, where agents opened it and searched it an hour and a half later. The agents neither obtained a search warrant nor the defendants' consent to the search.
The government did not argue...
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