§403 Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons

• Library: Evidence Restated Deskbook (2021 Ed.)

§403 Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

Notes

This section states Missouri's caselaw regarding "legal relevance," a principle explained by the Southern District in Pittman v. Ripley County Memorial Hospital, 318 S.W.3d 289, 293–94 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010) (citations omitted), as follows:

Fundamental to the Missouri law of evidence is the rule that evidence must be both logically and legally relevant in order to be admissible. Evidence is inadmissible if it fails to satisfy either prong of this bifurcated relevancy standard.

Evidence is logically relevant if it tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence, or if it tends to corroborate evidence which itself is relevant and bears on the principal issue of the case.

Legal relevance, on the other hand, requires the balancing of the probative value of the proffered evidence against its prejudicial effect on the jury. Stated another way, legal relevance is determined by weighing the probative value of the evidence against its costs, including unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness. Thus, logically relevant evidence is excluded if its costs outweigh its benefits. Ultimately, the determination of whether evidence is legally relevant rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Consequently, if evidence is erroneously admitted or excluded, we will reverse only if the error results in substantial and obvious injustice. (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)

The trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence otherwise admissible when the dangers likely to result from admission are "wholly disproportionate to the value and usefulness of the offered evidence." State v. Mayes, 63 S.W.3d 615, 631 (Mo. banc 2001) (quoting State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 848 (Mo. banc 1998) (quoting Conley v. Kaney, 250 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. 1952))). Generally, the greater the tendency of the evidence to prove or disprove a material issue of the case, the more likely that the dangers will be outweighed and the evidence admitted. See, e.g.:

· State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 510–11 (Mo. banc 1994) (affirmed preclusion of proof that the victim's ex-husband had motive and opportunity to commit the homicide, absent any evidence directly connecting him to the crime), overruled on other grounds by Joy v. Morrison, 254 S.W.3d 885, 889 (Mo. banc 2008)

· Egelhoff v. Holt, 875 S.W.2d 543, 549–50 (Mo. banc 1994) (not an abuse of discretion to admit a videotape of the plaintiff dancing and playing pool one and one-half years after she was injured, which was introduced to show her range of motion and flexibility contrary to her asserted disability, even though the videotape depicted the plaintiff briefly lifting shirt, zipping and unzipping her pants, and taking her bra off from under her shirt, when her body was not exposed)

· State v. Anderson, 76 S.W.3d 275, 277 (Mo. banc 2002) (it was an abuse of discretion to introduce a magazine brochure in the defendant's possession that advertised semi-automatic pistols as evidence that he was familiar with a handgun like that described by the victim because the brochure had minimal probative value and was unfairly prejudicial)

· Farr v. State, 408 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (no abuse of discretion to allow replay to the jury of recording of the defendant's drug sale so that the officer could explain locations involved; it is within the trial court's discretion to determine when cumulative evidence should stop)

· Hays v. State, 360 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (a witness's testimony that she was fearful about coming forward against the defendant was logically and legally relevant because credibility of witnesses is always a relevant issue in a lawsuit; it explained why she was visibly nervous while testifying; and the probative value of explaining her demeanor and thereby establishing her credibility while testifying far outweighs the possibilities of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, and cumulativeness)

· Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 902–03 (Mo. banc 2013) (not an abuse of discretion to admit a reenactment video presented by the State at trial in a death penalty case—even though the defendant argued that it wasn't accurate because the officers in the reenactment were not the same heights as the victim and the defendant and, therefore, the video was deceptive and misleading—because the State clarified that the officers in the video were not the same heights as the victim officer and the defendant, and the exhibit was supported by the evidence adduced at trial)

Evidence of third-person guilt

The admission of evidence relating to another's guilt is subject to Missouri's "direct connection rule," which was explained by the Supreme Court of Missouri as follows:

To be admissible, evidence that another person had an opportunity or motive for committing the crime for which a defendant is being tried must tend to prove that the other person committed some act directly connecting him with the crime. The evidence must be of the kind that directly connects the other person with the corpus delicti and tends clearly to point to someone other than the accused as the guilty person. Disconnected and remote acts, outside the crime itself cannot be separately proved for such purpose; and evidence which can have no other effect than to cast a bare suspicion on another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible.

State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 848 (Mo. banc 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also State v. Rivers, 439 S.W.3d 862, 865–66 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). The direct connection rule "is constitutional because it prevents confusion of the issues and reduces the potential to mislead the jury." State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 514 (Mo. banc 2011).

Appeal to emotions

Evidence "calculated to procure the jury's beneficence" or otherwise unduly suggestive of an improper basis for decision, commonly an emotional one, poses the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Hampton, 607 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980). But the likelihood that evidence will have an emotional impact on the fact-finder does not, in itself, preclude admission; the prejudice must outweigh its probative value. See State v. Kaiser, 139 S.W.3d 545, 558 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) ("[T]he mere fact that . . . evidence [of abuse and neglect] is revolting and harmful to the defense does not justify its exclusion."); State v. McDaniel, 254 S.W.3d 144, 147 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008) ("Probative value of evidence that defendant called victim a nigger was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect; use of word was highly relevant to demonstrate defendant's acute animosity toward victim and clear motive and intent to do harm."); State v. Mort, 321 S.W.3d...